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Abstract; How New is New Loyalism?
This thesis provides an analysis of the manifestos of two political parties 
in Northern Ireland. These parties are the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) 
and the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), which is now defunct.
These parties came to prominence during the peace process that led to the 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 and both were termed new 
loyalist. The phrase new loyalism suggests a novel alternative to the 
pessimistic and exclusivist ethos of traditional loyalist expression as 
exemplified by lan Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). However, 
a brief survey of the history of labourism in the North-East of Ireland 
reveals that there have been previous attempts to form a political party 
with a social democratic manifesto, an agenda that could supplant 
sectarianism as the main organising principle of Protestant working class 
politics. Some of these movements have emerged from within the same 
loyalist paramilitary groupings who were responsible for the formation of 
the new loyalist parties.
The purpose of the research on which this thesis was based was to 
ascertain if the PUP and the UDP represented a genuinely new and 
different political direction in loyalism, which could outlast uncertainty 
over constitutional matters. A framework to test the parties was 
constructed from two separate literature reviews. The first was a review of 
literature defining unionism, loyalism and new loyalism. The second 
considered the academic debate on reconciling differentiated citizenship 
rights within a polity. Data was then collected on the development and 
manifestos of the two parties and qualitative interviews were conducted 
with fifteen members of the PUP.
The thesis concludes that the parties were both affected by a number of 
external factors, in particular the growing disaffection of unionists with 
the Agreement. However, it must also be concluded that neither party 
developed an agenda that transcended sectarianism.
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with evaluating the concept of new loyalism in the context of 
Northern Irish politics. The term new loyalism is associated with two political parties 
the PUP (Progressive Unionist Party) and the UDP (Ulster Democratic Party). The 
purpose of the thesis is to evaluate the agenda and actions of these parties and provide 
conclusions as to whether these parties could be described as genuinely innovative 
and therefore whether there is anything actually new about new loyalism.
New loyalism can be defined as a distinctive political movement within Ulster 
loyalism. Loyalism is a unionist political ideology, which means that loyalists believe 
that Northern Ireland is a legitimate part of the United Kingdom and that this 
constitutional status should be preserved. However, loyalist ideology dictates that this 
union is constantly under threat. These threats come partly from the Irish Republic. 
Irish irredentism is seen as one of the main factors that has encouraged Irish 
nationalists living within the borders of Northern Ireland to agitate, sometimes 
violently, for the unification of Ireland as an island. Successive British Governments 
at Westminster have also been defined as a threat. This is because they are unwilling 
to unequivocally guarantee the future of the union, and have kept the province of 
Northern Ireland at a distance, despite a history of sacrifice and allegiance to the 
British Crown by the loyalist people. Loyalism is also threatened by traitors who are 
supposedly unionist, but who fail to understand that, in order to survive, albeit 
precariously, loyalism cannot make any compromises or concessions to Irish 
nationalism.
Loyalism as an ideology has been developing in the North-East of Ireland since the 
Plantation of Ulster in the Seventeenth Century. Loyalists connect key events of this 
period, such as the massacre of settlers by Catholic natives in 1641, and battles 
between the forces of William of Orange and Kings James II in 1688 and 1690 to 
current events. The continued references to this historical period, the equation of 
loyal and disloyal in Northern Ireland with Protestant and Catholic, and an emphasis 
on contractarian relationships between individuals and the government, can make 
loyalism appear as no more than an anachronism within the modern British state.
However, the components of loyalism - pessimism, vulnerability, hostility to Irish 
nationalism and suspicion of change - persist within an increasingly secular Northern 
Ireland, because loyalism provides an immediate 'common-sense' explanation of the 
conflict between unionism and nationalism.
Given that loyalism is based on intransigence and pessimism, it would follow that 
new loyalism as an ideology would exhibit more confidence about the merits of 
change and the future of the union. The definition of new loyalism used in this thesis 
does take this as a starting point. New loyalism is taken to mean a style of politics 
that is designed to secure the union by enhancing the quality of life of all those who 
live within it. This involves a number of policies that make it distinct from loyalism.
Firstly, Traditional loyalism interprets the history of the province as one of a loyal 
Protestant people seeking to defend themselves against a horde of Catholic rebels. 
New loyalism rests on a different history, constructed from events leading up to and 
after the establishment of Northern Ireland in 1921. According to this interpretation 
of the past, nationalists were deliberately excluded from social, economic and 
political life and the emergence of conflict became inevitable. Therefore, it would 
follow that negotiating with nationalists and searching for ways to make Northern 
Ireland more inclusive is the best way of preventing further violence. In contrast to 
traditional loyalism, involving the British and Irish governments in such negotiations, 
would be seen as positive and constructive, rather than inherently dangerous.
Secondly, traditional loyalism depicts political and cultural identity in Northern 
Ireland as a binary split between Protestant and Catholic, British and Irish and, 
crucially, loyal and disloyal. Therefore a new loyalist approach to identity would be 
one which sought to break these automatic connections.
Thirdly, loyalist politicians have often addressed socio-economic issues, rather than 
just constitutional ones. However, they have connected this style of politics to the 
binary split of loyal and disloyal, meaning that material resources became part of the 
battle between loyalists and rebels. In this arena, as in constitutional matters, loyalists 
had to be dominant because the alternative was defeat and, eventually, obliteration. 
Conversely new loyalist politicians would use politics based on material need and the
distribution of resources as a means of creating alliances across the religious cleavage, 
rather than reinforcing it.
From these factors a definition of new loyalism can be offered. It is a style of politics 
that demonstrates optimism about the future of the union and also demonstrates 
confidence about dealing with the key actors in any round of negotiations on the 
subject, the nationalist community and the British and Irish governments. It is also a 
style of politics that is committed to eroding the binary split between loyal and 
disloyal and to encouraging a commitment to forging cross-community alliances 
based on social and economic issues.
This definition is the basis of the positive model of new loyalism used in this thesis. 
As will be outlined in the following chapter, two models have been constructed of 
new loyalism, one positive and one negative, as evaluative tools. One more 
component was added to the positive model of new loyalism, which was a stable level 
of electoral support. In chapter four, the impact of prison on the paramilitaries who 
became new loyalist politicians is examined. Being imprisoned by the state they had 
sworn to defend had a profound impact on UVF members such as David Ervine and 
Billy Hutchinson, who would go on to be elected to the power-sharing assembly set 
up after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. They underwent a 
personal journey of transformation. They had joined an organisation that sought to 
defend Northern Ireland's constitutional by any means necessary, including the 
murder of Catholic civilians, and moved towards finding common cause with 
republican prisoners and to committing themselves to the search for a peaceful 
constitutional settlement that would earn the acquiescence of nationalists. However, 
the definition of new loyalism is based on it being a political movement, not a few 
instances of individual epiphany. Electoral support serves as an indicator that the 
message of optimism and openness has been accepted by those who did not follow the 
path of paramilitary organisation, prison, politics taken by key figures in the UDP and 
PUP.
The purpose of the research was to evaluate the novelty of new loyalism as 
represented by the UDP and PUP The first three chapters of this thesis are concerned
with creating a framework for this evaluation. The next three chapters deal with the 
testing of the UDP and the PUP within this framework.
Chapter one outlines the hypothesis guiding this work, which is that new loyalism 
contains a number of internal contradictions that will cause it to falter. This chapter 
also details the methodology used to construct this thesis.
The second chapter is the first of two literature reviews and provides an overview of 
existing academic definitions of unionism, loyalism and new loyalism. This literature 
review was an essential component of the methodology because it aided the 
development of definitions of both loyalism and new loyalism.
The third chapter is also a literature review, dealing with theoretical and practical 
attempts to reconcile civic citizenship with ethnic division. The end point of this 
chapter is the work of Norman Porter. 1 Porter directly addresses the issue of civic 
citizenship in Northern Ireland and his aim is to convince other unionists that 
improving the quality of life within the union is essential to maintain the legitimacy of 
the constitutional link between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Porter's 
discussion of a civic unionism therefore clearly resonates with the definition given 
here of new loyalism and thus it also fits into the methodology by aiding the 
construction of a critically rigorous positive model of new loyalism, by which any 
contenders for the title could be tested.
The fourth chapter outlines a number of projects within unionist politics that could be 
said to share similarities with new loyalism. These are Terence O'Neill's belief in the 
use of civil society to reconcile Catholics to Northern Ireland; the Northern Ireland 
Labour Party's attempt to attract more Catholic voters with a programme based on 
redistribution and social justice; and the first political initiatives undertaken by the 
two main loyalist paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Volunteer Force 
(UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). Identifying the reasons that these 
projects failed to achieve their aims or to endure, is useful in providing an outline of 
the pitfalls involved in undertaking a commitment to reach out to nationalists.
' Porter, N Rethinking Unionism (Belfast) Blackstaff 1996 and The Elusive Quest: Reconcilliation in 
Northern Ireland (Belfast) Blackstaff 2003
Analysing paramilitary initiatives prior to the PUP and UDP is also necessary because 
it helps establish what, if anything, is new about these parties.
The fifth chapter provides the background to the entry of the two new loyalist parties 
to the peace process. The chapter narrows in focus to the collapse of the UDP. In 
testing the UDP against the models of new loyalism, it will be argued that the UDP 
corresponded more closely to the negative model. This model suggests that new 
loyalism is merely another manifestation of loyalist disaffection with nationalists, 
other unionists and the British and Irish Governments, given a veneer of novelty by 
debates about identity. In the case of the UDP their commitment to a civic Ulster 
identity was not even new in the context of political action undertaken by the UDA. 
In terms of testing the hypothesis the UDP seem to confirm that they failed to resolve 
the contradictions between the ethnic and the civic in their vision of Ulster 
nationalism.
The sixth chapter focuses exclusively on the PUP. In testing the PUP two things 
become apparent. The first is that in refining its view of social class by using the 
concept of the community, the PUP has developed significantly from the original 
actions of the UVF. The second is that the PUP have maintained a commitment to the 
Good Friday Agreement and to negotiating with all relevant actors, even though this 
is not an easy position to sell to a loyalist electorate that fails to see what benefits 
have been delivered by the peace process. However, in terms of the hypothesis, the 
PUP must also address an internal contradiction, which is between their commitment 
to replacing sectarianism with politics based on material need and their sectarian 
analysis of how social goods, such as housing, are distributed in Northern Ireland.
CHAPTER ONE: HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY
1.1 Overview
The concept of new loyalism remains an under-researched area of the politics of 
Northern Ireland. Studies of the groupings that are associated with this term, the 
Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Ulster Democratic Party have usually been 
fitted into more general studies of unionist responses to the peace process.' This 
literature is by no means comprehensive. Given the collapse of the UDP in November 
2001 there is also a need to question the relevance of the term, new loyalist, in relation 
to the groups that have ostensibly developed to replace the UDP's political role.
The term new loyalism refers to a style of politics associated with the political 
representatives of loyalist paramilitaries. Ruane and Todd offer a definition of this 
ideology.
The post-ceasefire period has seen the emergence of a new loyalist politics. The 
'new loyalists' stress the shared and equal deprivation of all working class people 
under the Stormont regime and the need for a re-alignment of politics on class 
lines. They also endorse power-sharing in Northern Ireland.
The Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) ceasefire of 13th October 1994 
marked the public entry of the PUP and UDP to the peace process. During this period, 
as McGarry and O'Leary recognise, "the PUP and UDP emerged from obscurity, 
indicating remorse for the killing of innocent civilians carried out by their comrades 
and displaying more political sophistication than they had previously been 
accredited". 3 It was these qualities that led to the popular perception that this was a
1 See for example Cochrane, F Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism Since the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement (Cork) Cork University Press 2000
2 Ruane, J & Todd, J The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power. Conflict and Emancipation 
(Cambridge) Cambridge University Press 1996, pi05
3 McGarry, J and O'Leary, B Explaining Northern Ireland (Oxford) Blackwell 1995, p385
different development in loyalist politics. This prompted the branding of these parties 
as new loyalist rather than, simply, loyalist.
The comrades referred to are the most enduring loyalist paramilitary organisations in 
Northern Ireland, respectively the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster 
Defence Association (UDA). These organisations both began with a purely military 
brief but political initiatives have surfaced from within these organisations since the 
early 1970s. PUP and UDP members saw themselves as the heirs to this political 
activity, much of which they saw as centred on their community, the loyalist working 
class.
The purpose of this work has been to ask the question, how new is new loyalism? This 
is far from a descriptive task. Price, for example, has demonstrated that elements of 
class-consciousness and attempts to promote non-sectarian politics have previously 
surfaced in the history of the province. 4 By asking what is new, and by examining the 
legacy of similar political directions taken within unionism in general and paramilitary 
organisations in particular, it can be established if new loyalism is a coherent and 
progressive force, or if it contains contradictory impulses that will cause it to falter.
The main product of this study, therefore, is the construction of a comprehensive 
definition of the concept of new loyalism and a critical appraisal of the political force 
and its novelty. Undertaking this task entailed three main objectives. The first was to 
analyse whether the social-democratic or socialist programmes proposed by these 
groups were capable of transcending the power of sectarianism. The second was an 
assessment of whether elements of redistributive social justice and identity politics 
could be forged into a coherent agenda and pursued in the face of uncertainty about the 
constitution. The third task set was to examine the impact of this agenda on the parties' 
proclaimed community, the Protestant working class.
Price, J 'Political change and the Protestant working class' Race and Class 1995 Vol.37, No.l pp57-70
1.2 Literature and Background
Much work on unionism and loyalism has sought to undo perceptions of Protestants in 
Northern Ireland as a monolithic, homogenous community. Bew, Gibbon and 
Patterson argue that in the period before the suspension of Stormont the dominant 
'populist' politicians in the Unionist Party managed class tensions by successfully 
underpinning the state with a sectarian ethos. 5 This created the image of a hegemonic 
power bloc, an image that obscured the progressive impulses within working class 
political expression. According to Bew and Norton:
The first priority of the populists was the reproduction of a "good" relationship 
between the Protestant masses and the unionist bourgeoisie to the visible 
exclusion of the Catholic population, irrespective of any British government 
policy that may have hindered or obstructed this strategy.6
McAuley and McCormack state that:
Before 1969 the Protestant working class had been encouraged to believe that its 
right to exist and its livelihood were guaranteed by the existence of the Stormont 
Parliament, the Unionist Party and the Orange Order. Thus to oppose or even 
criticise the state was to display evidence of disloyalty. 7
However they do not see this as a static situation, arguing instead that this allegiance 
was unstable and had to be worked for.
Walker believes that the manner in which the Northern Irish State developed
5 Bew, P Gibbon, P and Patterson, H The State in Northern Ireland 1921-1972: Political Forces and 
Social Classes (Manchester) Manchester University Press 1979, Northern Ireland 1921-1996: Political 
Forces and Social Classes (London) Serif 1996
6 Bew, P & Norton, C 'The Unionist state and the outdoor relief riots of 1932' Economic and Social 
Review 1978-9 Vol.10 p258 See also Norton, C 'Creating jobs, manufacturing unity: Ulster Unionists 
and Mass Unemployment 1922-1934' Contemporary British History Vol.15 No.2 2001 ppl-14
7 McAuley, JW and McCormack, C The Protestant working class and the state in Northern Ireland since 
1930: a problematic relationship' from Hutton, S and Stewart, P Ireland's Histories: Aspects of State. 
Society and Ideology (London) Routledge 1991 pi22
"established a sectarian political mould which determined labour's minor status as a 
political force". He adds, "labour equivocation on the national question ensured that it 
would play only a peripheral role in the state's politics as long as the issue over-rode all 
others."8 It is the contention of this work that the issues of sectarianism and the national 
question have to be separated. Constitutional uncertainty has certainly marginalized 
parties based on other issues. However, sectarian attitudes and values are not simply 
reliant on constitutional strife.
The labour movement in Ireland, and then Northern Ireland, developed against a 
background of tension and uncertainty about the future of Ireland's union with Great 
Britain. This diverted support from developing social democratic parties. The Northern 
Ireland Labour Party founded in 1924 tried to avoid a stated position on constitutional 
matters. The party formed links with the British Labour Party but, in common with the 
other major parties at Westminster, Labour did not organise in Northern Ireland.
From 1949 the NILP defined itself officially as a unionist party, whilst still trying to 
attract non-unionist support. The party enjoyed its strongest support between 1958 and 
1965, holding four seats at Stormont. This period was one of greater security over the 
status of Northern Ireland and the re-emergence of conflict seems to have been the main 
factor in the dramatic decline of the party. The SDLP and the DUP drew votes away 
from the NILP and another new party, Alliance, appealed to those who did not want to 
vote along constitutional lines. This does not mean, though, that constitutional 
insecurity has been the only debilitating issue for socialist political groups.
Boyle characterises the period 1805-1906 as a relatively peaceful one in the north-east 
of Ireland with a Conservative government in power and plans for home rule sidelined. 
He argues that this created space for working class dissent, in which context the 
Independent Orange Order emerged. By 1905 the I.O.O. had seventy lodges in the east 
of Ulster and the chairman, Lindsay Crawford, had drawn up the Magheramorne
8 Walker, G.S The Politics of Frustration (Manchester) Manchester University Press 1985, p23
9 Boyle, J 'The Belfast Protestant Association and the Independent Orange Order 1901-1910 Irish 
Historical Studies 1962-3 Vol. 13 ppl 17-152
Manifesto as the vehicle for creating a new political party. The manifesto combined 
social campaigning on issues such as tenants' rights with a commitment to developing a 
non-sectarian Irish patriotism. The manifesto proclaimed a new order stood "on the 
banks of the Boyne, not as victors in the fight...but to hold out the right hand of 
fellowship to those who, while worshipping at other shrines are yet our countrymen". 10
This manifesto caused discord in the I.O.O as there were fears it was the first step 
towards committing the new organisation to support for home rule. However it also 
seemed to lead the order away from its roots in the Belfast Protestant Association. The 
association expressed working class dissatisfaction both with the distance of Orange 
and unionist leaders, and the unchecked power of the Catholic Church. Haddick-Flynn 
charts the development of the BPA's public criticism of the unionist leadership from 
heckling politicians for failing to a support a bill for the inspection of convent laundries, 
through to a critique of the unionist and orange leadership as "a wealthy elite, more 
concerned with their own interests than with helping workers". 11
The BPA's first parliamentary candidate, T.H. Sloan stood for election in 1902. Boyle 
describes his campaign as consisting of "attacks on the Ulster "dead-heads", the leaders 
of Ulster unionism who slighted the unionist working man, opposed temperance 
measures, and were generally "soft" on ritualism in the Church of Ireland and the 
menace of Rome." 12 The constitutional issue created a rift in the I.O.O which was 
increased with the return of the Liberal Party to British government. However, the 
I.O.O's move towards a non-sectarian politics was also too radical a departure from the 
nature of the dissent that had prompted the order's foundation.
The dominant ideology detectable in Protestant working class politics is loyalism. 13 
Loyalism is mistrustful of institutional politics and often rests on an antagonistic
10 Quoted by Boyle, J 1962-3 Op. cit. pi34
1 ' Haddick-Flynn, K Orangeism: The Making of a Tradition (Dublin) Wolfhound Press 1999, p316. 
Convent laundries appeared regularly in anti-Catholic pamphlets and were characterised as a site of 
sexual depravity.
12 Boyle, J 1962-3 Op. cit. p!20
13 Todd, J Two traditions in unionist political culture' Irish Political Studies Vol.2 1987, ppl-26
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attitude to the unionist political elite and the British government, which is seen as 
duplicitous. Loyalists are thrown into an alliance with these groups, despite their 
perceived failings, against the force of Irish nationalism. Loyalism expresses itself as 
intransigent resistance to change, because compromise cannot be made with the 
nationalist community. Nationalists are always the 'other' that unionism can be defined 
against. Loyalists seek to defend their British identity, but hostility towards nationalists 
is matched by fear of the intentions of the British Government. This mindset has been 
characterised by McAuley as a discourse of perpetuity that links historical and current 
events to a theme of betrayal by Britain, something which will ultimately lead to the 
reunification of Ireland by stealth. 14
1.3 New Lovalism
The development of new loyalism has its roots in the activities of the UDA and the 
UVF. These organisations were founded for military purposes and paramilitaries had 
characterised themselves as defenders of the state. However, imprisonment by that state 
and the brutalising experience of prison, especially during protests about the removal of 
'special category' status, aided dialogue with republican prisoners. 15 For some loyalist 
prisoners, such as the UVF's original leader Gusty Spence, this led to a dramatic 
reappraisal of who paramilitaries shared interests with and ideas of shared identities and 
socio-economic needs developed.
There was also scope for political activity outside prison. Paramilitaries had played a 
big role in the successful Ulster Workers' Council strike of 1974, which brought down 
the new power-sharing executive. This victory encouraged ideas of community action 
as a means of addressing social issues. Members of the UDA, in particular, immersed 
themselves in these grassroots activities and new constitutional settlements were 
floated with a view to attracting the support of nationalists.
4 McAuley, JW What's New about New Lovalism? Conference paper for the University of Salford 20th 
November 2000
15 Crawford, C Defenders or Criminals? Loyalist Prisoners and Criminalisation (Belfast) Blackstaff 
1999
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Both paramilitary organisations sought to gain an electoral mandate through the 
formation of political parties. However, they made a very poor showing at the polls. 16 
Bruce argues that the reputation of the paramilitaries as racketeers meant they were 
often seen as the oppressors of the community they claimed to represent. l7 
Additionally the paramilitaries were vying for the title of defender with the security 
forces which lessened the credibility of their self-defined role.
In addition to involvement in electoral politics both groups, the UDA in particular, 
became involved in community projects, such as campaigns for improvement in social 
housing. Nelson argues that "community action encouraged people to see divisions in 
terms of the small man/woman against 'the establishment' (from planners to politicians) 
which could often lead to a rather woolly form of populism". 18 This accorded with 
more traditional loyalist attitudes of hostility and dissent. These were tapped into by the 
growing Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) which emerged as the main electoral rival to 
the Ulster Unionists.
The CLMC ceasefire of 1994 was a pivotal moment for paramilitaries who sought 
political influence. The declaration of certainty that the union was safe was a starting 
point from which these actors could positively participate in and support the peace 
process through multi-party talks and public support for the Good Friday Agreement. 
The finality of the ceasefire and statements of remorse minimised the traditional 
'gangster' image of the paramilitary representatives and opened the way for meaningful 
engagement with nationalist politicians. Election to local government for both parties 
and to the Northern Ireland assembly for the PUP, plus the appointment of the UDP
16 The strongest show of support during the 1970s was for Ken Gibson of the VPP. He stood in the 
second general election of 1974 in the constituency of North Belfast and gained 2,600 votes. Under the 
first past the post system this was nowhere enough to win. However, other representatives did get elected 
with less votes in STV elections, for example Hugh Smyth (connected to the UVF) and Glenn Barr (UDA) 
gained seats on the constitutional convention in the 1975 election.
Bruce, S The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Oxford) Oxford University 
Press 1992
1 ft Nelson, S Ulster's Uncertain Defenders (Belfast) Appletree Press 1984, p201
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leader, Gary McMichael, to the Civic Forum, gave the parties a role in the new 
institutional arrangements. The parties also committed themselves to continuing 
grassroots activities, such as political discussion groups within working class 
communities, seeking to create change from the bottom up.
The idea of new loyalism rests on an attempt to ease sectarian division and create a 
secure and legitimate union that enjoys the support of its inhabitants regardless of 
religion. This begins with a critique of the Stormont regime before its suspension in 
1972 as a divisive force that provided marginal superiority over Catholic workers at the 
expense of long term stability or substantial benefit to the working class of either 
community. Additionally, there is a critique of the politics of the DUP as a negative 
force that stifles opportunity for normalised political activity. Leading on from this is a 
belief that the union can be secured by developing political demands based around 
social and economic issues. This would be supplemented by assertions that unionism is 
not about a straightforward split between homogenous national allegiances. Instead 
one could be Irish albeit peculiarly British (as the PUP contend) or a member of the 
community of Ulster which is one of the many regional and national identities evident 
in the United Kingdom (which corresponds to UDP/UPRG) thought). Essentially by 
promoting the union as the basis of a class alliance that stretches from east to west and a 
forum for diverse identities, these parties asserted that the exclusive connection 
between unionism and Protestantism can be broken.
1.4 Hypothesis
The central hypothesis to be tested in this work is that there are a number of tensions or 
contradictory impulses within new loyalism. These tensions would have to be resolved, 
especially if insecurity about the certainty of the union increases. Otherwise new 
loyalist parties would not be able to make any contribution to the creation of a civic 
unionism that would aid the development of normalised politics within Northern 
Ireland.
For new loyalism to be novel it would have to be about more than the emergence of 
material political demands, as emerged in the relative peace of the late 1950s
13
(notwithstanding the IRA's border campaign) and was registered through increased 
support for the Northern Ireland Labour Party. A new loyalist party would have to 
recognise and tackle the sectarian perceptions of how resources, such as housing and 
jobs, are distributed. For new loyalism to be genuinely new, therefore, it must amount 
to more than the expression of traditional loyalist disaffection and antagonism towards 
the unionist hierarchy.
Linked to this is how a new loyalist party would deal with anxiety about the future of 
the union and the sense that unionists were being forced to relinquish too much in the 
new devolved settlement. If new loyalist politicians are to succeed in creating a brand 
of politics that is based on common interests they will have to find a way of channeling 
these anxieties through both institutional and community politics and resist retreating 
into a traditional fear of expansionist nationalist demands.
In essence, the hypothesis that governs this work is that as a defence of the union that 
seeks to accommodate the aspirations of all citizens, new loyalism must mark a 
sophisticated and coherent progression from populist resistance to the unionist 
hierarchy, which has not combated sectarianism. Otherwise, this challenge to ethnic 
division from the 'bottom up' will not be able to develop and maintain support and the 
project could become as discredited as those of reformers within the elite such as 
Terence O'Neil in the 1960s. This challenge could also founder in terms of electoral 
support thus leading the parties to dissolve as the NILP did in the 1970s.
1.5 Methodology
1.5.1 MethodoloRical Issues
At the beginning of this research it was apparent that there were two parties, the PUP 
and the UDP, who could both lay claim to the title of new loyalism. When considering 
the best means to undertake data collection it was acknowledged that the methodology 
must take into account that two separate organisations were being considered. To 
resolve this issue two models of new loyalism were constructed that both parties could 
be tested against individually.
14
As has already been noted, over the course of the research the UDP disintegrated. The 
UDA's political side is currently expressed through a research group, rather than a 
political party. The fifth chapter of this thesis charts the party's decline and tests the 
data collected about the UDP against these models. It will be argued that the UDP's 
emphasis on an Ulster identity and its populist, rather than social democratic, manifesto 
meant it did not carve out a distinctive space from the 'no' unionism of the DUP. The 
implication of this was that the latter half of the thesis inevitably narrowed in focus to 
concentrate on the PUP. This meant that there was a requirement for more detailed data 
to be collected about the prospects and manifesto of the Progressive Unionists.
1.5.2 Models of New Lovalism
The models referred to were constructed to enable the concept of new loyalism to be 
empirically tested. This provided a means of drawing conclusions as to whether these 
political actors could produce the agenda required to facilitate the emergence of 
cross-community social democratic politics within Northern Ireland.
The first model offers a pessimistic prognosis for the prospects of new loyalism. The 
concept is presented as traditional loyalism imbued with a veneer of novelty by debates 
about identity and grassroots political cooperation. This covers ongoing hostility 
towards ceding actual political power to the nationalist community. In this model, the 
emphasis on class politics is merely another manifestation of the alienation of the 
Protestant working class from the unionist hierarchy. This is something that has not yet 
managed to preclude sectarian sentiment.
The second model is the polar opposite of the first. In the words of Billy Mitchell from 
the PUP it is "a radical political alignment where those of us who aspire to a genuine 
social democracy can engage in debate and action on how best we can ensure that the 
social and economic benefits derived from the new politics will actually reached the 
people who need them most". 19 This suggests a redefinition of interests that would aid
19,,.Mitchell, B 'My vision for the future' www.pup-ni.org 2000
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the realignment of citizens from ethnic to social issues and would therefore contribute 
to overcoming the binary logic of Protestant and Catholic as loyal and disloyal.
1.5.3 Testing the Models
In composing this thesis, there were three main elements to the methodology required 
to make this work a comprehensive and effective study of new loyalism. These were a 
literature review, analysis of the political activities of the parties, and interviews.
The literature review served as an evaluation of existing academic assessments of 
loyalism and new loyalism and a base from which definitions of both concepts could be 
advanced. This was complemented by a review of literature covering constitutional 
settlements that could accommodate different national identities. This was necessary 
because of the consociational nature of the Good Friday Agreement to which both 
parties were signatories. The Agreement was the context in which political power was 
devolved from the British government to Northern Irish institutions.
The analysis of the political activities of the parties was drawn from mainly primary 
sources and focused on documents produced by the parties, their submissions to peace 
negotiations and institutional records such as minutes. In this way commitment to 
cross-community cooperation and diversity within the union could be observed.
Qualitative interviews were undertaken with PUP members, a project that was made 
possible by the co-operation of the party. These were semi-structured in nature and 
provided a range of information on attitudes towards a number of areas: identity; 
socialism; constitutional and non-constitutional political issues; the legitimacy of 
paramilitary activity; and the future of the party. This information formed the basis of 
the in-depth assessment of the PUP's manifesto and prospects presented in the sixth 
chapter.
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1.6 Structure of Work
The first two chapters set out the construction of the models of new loyalism. The 
following chapter is the literature review, as outlined above. The third chapter reviews 
debates about accommodating different national identities within constitutional 
arrangements and contrasts this with the role of civil society as a space where these 
identities can be expressed without being institutionalised within the state. This will 
provide context for a discussion of Porter's concept of civic unionism20 and whether 
this can provide a template for a civic new loyalism.
The next chapters assess the development of the UDP and the PUP. It is within these 
chapters that the parties are tested against the models of new loyalism. The fourth and 
fifth chapters chart the development of political initiatives within loyalist paramilitary 
groupings and assess the significance of the collapse of the UDP. The focus will then 
narrow to the PUP in the sixth chapter.
20 Porter, N Rethinking Unionism (Belfast) Blackstaff 1996
17
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW: UNIONISM, LOYALISM, NEW LOYALISM
2.1 Introduction
Whilst it has already been acknowledged that there is a limited body of work on the 
concept of new loyalism and new loyalist parties, literature has been produced 
examining the ideology of political movements associated with the UVF and the UDA. 
This literature fits into a wider debate about divisions within unionism and the material 
and cultural bases of loyalism.
The purpose of this chapter is to review this debate and evaluate the main academic 
perspectives on the concepts of unionism, loyalism and new loyalism. This review will 
consider the elements of national, political and religious identity exhibited within 
unionism. This will be related to the importance of class, both in terms of how it 
promotes internal division within unionism and how it relates to the concept of 
loyalism.
Unionism, at its most basic, is support for maintenance of the union between Northern 
Ireland and Great Britain, and a belief that British sovereignty is legitimately exercised 
within the territory. Some commentators have taken this position as a starting point for 
a search for a core of unionist identity, a core that could be established as the foundation 
of all unionist political and cultural expression
The first section of the literature review will assess possible core elements of a unionist 
identity. It will be argued that political support for the union cannot be reduced to a 
single element such as religion, but that this is not the same thing as saying that 
unionism suffers from an overwhelming crisis of identity. The second section will 
consider the impact of class on unionist unity and political aspirations. The third 
section will review academic assessments of political movements within loyalist 
paramilitary groupings and possible definitions of new loyalism.
18
2.2 Searching for the essence of unionism
2.2.1 Settler Ideologies
The first element of unionist identity to consider is the historical background of 
colonialism. The plantation of Ulster in the seventeenth century brought an influx of 
mainly Scottish settlers to the North-East of Ireland. Some commentators have drawn 
comparisons with other settler groups, in order to underline how this process of 
settlement creates a distinct ideology. For example, Crawford makes use of the 
Afrikaner analogy 1 presenting both groups as keen to preserve their identity in a hostile 
environment and reliant on their religion as a means of proclaiming divine approval for 
their settlement.
Clayton argues that "significant strands of Protestant ideology in the 20th century can 
be explained by Ulster's history as a settlement colony". 2 She describes two particular 
strands - ultras and moderates - who are defined by their respective alienation from and 
identification with the metropolis.
The Plantation of Ulster did mark a distinct change in the manner that the British State 
was administered in this part of Ireland. References to historical events such as the 
massacre of settlers in 1641 are still used in murals and rhetoric to highlight modern 
insecurities. However, presenting unionists as simply a settler group stems from a 
limited reading of Irish and British history that ignores other important events and 
changes in the constitutional status of Ireland, including the 1801 Act of Union. It also 
belittles the fact that descendants of the original settlers have been developing a sense 
of connection to the territory over nearly four hundred years.
The depiction of unionism as a settler ideology highlights the problem of focusing on 
one element of unionist experience to the exclusion of others. It introduces the danger 
of telescoping key events to support an explanation of unionist identity, which denies
1 Crawford, R Loyal to King Billy (London) C.Hirst and Co 1987
2 Clayton, P Enemies and Passing Friends: Settler Ideologies in Twentieth Century Ulster (London) 
Pluto 1996, p222
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the existence of diversity within unionism and fails to account for anything but broad, 
simple divisions. It is this diversity that must be borne in mind when considering the 
relationship between unionism and Protestantism.
2.2.2 Unionism and Protestantism
Survey data suggests an association between Protestantism and unionism remains in 
Northern Ireland and the two terms are often used interchangeably. In the most recent 
Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey seventy-three per-cent of respondents who 
identified themselves as Protestant stated that they thought of themselves as Unionists, 
whilst one per-cent of these respondents answered that they thought of themselves as 
nationalists. Sixty-five per-cent of Catholics described themselves as nationalists, 
whilst one per-cent described themselves as unionists. 3 Protestantism in this survey is a 
matter of self-identification, which could cover those who would define themselves as 
practising Protestants and those who view it as a cultural identity. In itself the fact that 
the majority of those who define themselves as Protestants describe themselves as 
unionist, and indeed make up the majority of voters for unionist parties, does not 
provide a full picture of the relationship between Protestantism and unionism.
There are a variety of Protestant churches in Northern Ireland. Whyte argued that "if 
the churches as such were the main source of division, one might expect to find not two, 
but many more than two communities in Northern Ireland" especially given the history 
of bitterness between Anglicans and Presbyterians.4 The analysis of Protestantism and 
unionism presented by Bruce concentrates on evangelical Protestantism. Bruce posits 
that it is the central component of an ethnic identity. He argues that evangelicalism 
resonates beyond those who are actually practising Protestants, because "the key point
3 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 2002. The question asked was Generally speaking, do you 
think of yourself as a unionist, or a nationalist or neither? www.ark.uk/nilt. Analysis by Curtice and 
Dowds shows that in survey data produced between 1989 and 1998 Protestants describing themselves as 
nationalists and Catholics describing themselves as unionist was not recorded at a higher level than one 
per-cent. See 'Has Northern Ireland Really Changed?' Crest Working Paper 74, September 1999 
www.crest.ox.ac.uk
4 Whyte, J Interpreting Northern Ireland (Oxford) Oxford University Press 1990, p30
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is the centrality of evangelicalism for the Ulster loyalist's sense of ethnic identity". 5 In 
addition Bruce believes that for loyalism "beyond Protestantism, no secure identity is 
available."6
Bruce depicts a unionist community in Northern Ireland that is a self-contained ethnic 
group, one that is dependent on evangelical Protestantism as a common bond between 
its members. He uses the success of the Reverend lan Paisley's DUP as evidence that 
the evangelical message exerts influence over many more people than those who come 
to hear it preached in church.
Bruce rejects the argument that Paisley's message has a distinct secular function where, 
as Morrow puts it, "Paisley's religious defence of secular borders has appeal to 
threatened and insecure people". 7 Bruce claims that voting for evangelicals is about 
more than a robust defence of the constitution, it is about recognising evangelicals as 
carriers of social characteristics that are perceived as admirable, which is also a 
recognition that "evangelicalism is at the heart of what it means to be a Protestant". 8
Bruce's argument that evangelicalism is the core of unionist identity is a reductionist 
one. It ignores the existence of different Protestant churches in Northern Ireland as well 
as secular impulses within unionist politics. Maciver asserts that Paisley's political 
rhetoric links secular history to religious struggle, making Ulster part of the apocalyptic 
battle between good and evil. 9 However, Bruce is wrong to ignore the extent to which 
this religious message does have a strong secular appeal. Bruce also downplays the fact 
that as the DUP has sought to build electoral support, the party itself has had to
Bruce, S The Edge of the Union: The Ulster Loyalist Political Vision (Oxford) Oxford University Press 
1994, p25
Bruce, S God Save Ulster! The Religion and Politics of Paislevism (Oxford) Oxford University Press 
1986, p258
Morrow, D 'Suffering for righteousness sake? Fundamentalist Protestantism and Ulster polities' from 
Shirlow, P and McGovern, M Who are the People? Unionism. Protestantism and Loyalism (London) 
Pluto 1997, p63
8 Bruce, S 'Ulster Loyalism and Religosity' Political Studies 1987 Vol. 35, p647
9 Maciver, MA 'lan Paisley and the Reformed Tradition' Political Studies 1987 Vol. 35, pp359-378
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consolidate its urban working class base and therefore has engaged with secular 
political issues.
Paisley himself utilises political arguments that do not rely on religious rhetoric. 
Writing a critique of the Good Friday Agreement in the Belfast Telegraph, Paisley 
found a number of reasons to rail against the settlement without calling on the threat to 
Protestant liberties:
We saw the terrorist prisoners released, we saw the RUC destroyed, we saw Sinn 
Fein/IRA ministers sitting in government, saw all-Ireland executive bodies with 
executive power set up and we saw Northern Ireland being stripped of security 
installations, but we still have not seen one gun decommissioned or even been 
told what has been done... Before there is meaningful movement on 
decommissioning do not be surprised if Sinn Fein are back at the table with 
another set of demands. 10
Morrow states that "unionism in Ireland over the last two hundred years is, without any 
exaggeration, absolutely incomprehensible without an understanding of Protestantism 
and its theological uses". 11 Protestantism has not been an apolitical force in the North 
East of Ireland. In particular the Orange Order has historically linked defence of the 
faith with defence of the union. However, to pitch the practices of Protestantism as the 
essence of unionist identity is erroneous. In particular Bruce makes connections 
between religious identity and political action, but in doing so he ignores the historical 
instances of evangelical preachers agitating against the unionist establishment and 
mustering support by fusing religious concern and secular resentments. The 
relationship between evangelical Protestantism and unionist politics is a complicated 
one. The fact that it has taken the DUP three decades to overtake the UUP as the largest 
unionist party contradicts Bruce's claim that unionists recognise Paisley's religious 
stance as the fulcrum of their identity.
0 'The REAL question' www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk 31st October 2001 
11 Morrow, D 1997 Op. cit. p58
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Farrington's discussion of the religious-secular spectrum in unionist politics concludes 
that the secular and religious are not discrete and that "reality dictates that a mixture of 
the two strains is the most appropriate for success and maintaining a support base". 12 
The DUP is a case study, not simply in how the Protestant religion is articulated in 
political action, but in how the secular and the religious can interact in unionist politics. 
Bruce's hypothesis is that evangelicalism is the core of unionist identity. He casts the 
survival of the DUP as a successful test of this hypothesis. The DUP has outlived 
parties that have advanced a hardline but secular defence of the union, such as 
Vanguard. However, there are other reasons, principally the DUP's mastery of saying 
'no' without embarking on the risky path of offering new political solutions to say 'yes' 
to, and the emphasis on day-to-day constituency work. The DUP's religious appeal has 
not excluded a secular component to the party.
Protestantism as an identity can be both religious and cultural. Religion can interact 
with secular unionist politics and evangelical notions of good battling evil makes 
immediate sense to those who never enter a church or gospel hall. However, an 
analysis such as that advanced by Bruce, does not deal with the importance of 
British-ness to unionists beyond the Williamite settlement and the Protestant crown. In 
addition this view does not take into account that whilst the evangelical message can 
exert a strong influence in the political arena, there are secular impulses within unionist 
identity and politics.
2.2.3 Conditions and Contracts
Bruce argues that for loyalists "loyalty to Britain has always been conditional", but that 
"when Ulster Protestants do want to be British, the Britain they want to be part of seems 
to be a country which ceased to exist a century ago". 13 The idea of conditional loyalty 
surfaces more than once in academic assessments of unionism. Informed by his
12 Farrington, C 'Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century" Irish Political Studies 
2001 Vol. 16, p56
13 Bruce, S 1986 Op. cit p251
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argument that Protestantism is the essence of an ethnic group present in Northern 
Ireland, Bruce's view of conditional loyalty is that loyalists have separated the British 
Crown from the actions of the British Government in order to claim loyalty to Britain 
whilst decrying any attempts to "undermine Protestant self-determination". 14 Despite 
use of the term self-determination Bruce is keen to rebut any suggestions of Ulster 
Protestants as a nation. They are closer to Anthony Smith's idea of an ethnie - an ethnic 
group that has not identified itself as a nation. 15
Bruce's assessment of the conditional nature of loyalty amongst unionists asserts a 
measure of instrumentalism; that is loyalty to Britain is seen as the best way of shoring 
up the precarious position of Protestants in Ulster. However, Bruce acknowledges an 
element of identification with British-ness, albeit an idea of British-ness that no longer 
exists. Neither of these arguments are peculiar to Bruce. Instrumental allegiance and 
allegiance to an outdated Britishness are relevant to other discussions of 
contractarianism.
Farrell and Bell developed Marxist critiques of unionism in the 1970s. They placed 
much more emphasis on the instrumental nature of conditional loyalty. They linked 
Protestant political identity to the materialist demand to maintain a hegemonic 'Orange 
State' where the Protestant working class embraced their division from Catholic 
workers for preferential treatment in employment and provision of social goods. Bell 
describes the Protestants of Ulster as "a community whose loyalism appears a 
moveable feast". 17
This version of conditional loyalty becomes a useful insult in which British-ness is a 
cynical cover for Protestant supremacy and economic power. Apart from the fact that it 
reduces unionism to material interest, this type of explanation cannot account for 
enduring loyalty to Britain since the suspension of Stormont and the dismantling of
14 Bruce, S 1986 Op. cit p252
15 Smith, A.D National Identity (London) Penguin 1991
1 Farrell, M Northern Ireland: The Orange State (London) Pluto 1980
17 Bell, G The Protestants of Ulster (London) Pluto 1976, p8
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institutions such as the 'B' Specials, that formed the infrastructure of the Orange State. 
In addition it cannot answer why Protestants were so astute at the turn of the last 
century to throw their lot in with British industrial and imperial might, but cling to the 
British state at the turn of this century despite the erosion of this power and the surge in 
prosperity that has earned the Republic of Ireland the epithet of the Celtic Tiger.
Farrell and Bell both wished for unionism to be erased to make way for a united Irish 
nation that could then embrace socialism. In contrast Tom Nairn argued that the 
incipient Ulster nationalism he saw emerging from the growing conflict in the 1970s 
should be used as the bourgeois stop-gap between pre-modernist allegiance and a 
developed class consciousness. Nairn linked the idea of developing nationalist identity 
to the conditional loyalty thesis:
The Protestant community maintains its claim to be part of 'Britain' against hell 
or high water, but since it has refused to be 'British' in the fairly elementary sense 
of obeying the British government's plan for the province the claim has become 
in practice a form of nationalism. 18
McBride argues that unionists have not developed an Ulster nation and they are not 
integrated into the Irish or British nations either. This means, "consequently they are 
unable to articulate their political demands in the respectable language of 
self-determination. Instead Ulster Protestants seems trapped within religious and 
political attitudes derived from the Seventeenth Century". 19
This echoes the work of Miller on the contractarian position of unionists within the 
United Kingdom. Miller argues that Ulster unionism was imbued with a sense of 
insecurity from the beginnings of the Plantation. Settlers were under threat from the 
Gaels they had displaced, but their practice of public banding for defence was also a 
mechanism for dealing with constitutional threats, especially the duplicity of kings
1 O
Nairn, T The Break-Up of Britain (London) NLB 1977, p252
19 McBride, I 'Ulster and the British Problem' from English, R & Walker, G (eds) Unionism in Modern 
Ireland (Basingstoke) MacMillan 1996, pi
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such as James II. Miller says that public banding "sustained in the Protestant 
community the sense that public order really derived more from their exertions than 
from the activities of the sovereign authority". 20 This enforced a contractarian idea of 
the relationship between the settlers of Ulster and the British State rather than "a 
wholehearted sense of incorporation into the British nation".21
Furthermore, Miller argues that this conditional attitude to British sovereignty remains 
and has hampered the integration of Ulster Protestants into any of the nations 'on offer': 
Britain, Ireland and Ulster. Miller attributes the persistence of seemingly anachronistic 
concerns with contracts and covenants to the development of Ulster unionism within 
the British Empire before modernizing processes such as industrialisation and 
democratisation. This meant that the unionist identity developed before nationalism 
became a dominant ideology in Europe. Miller shares the modernist view of 
nationalism which McCrone outlines:
The essence of the case is that nationalism is a cultural and political ideology of 
'modernity', a crucial vehicle in the Great Transformation from traditionalism to 
industrialisation, and in particular the making of the modern state. 22
This modernist view is exemplified in the work of Gellner who argues that "nations can 
be defined only in terms of the age of nationalism, rather than, as you might expect, the 
other way round". 23 Miller's conditional loyalty thesis suggests that the development of 
Ulster Unionism pre-dates this age and is trapped in a now out-of-date ethos of 
contracts between individuals and the state.
Coulter and Aughey both criticise Miller's account for ignoring the actions of the 
British State. Coulter states that whilst unionism is about material position and ethnic 
identity, the precarious nature of Northern Ireland's constitutional position means these
20 Miller, D Queen's Rebels (Dublin) Gill and MacMillan 1978, p25
21 Miller, D 1978 Op. cit p!20
22 McCrone, D The Sociology of Nationalism (London) Routledge 1998, plO
23 Gellner, E Nations and Nationalism (Oxford) Blackwell 1983, p55
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concerns are articulated in contractarian language, or "in other words the 
contractarianism that pervades unionism represents not its ideological substance, but 
rather its political form".24
Aughey points out that Northern Ireland's constitutional position is open to question 
and this is a situation that makes contractarianism relevant rather than anachronistic. 
Furthermore, Aughey argues that unconditional loyalty to a state would belittle an 
individual to the status of a serf. 25 As part of the Cadogan Group, Aughey has 
expressed a desire for the British Government to retreat from a declaration of lack of 
selfish interest in Northern Ireland in favour of an assertion "that Northern Ireland is 
part of the United Kingdom, that it expects it to remain so for the foreseeable future, 
and that all discussion of the problem must revolve around that central fact".2» 26
A contract does require at least two signatories and Miller's work concentrates more on 
the actions of one partner. In addition, as Cochrane points out, Miller's argument 
discounts the fact that a common British culture is perceived to exist by unionists, and 
that the bonds between unionists and the rest of Britain are seen as more than those of 
sovereignty and constitutional law.""27
However, it is incorrect to lay the blame for the continuation of this mode of politics on 
the policies of British governments. Northern Ireland's position is not challenged 
solely by the actions of the British State, but by the presence of a group on the territory 
who question the legitimacy of British sovereignty. This situation means that it is 
possible that the British State could never be loyal enough for some unionists. In 
addition Cochrane argues that "it could justifiably claimed that the ambiguity of
24 Coulter, C 'The Character of Ulster Unionism' Irish Political Studies 1994 [a] Vol. 9, p5
Aughey, A Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (London) C.Hirst and Co. 
1989
^f\ The Cadogan Group Picking up the Pieces: Northern Ireland after the Belfast Agreement 
www.cadogan.org May 2003. The other members of the group are Colin Armstrong, Paul Bew, Arthur 
Green, Graham Gudgin, Dennis Kennedy, and Steven King
27 Cochrane, F Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism since the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Cork) 
Cork University Press 2001
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unionist loyalty to the state is pronounced to an unusual degree". 28 Aughey is right to 
say that every citizen's loyalty is, or should be, essentially conditional, but unionist 
loyalty is more conditional than most.
2.2.4 The Liberal Unionist Position
Aughey is concerned with notions of citizenship because he is keen to stress that 
unionism is a political position that is committed to citizenship within a liberal pluralist 
state. Aughey believes that accusations of an identity crisis have led to attempts by 
some unionists to foster a specific Ulster heritage. This is a flawed project because 
unionism is not nationalism and should not seek to be measured in these terms. Instead 
Aughey opines "the identity of unionism has little to do with the idea of the nation and 
everything to do with the idea of the state". 29
Aughey makes a case for the full integration of Northern Ireland into the structures of 
the British State. The United Kingdom could accommodate Irish nationalists as citizens 
in a state containing a variety of regional and national identities. The Republic of 
Ireland would not be able to perform this task as it is still tied to Catholic mores and an 
exclusivist identity.
While Aughey succeeds in demonstrating that "unionism is defensible in terms that are 
rational and coherent"30 not all defenders of the union rely on these rational terms. This 
is something that Aughey ignores. Coulter points out:
While the political aspirations of many unionists may well stem from their 
adherence to abstract ideals of citizenship, they are also motivated by substantive 
identities such as nationality and ethnicity. 31
28 Cochrane, F 2001 Op. cit p74
29 Aughey, A 1989 Op. cit, p!8
30 Aughey, A 1989 Op. cit, pi
31 Coulter, C 1994 [a] Op. cit pi6
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Aughey is determined to separate the concepts of state and nation. However allegiance 
to a state is usually based on a more than a rational assessment of its liberal democratic 
credentials. If it were the Republic of Ireland could feasibly offer a tempting alternative 
to British citizenship. As McGarry and O'Leary point out, the Irish State is a republic. 
The legally honoured position of the Catholic Church was removed in 1972 after a 
constitutional referendum and the first head of state was a Protestant. In contrast the 
United Kingdom has a monarchy, established churches in England and Scotland, no 
written constitution and a bar on Catholic accession to the throne. 32
Aughey's defence of unionism skirts around the full range of motivations that drive 
unionists to ally themselves with a wider British community. By seeking to separate 
political aspirations from cultural and national identity, he gives only a partial 
explanation of why unionists value their British citizenship.
2.2.5 An identity crisis?
So far this overview of unionism suggests that unionist identity cannot be reduced to a 
single essential element. It cannot be explained away as a colonial hangover, a 
religiously defined ethnicity, an instrumental concern with material position or a purely 
rational assessment of the merits of British and Irish citizenship.
One of the reasons Aughey is so intent on stressing the citizenship aspects of being part 
of the United Kingdom is because he believes that unionist politics should not be 
articulated using nationalist terms of reference. He states that "a popularly held belief 
is that unionism suffers from a thorough crisis of identity". 33 He seeks to refute this 
identity crisis thesis by separating cultural and national identity from allegiance to the 
state. Aughey quotes a loyalist bandsman interviewed in New Society about his 
identity:
32 McGarry, J and O'Leary, B Explaining Northern Ireland (Oxford) Blackwell 1995
33 Aughey, A 1989 Op. cit. p!2
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Well, I'd like to call myself British, a British person like. But you look deep into 
it like, I'm Irish...because Northern Ireland like. 34
Aughey uses this quote to dismiss the "narrow perversity of the politics of identity"35 
which he is convinced the modern British State, and Ulster unionism, has moved 
beyond.
Cochrane pours scorn on Aughey's interpretation:
Rather than accept the apparently obvious explanation that the individual is 
profoundly confused about his identity, Aughey chooses to depict the bandsman 
as a latter-day Platonic philosopher-king.36
Cochrane believes that the unionist experience is one of isolation and insecurity which 
has promoted an identity crisis. He argues:
One of the main problems for unionists in determining their true identity lies not 
so much in the struggle to understand their own cultural heritage as in coming to 
terms with where they fit between Britain and Ireland. At the root of their 
difficulty in comprehending the British/unionist relationship lies the fact that they 
have taken a political allegiance and transformed it into a cultural one. 37
In a sense Cochrane's argument echoes Aughey. However, Aughey is trying to argue 
that a straightforward political preference is forced to define itself in alien terms of 
cultural and national identity. Cochrane's argument is that unionists have sought to 
dress up political allegiance in cultural connections to British-ness, whereas in fact they
34 quoted in Aughey, A 1989 Op. cit. p!5
35 Aughey, A 1989 Op. cit. p!6
36 Cochrane 2001 Op. cit. p77
37 Cochrane, F 'Any takers? The isolation of Northern Ireland' Political Studies Vol. 2 No.3 1994[a], 
p383. Cochrane's thesis is that both communities in Northern Ireland are increasingly isolated as they 
have failed to grasp changes within the UK and the Republic of Ireland, and changes in the relationship 
between the two states. See also 'Ourselves Alone' Fortnight March 1994, pp!6-18
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have a strong degree of cultural distinctiveness, which reflects their political isolation. 
Outdated unionist ideas of what British-ness is only serve to reinforce this and therefore 
they cannot share the bonds that keep Scotland, England and Wales within the union. 
Cochrane avers:
Unionist expressions of their British-ness, which might have commanded 
empathy in the nineteenth century, serve to reinforce the cultural alienation of 
Britain; feeding the desire to maintain the present level of political separation 
between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. 38
Within Northern Ireland different regional and national identities are held by both 
Protestants and Catholics. The 2002 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey showed 
twenty-five percent of Catholics were willing to say that Northern Irish described them 
best, whilst sixty-five per-cent chose Irish and ten per-cent chose British. 39 The overlap 
of British, Irish and Northern-Irish identities is not merely a conundrum for Aughey 
and Cochrane's loyalist bandsman to wrestle with. Neither is Northern Ireland the only 
area within the United Kingdom where different national identities are concurrently 
held, so this 'confusion' cannot be held to be solely a product of Northern Ireland's 
isolation from either the Republic of Ireland or the rest of the British state.
McBride argues that British-ness is not a homogenous identity but "a plurality of 
identities brought together by common historical experience". 40 Some of the common 
bonds, such as empire, have disintegrated since the creation of the Northern Ireland 
statelet. In addition, as Cochrane is keen to stress, Northern Ireland is geographically 
separate from the other national groupings of the United Kingdom and has been kept at 
arm's length in many ways by the British State. It can also be acknowledged that many 
unionist representations of British-ness are alien to other British citizens. Cochrane 
presents unionists as physically isolated from the British State and culturally sealed off 
from modern day notions of British-ness.
38 Cochrane, F 1994 [a] Op. cit p384
39 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 2002 ark.ac.uk The question asked was, which of these best 
describes yourself: British, Irish, Ulster, Northern Irish, Other, European
40 McBride, I 1996 Op. citp!4
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Within the British State there are differences of administrative and legal practices, but 
Northern Ireland has been subject to distinctly different treatment. Nevertheless, its 
isolation is not total. Northern Ireland has been fully subject to the British welfare state 
and the National Health Service. In addition the province receives British media, such 
as the BBC. When considering cultural isolation, it is apparent that orangeism 
mystifies many other British citizens. However, unionism cannot be reduced to 
orangeism and the tenets of monarchy, commonwealth and world war sacrifice have 
not been completely transcended in favour of a new definition of British-ness.
Presenting unionists as beset by an identity crisis is an over-simplification. It carries the 
implication that ideas of British-ness and Irish-ness are well defined and subscribed to 
in full by those who claim these identities. The concurrent holding of different 
identities is not peculiar to unionists within the United Kingdom. Unionism certainly 
has internal divisions, but one thing they seem more certain of than ever is their 
British-ness41 . That their feelings are not always reciprocated reinforces feelings of 
insecurity, but this has not forced them to rethink their sense of belonging. That their 
displays of British-ness can seem a century out of date does not mean that these 
displays represent in full what all unionists mean when they describe themselves as 
British.
2.3 Class and Unionism
So far this discussion has considered the role of religion and of national identity within 
unionism. Another important factor is to consider is that of social class. In particular, 
ideas about how material position and class identity relate to the concept of loyalism 
must be evaluated before the topic of new loyalism can be introduced.
41 Rose's data found that thirty-nine per-cent of Protestants respondents described themselves as British. 
Ros6i R Governing Without Consensus (London) Faber and Faber 1971, p208 The 2001 Northern 
Ireland Life and Times Survey showed that seventy per-cent of Protestants thought British best 
described the way they thought of themselves www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2001
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2.3.1 Ulster British and Ulster Loval
One of the most discussed pieces of work on Protestant identity in Northern Ireland is 
Todd's article on the two traditions of unionist political culture. Todd is at pains to 
make clear that these are dominant traditions rather than the only possibilities for 
political culture in unionism. She does not make a neat distinction between two camps 
but stresses that ideology is the result of several influences and political expression can 
shift between these dominant strands. She also identifies other tradition such as dissent 
and socialism.
One tradition is that of the Ulster British which is defined by its "primary 'imagined 
community' of Great Britain and its secondary regional patriotism for Northern Ireland. 
It professes liberal values".42 The other tradition, Ulster loyalism, is more introspective, 
seeing fellow Protestants of Northern Ireland as the primary 'imagined community'.43 
The Ulster British tradition generates self-esteem from the achievements of the British 
State, such as a liberal political culture, fighting for the common good in the Second 
World War, and the creation of the welfare state. Ulster loyalism reproduces itself and 
identifies with cultural practices such as religion and marching rituals. Evangelical 
Protestantism is important, not because it is the sole basis of identity, but because the 
Ulster loyalist tradition entwines it with politics to make sense of insecurity and 
beleaguerment, creating a simple battle between good and evil.
Todd presents these traditions as underpinned by an ideological structure, by which she 
means:
The inter-related and often unspoken cultural assumptions and beliefs which are 
reproduced not primarily by state action or elite manipulation but by typical 
modes of experience and practice in the society, which are themselves
42 Todd, J 'Two traditions in unionist political culture' Irish Political Studies 1987 Vol. 2, pi
43 Anderson, B Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London) 
Verso 1991. Anderson argues that the ideology of nationalism dictates that we feel bonds with 
co-nationals we have never met, with ancestors, and with members of the nation yet to be born. These 
bonds are the basis of the nation as an imagined community.
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conditioned by wide socio-economic structures.44
Todd sees these structures cutting across class lines, across integrationist and 
devolutionist unionism, and across any left-right political spectrum.
Farrington states that a more layered approach should be taken to analysing divisions 
within unionism rather than seeking an essence or a dichotomy.45 He believes that 
Todd's analysis cannot account for the Orange Order's role in the UUP or the secular 
element of DUP. However, Todd's project is different to Farrington's who is seeking to 
present a framework whereby a number of divisions within unionism are set in an 
organisational context. Todd presents these traditions, not simply as the essence of 
unionism or as a dichotomy, but as "ideological poles" to which individuals gravitate.46
Todd presents these traditions as cutting across social class. However, her argument 
does suggest the importance of socio-economic factors. Todd states:
Ulster British ideology is reproduced in their life paths which take them to Great 
Britain and beyond to further their education, business and careers, and in time of
war. 47
Whilst Todd includes bodies such as trade unions in her examples of institutions that 
bind the Ulster British to this wider community, these opportunities for mobility do 
tend to be less open to unionists lower down the socio-economic scale. This suggests 
that the freedom and mobility of the unionist middle class means that its relationship 
with the state is bound to be more positive.
Coulter argues that the unionist middle class has found itself in a paradoxical situation 
where:
44 Todd, J 1987 Op. cit,pl-2
45 Farrington, C 2001 Op. cit.
46 Todd, J 1987 Op. cit p2
47 Todd, J 1988 Op. cit pi 1
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The execution of public policy over the past two decades has simultaneously 
nurtured the political alienation of middle class unionists from the British state 
and established their increasingly rewarding instrumental dependence upon the 
metropolis.48
According to Coulter, Northern Ireland's middle class has been pulled in two different 
directions since direct rule was imposed. The British State has not integrated Northern 
Ireland but has kept the province at a distance. At the same time the public sector in 
Northern Ireland has not been subject to the same reduction that it has in other areas of 
the United Kingdom and it is in fact the main source of employment. 49
Todd's assessment of the Ulster British tradition seems to suggest that its identification 
with its British imagined community is less problematic than is actually the case. The 
British State simultaneously seems to draw Northern Ireland closer and push it away. 
Todd suggests that Ulster British ideology "is not a closed ideological system." 50 
However, it seems wrong to picture 'Ulster British' unionism on a smooth trajectory 
from a British to Irish sense of community. It also seems too simplistic to link middle 
class mobility with increased security and generosity towards ideas of Irish-ness. From 
his qualitative interviews Cochrane offers the example of Nigel Dodds from the DUP as 
someone who saw the link with Great Britain as a means of preserving the Protestant 
cultural ethos of Northern Ireland. Cochrane sees Dodds, a lawyer with a degree from 
Cambridge, as part of a group of "young, urban, upwardly mobile middle class 
Protestants [who are] not changing their political philosophies in line with the growth
Coulter, C 'Direct rule and the unionist middle classes' from English, R and Walker, G Unionism in 
Modern Ireland (Basingstoke) MacMillan 1996 p!77. A similar picture of the unionist middle class is 
presented in Coulter's chapter "The culture of contentment: the practical beliefs and practices of the 
unionist middle classes" from Shirlow, P and McGovern, M Who are the People? Unionism. 
Protestantism and Loyalism in Northern Ireland (London) Pluto 1997, ppl 14-139
Coulter estimates that four out often employees in Northern Ireland are employed by the British state. 
A further three out often employees are indirectly dependent on the British state for their continued 
employment. This means that "the era of direct rule, therefore, has served to establish the British state as 
the absolute fulcrum of the British economy" 1996 Op. cit p!74
50 Todd 1987 Op. cit, p21
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51of their material prosperity".
When examining the prospects for change in Ulster Loyalism, Todd believes that 
transformation will be difficult as loyalist ideology remains self-contained and "no new 
evidence or argument can prove that humiliation won't follow from loyalists letting 
down their guard". 52 Todd suggests that change will have to be brought to bear by 
external forces as loyalists have been so resistant to change. In particular there has been 
very little redefinition of political action along class lines.
Todd's analysis is over-reliant on differences in social class between the two bases of 
these traditions. As Finlayson asserts "political identity cannot be simply read off the 
social structure". 53 In particular, Todd places too much emphasis on the material 
security of the Ulster British tradition which she sees can generate a greater ease with 
ideas of Irishness. This is important to bear in mind when considering the relationship 
between loyalism and social class. When looking at possible connections between 
economic insecurity and political isolation it must be noted that to infer that prosperity 
and mobility are in themselves a 'cure' for the introspective nature of loyalism would 
be erroneous.
2.3.2 An Ontology of Class?
Another factor to consider when examining the relationship of loyalism to social class 
is that it is not just a matter of socio-economic indicators. The holding of class as an 
identity and the importance of that identity to individuals is also salient. In his article on 
the PUP and UDP Price says that a "fundamental question for the PUP and the UDP is 
whether or not the political base they hope to build on actually exists. Does it make 
sense any longer to refer to the Protestant working class?"54
51 Cochrane 2001 Op. cit, p44
52 Todd 1987 Op. citp20
53 Finlayson, A 'Loyalist political identity after peace' Capital and Class 1999 Autumn No.69, p48
54 Price, J 'Political change and the Protestant working class' Race and Class 1995 Vol.37, p63
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Northern Ireland has been subject to the same economic developments that have taken 
place within the rest of the United Kingdom, such as de-industrialisation and 
casualisation of labour practices. This makes the question Price poses a very pertinent
one.
McAuley's exploration of loyalism is based on the premise that it is the ideology that 
governs the actions of the Protestant working class. McAuley does not present identity 
as reducible to economic position in the social structure. However he sees ideology as a 
phenomenon constructed by individuals within economic and geographical constraints 
to make sense of their experience. He argues that the Protestant working class are 
exposed to a limited range of ideas from which they construct a 'common sense world 
view' based on four central concepts of identity: "community, national identity, 
sectarianism and class identity". 55 Given the decline in the traditional heavy industries 
that formed the basis of Protestant working class employment it should be noted that 
class identity persists despite these major economic changes.
Coulter cites British Social Attitudes surveys as evidence that class is still a salient 
factor in how people view their identity. He advances the theory that class is partly an 
ontological state, rather than being strictly defined by occupation. Coulter believes this 
ontology of class means that it can be considered in the same terms as an ethnicity, 
generating a similar sense of belonging. However this does not mean that class replaces 
ethnicity as a mode of identity:
Social class represents an ontological state and cultural form fashioned by the 
literal everyday experiences of social actors. In segmented societies such as 
Northern Ireland, however, social reality is mediated not only by class but by 
ethnic identity also. As a result, the particular forms of cultural expression 
employed by social aggregates in the province will inevitably betray the 
influence of both class and ethnic sentiment. 56
55 McAuley, JW The Politics of Identity (Aldershot) Ashgate 1994 [a], p!75
56 Coulter, C 'Class, ethnicity and political identity in Northern Ireland' Irish Journal of Sociology Vol.4 
1994[b]pl9
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What this suggests is that, in Northern Ireland, a sense of class is not drawn just from 
economic status but from community and cultural practices and that class interacts with 
ethnic identity to define a sense of belonging. This implies that class and ethnic identity 
are both salient in political and cultural expression and that they interact with each other 
as factors that shape people's perception of the realities of life in Northern Ireland. This 
argument is important because, as will now be shown, it has been argued by more than 
one commentator that this strong sense of class has not promoted a sense of unity that 
would erode the strength of sectarian values. Instead these values and beliefs 
complement each other. As Graham puts it:
Working class (increasingly non-working) Protestant identity can be defined 
along two schizophrenic axes. An element of class politics does exist, reflected 
in a radical unionist consciousness which traditionally depended on, as it 
continues to do, the alienation of the Protestant working class from its leaders. In 
general, however, that class consciousness has been at best diluted, at worst 
subsumed by a sectarianism derived from the sacred sense of Protestantism57
It is this relationship between class identity and sectarianism which must be considered 
before a definition of loyalism can be formulated.
2.3.3 Socialism and Sectarianism
Price states that "an attachment to socialist values does not in itself clear the mind or the 
collective class consciousness of sectarian values and attitudes". 58 McAuley presents 
both values as existing within Protestant working class ideology, which, he says, is not 
"as some would have us believe, uni-dimensional; based on sectarianism. Rather it is 
best understood as a dual consciousness where sectarianism does not exclude labourism
57 Graham, B 'Ulster, a representation of place yet to be imagined' from Shirlow, P and McGovern, M 
Who are the People? Unionism. Protestantism and Loyalism in Northern Ireland (London) Pluto 1997, 
P39
58 Price,! 1995 Op. citp61
38
or vice versa". 59
McAuley acknowledges other divisions within Northern Ireland's working class, but 
sees sectarianism as "the crucial form of relationship of domination and subordination 
which divides the working class."60 Along with McCormack he presents "the strength 
of the ideological reproduction of sectarianism within both nationalist and unionist 
blocs"61 as severely divisive.
Finlayson points out that the working class of Northern Ireland is not an anomaly and 
that it should not be implied that its members are unusual for not deciding they have 
collective interests that must be pursued as a political priority. 62 The divisions 
McAuley touches on, such as "gender, age and employment patterns"63 would remain 
if the power of sectarianism was curtailed, which makes it problematic to assert that it is 
the element that prevents class unity. However, one does not have to view sectarianism 
as an elite tool for disorganising the working class to accept that "sectarian 
consciousness has not negated other forms of consciousness, such as class, or vice versa. 
Rather these co-exist within the same world view and within the same political 
parameters". 64
Coulter has considered how sectarianism interacts with other possible ideologies and 
concludes that the ability of sectarianism to accommodate other political identities 
allows it to endure. He concludes:
59 McAuley, JW The Politics of Identity (Aldershot) Ashgate 1994, p52 McAuley also makes this dual
consciousness argument with McCormack in the chapter 'The Protestant working class in Northern 
Ireland since 1930' from Hutton, S and Stewart, P Ireland's Histories (London) Routledge 1991 
ppl 14-128
60 McAuley, JW 1994 [a] pi81
McAuley, JW & McCormack, J 'The hound of Ulster and the re-writing of Irish history' Etudes 
Irlandaises December 1990, pi49
62 Finlayson, A 1999 Op. cit.
63 McAuley, JW 1994 [a] pi 81
McAuley, JW 'A process of surrender? Loyalist perceptions of a settlement' from Anderson, J & 
Goodman, J Pis/Agreeing Ireland: Contexts, Obstacles. Hopes (London) Pluto 1998, p204
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The sectarianism which besets Northern Ireland should not be conceived as an 
expression of personal pathology, nor as a phenomenon which exists and operates 
purely in the realm of the ideal and the cultural. On the contrary, the 
ethno-religious divisions which exist in the province should be understood as 
having roots in the material realities of Northern society. 65
Coulter presents a situation where sectarianism binds itself to political demands making 
them a zero-sum game: for one side to gain the other must concede. This reinforces 
conflict between the two communities. He gives the example of employment, where 
Catholic demands for fair employment legislation seems to Protestants to be a gain for 
the other side made at the expense of their jobs.
Reviewing these assessments of class identity and politics, it is apparent that more than 
one analysis of Northern Irish society concludes that sectarian social relations are not a 
substitute for class-consciousness and collective action. Rather sectarianism 
accommodates and interacts with a strong self-defined class identity, which means that 
social issues can generate as much conflict as constitutional ones. This serves to 
reinforce the binary division of loyalist thought and maintain hostility between the two 
communities.
2.3.4 Loyalism as Supremacism
The persistence of sectarianism means that it shapes how the distribution of social 
goods is viewed by both of the main groupings in Northern Ireland. Loyalists seek to 
resist making concessions by which nationalists would be seen to be gaining. 
Literature produced regarding loyalist identity explains this by reference to insecurity 
rather than superiority. Loyalists are engaged in a battle for supremacy because the 
alternative is annihilation. Todd dissects the meaning of dominance for loyalists:
65 Coulter, C 1994 [b] Op. cit, p5
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The ideological structure of Ulster loyalism is such that loyalists see dominance 
as the only means of preserving their identity. It is not simply Protestants' desire 
to hold on to material or even status advantages that explains Ulster loyalist 
practices although this is an important factor...It is because dominatory practices 
are perceived as the only alternative to humiliation that they are fought for to the 
last. And to the extent that they continue, they reproduce the binary structure of 
Ulster loyalist thought. 66
Nelson refutes the notion that loyalism is a supremacist ideology, claiming that:
The very people who repeat cliches about Catholics' reluctance to work or 
subservience to the Church will often envy what they see as Catholics' ability to 
'get on' and their greater capacity for independent social and political action. The 
phrases used about Irish unity suggest few can even picture a situation where they 
will not be annexed, repressed or submerged.67
McAuley detects this fear of destruction in the current peace process, where "many 
loyalists perceive the whole 'peace process', the supposed concessions to the IRA and 
the British government's perceived duplicity, as yet further examples of a dynamic 
which consistently undermines their fundamental social and political identity". 6, 68
Price lays stress upon the economic insecurity of the Protestant working class. With the 
marginal privileges of the Stormont era having been eroded, changes in employment 
have meant the loss of full-time unionised jobs and the growth of the part-time service 
sector, which disproportionately recruits female workers. In addition, Price cites the 
low educational attainment by Protestant working class males as a factor in shutting off 
avenues of employment. 69
66 Todd, 1987 Op. cit, pll
67 Nelson, S Ulster's Uncertain Defenders (Belfast) Appletree Press 1984, p!3
68 McAuley, JW 1998 Op. cit pi99
69 Price, J 1995 Op. cit
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What this suggests is a wider loyalist fear and insecurity which means that loyalists 
must not make any concessions to nationalists. Given the growing exclusion of 
sections of a Protestant working class who, as McAuley argues, construct their 
ideology within the parameters of loyalism,70 this insecurity and desire to maintain 
dominance as the only means of survival, is manifested in more areas than 
constitutional preference. Whilst the binary structure of loyalist thought imbues the 
idea of 'loyal' with superior virtues that the rebellious other cannot possess, loyalists 
both fear and envy the qualities they perceive in the actions of nationalists.
2.3.5 Definitions of Loyalism
McAuley states that "at its most fundamental level, loyalism has always rested on its 
sense of separateness and difference, of an identification with 'Ulster' as a distinct 
political territory, and 'British-ness' as a label for its political and cultural 
expression."71 McAuley makes clear that he regards loyalism not as a solely working 
class ideology, but as the ideology that frames the actions of the Protestant working 
class. This distinction is important because unionist identity cannot be split into two 
discrete blocs of haves and have nots. Material deprivation reinforces uncertainty and 
insecurity and encourages introspection but it cannot be implied that this dynamic of 
mistrust and hostility is reducible to economic position.
What emerges from this literature review is that loyalism relies on a binary ideological 
structure that pitches it into perpetual conflict. The main division is between loyal and 
disloyal which puts Ulster loyalists a cut above both the rebellion of nationalists and the 
duplicity of successive British governments. This allows loyalists to make sense of the 
fact that they are British and that they are often in conflict with the British State.
Loyalism draws on evangelical Protestantism, which creates a narrative of the virtuous 
and honest, who are continually plagued by, but eventually triumphant over, evil
70 McAuley, JW 1998, Op. cit
71 McAuley, JW 'The Ulster loyalist parties' Etudes Irlandaises Autumn 1997, p!22
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enemies. However, this has not obscured secular political activity or identities amongst 
working class loyalists. This sense of class identity and inequality has not in turn 
marginalized sectarian perceptions of a battle for scarce resources that the other side 
must not win.
A final observation to be drawn from the literature on loyalism is that emphasis is put 
on people not place. Graham argues that unionists find it difficult to connect 
themselves to the land and therefore to any sense of Irish-ness and that consequently 
unionist historiography rests on key events rather than a sense of place. 72 This means 
that loyalism can picture Ulster as its home without feeling pressured to come to terms 
with others who live there who do not share their values.
Loyalism can be defined as a unionist ideology that seeks to shore up the presence of 
British Protestants in Ulster through the self-reliance of the people. This community is 
reaffirmed in the public display of rituals that link historical struggles to the present day. 
Loyalists see themselves as engaged in the battle for material and constitutional 
security, which must be brought about by domination of the 'rebels' because the 
alternative is oblivion.
2.4 New Loyalism
McAuley has examined how the DUP has reached out from its rural evangelical roots to 
attract support from the Protestant working class. In addition to constituency work on 
matters such as housing, the DUP appeals to sections of the electorate because it 
expresses a loyalist message of continued resistance. McAuley observes that:
The DUP effectively positions its members within loyalist culture and imposes 
specific meanings onto contemporary political events. Central to all of this is an 
idea that entering negotiations is embarking upon a journey that leads to a 
'slippery slope' and a spiral towards and all-Ireland. 73
72 Graham, B 1997, Op. cit.
73 McAuley, JW 'Very British rebels: politics and discourse within contemporary Ulster Unionism' 
from Bagguely, P Transforming Politics, Power and Resistance (Basingstoke) MacMillan 1999, pi 18
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However, McAuley argues that "support from Protestant workers for the DUP has 
never been pre-determined. It had to be won, and once won, it had to be sustained". 74 
Disaffection from the unionist mainstream did not automatically deliver votes to the 
Democratic Unionist Party. McAuley depicts the Ulster Workers' Council strike as a 
defining moment due to his belief that:
The widespread involvement of the Protestant working class caused many to 
rethink. It was clearly recognised by sections of the Protestant working class as 
having marked a distinct break with what had gone before...Although unionist 
hegemony was rapidly reconstructed during the strike, inherent class tensions 
quickly re-emerged.75
McAuley argues that this process of rethinking publicly re-emerged during the 
negotiations that led to the Good Friday Agreement. McAuley believes that "the 'peace 
process' has precipitated a need on the parts of some key elements within unionism to 
reassess their position, and to participate in a process of self-examination" and that 
from within working class unionism "there is now a much deeper questioning of social 
and political values, and the contemporary position they occupy within the social 
structure". 76 This process of reassessment is seen by McAuley as a challenge to the 
DUP's preoccupation with stalling change. The process is also threatened by the DUP 
who seek to impose the 'truth' about negotiation, which is that is can only end in 
betrayal.
This process of re-examination and questioning seems to be the basis of what could be 
called a new loyalism. Reviewing literature that considers this subject it seems there 
are three areas that embody this process. These three areas will now be outlined along 
with the issues they raise for defining and researching new loyalism.
74 McAuley, JW 1994 [a] Op. cit. p58
75 McAuley, JW 'Review of Fourteen May Days' Irish Studies Review 1994, No.8 p46
76 McAuley, JW '(Re)Constructing Ulster loyalism? Political responses to the 'peace process' Irish 
Journal of Sociology 1996 Vol.6 p!48
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2.4.1 Re-writing the past
Price detects a process of re-examination of the past taking place within Protestant 
working class communities. He sees two different pasts being unearthed during this 
process. One past is a history of socialist activity taking place within these 
communities. The other rests on pre-history and the uncovering of pictish ancestors 
who were established in the north-east of Ireland before the advent of the Gaels. Price 
sees the first past as potentially progressive and the second as promoting an exclusivist 
Ulster Identity. Price links the PUP to the first new past, stating that "in addition to 
criticising the UUP for fifty years of misrule, the PUP argues that mainstream unionism 
has failed even by its own standards. By promoting a sectarian state, the unionist party 
encouraged Catholic alienation". 77
The potential importance of this re-examination stems from Graham's argument that 
unionist identity rests on key events rather than a connection with territory. This 
accords with Porter's idea of a "grand cultural unionist narrative"78 in which these 
events form the basis of a tale of deceit and betrayal, which leaves the Protestant 
community in Northern Ireland reliant only on itself. The revisionism of new loyalist 
parties has the potential to tell a different story, one that could redefine traditional ideas 
of enemies and allies.
Criticising mainstream unionism is not in itself new. As was outlined in the 
introductory chapter, loyalism has often manifested hostility towards the elite. What 
could be new is the use of that that loyalist dissent to criticise the mainstream for 
dividing loyalists from nationalists, rather than not protecting loyalists from nationalist 
demands. A new historiography could impact on contemporary political alliances. It is 
the nature of this attitude to the past and how it informs current policies and reactions to 
contemporary events that needs to be considered in relation to the idea of a new 
loyalism.
77 Price, J 1995 Op. citp62
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2.4.2 Who are the people?
Leading on from this revision of the past, is revision of what constitutes loyal and 
disloyal. Like McAuley, Finlayson sees the peace process as an opportunity for 
reassessment because the institutions create a new challenge to loyalist support for the 
status quo and create a space "wherein loyalist identity may be re-configured and 
re-articulated."79 Finlayson argues that populism is a defining item of Northern Ireland 
discourse, meaning that politicians have concerned themselves with defining who the 
people are and then claiming that they are the defenders of the peoples' rights. 
Finlayson shows how, using traditional loyalist language of betrayal and defence of the 
people, the PUP demonstrate an understanding of multiple identities that are subject to 
transformation. In particular there is an emphasis on representing a previously 
marginalized (Protestant) working class. Finlayson believes this discourse currently 
lacks coherence because elements of class, national identity and ethnicity have not been 
reconciled. 80
Literature on the UDP and the UDA focuses on a different aspect of identity, that of a 
separate Ulster heritage. McAuley says that the UDP nominally based its politics on the 
constitutional solutions proposed by the New Ulster Research Group. However he 
identifies the core of UDA politics as the definition of an exclusivist Ulster identity,
n idrawing on sources such as lan Adamson's work on the Cruthin and the Ulster 
legends of Irish mythical history. Cuchulainn is of particular importance and McAuley 
avers that for the UDA he "was projected as a proto-type member defending the border
R9
against the ancient enemy".
Aughey concurs that there is a strong exclusivist component to 'the people' of Ulster as 
imagined by the UDA. However, Aughey argues that there is also a recognition of a
78 Porter, N Rethinking Unionism (Belfast) Blackstaff 1996, p87
79 Finlayson, A 1999 Op. cit p52
80 Finlayson, A 'Discourse and loyalist identity' from Shirlow & McGovern 1997 Op. cit. pp72-94
81 Adamson, I The Cruthin (Bangor) Pretani Press 1974. Adamson traces the movements of the Cruthin, 
an aboriginal people, who he asserts crossed over from Ireland to Scotland, making the Plantation a form 
of homecoming. See also The Ulster People (Bangor) Pretani Press 1991
82 McAuley, JW 'From loyal solders to political spokespersons: a political history of a loyalist 
paramilitary group in Northern Ireland' Etudes Irlandaises 1996 No.21, pi71
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relationship of "equality in adversity"83 that could possibly admit Catholics to an Ulster 
nation.
It seems that the UDP and the PUP entered the peace process with different ideas of 
who they spoke for. The PUP were keen to anchor themselves in the loyalist working 
class, whereas the UDP's rhetoric centred on the people of Ulster. Given the UDP's 
disintegration, it is important to find contrasts between the two parties as possible 
reasons for the poorer electoral showing by the UDP. Given that this is one of the main 
areas of difference focused on in what literature has been produced, the UDP and 
UDA's notions about Ulster nationalism seem to be an important part of testing the 
party against the two models of new loyalism.
2.4.3 Marginalizing sectarianism
A theme emerging from this review is that it is a contention of many commentators that 
sectarianism persists as a "common-sense' means of understanding daily life in 
Northern Ireland. It seems to follow that a truly new loyalist movement would engage 
with this issue and seek to, in McAuley's word's "eradicate, or at least marginalize, 
sectarianism as a fundamental organising principle". 84
McAuley saw the UDP and PUP's response to the peace process as to create dynamism 
and space for negotiation within loyalist politics:
That is not to say that those within the PUP or UDP, in taking this position, have 
superseded sectarianism or replaced it. Rather it should be seen within the context 
of negotiating the ideological terms within contemporary loyalism...It is the 
negotiation of this settlement which will determine the loyalist reaction, not just
83 Aughey, A 'Between exclusion and recognition: the politics of the UDA' from O'Day, A Dimensions 
of Irish Terrorism (Aldershot) Dartmouth Publishing, p86
84 McAuley, JW 'A process of surrender? Loyalist perceptions of a settlement' from Anderson, J and 
Goodman, J Pis/Agreeing Ireland: Contexts, Obstacles, Hopes (London) Pluto 1998, p204
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to the contemporary 'peace process' but also the future of Northern Ireland. 85
Given the emphasis on the persistence of sectarianism, a new loyalist manifesto would 
have to address sectarian attitudes and perceptions, rather than assume that a social 
democratic programme would in in itself superseded sectarianism. The manifestos of 
both parties along with public statements and interview data must therefore be analysed 
with this project in mind.
2.5 Conclusions
Cochrane avers that "the diversity of the unionist ideology's composition is both its 
greatest strength and its weakness". 86 Since the imposition of direct rule in 1972 this 
diversity has become more apparent. Unionists remain certain that Northern Ireland is a 
legitimate part of the United Kingdom and this corresponds to a strongly proclaimed 
British identity. However there are internal divisions within unionism. There are 
disagreements over the best form of administration for the province. There are secular 
and religious impulses that can sometimes be articulated in the same political message. 
There are liberal and pluralist values as well as exclusivist and hostile elements.
Loyalism is a populist unionist ideology that has dominated the political activity of the 
Protestant working class, although this does not mean it is defined by or restricted to 
one social class. What is suggested by McAuley, Todd and Price is that material 
insecurity and deprivation reinforces the context in which the Protestant working class 
construct their view of the world. This worldview is also shaped by the persistence of 
sectarianism, which McAuley says is "located in a strength of common identity and 
high levels of social segregation". 87 This legitimates the simple extremes of loyalist 
discourse often articulated in the evangelical imagery of good battling evil.
85 McAuley, JW 'The Ulster loyalist political parties: towards a new respectability?' Etudes Irlandaises
1997 Autumn, p!27
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Cochrane, F 2001 Op. cit. pix
R7 McAuley, JW 'Cuchullain and an RPG-7: the ideology and politics of the UDA' from Hughes, E (ed) 
Culture and Politics in Northern Ireland 1960-1990 (Milton Keynes) Open University Press 1991, p47
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Assessments of new loyalism, such as that of Finlayson, suggest that the peace process 
and resulting institutions have created a space by which other forms of political activity 
and identity could emerge and draw on the urban support base of the DUP. McAuley 
concurs with this view, arguing that one of the most striking developments surrounding 
the PUP is not their message "but rather the ideological space which has been created 
within unionism and loyalism to allow the PUP to openly express and find support for 
such notions". 88
This review of literature covering unionism, loyalism and new loyalism suggests 
possible areas of novelty in the political programme of new loyalist groupings to be 
considered in this thesis: historical revisionism, identity politics and the erosion of 
sectarianism. These areas relate to the ideal model of new loyalism created for the 
purposes of testing the overall hypothesis. The development of this model is also the 
subject of the next chapter, which will draw on literature pertaining to accommodating 
different national groups within the state.
What is also suggested by this review is that there needs to be discussion of the nature 
of Protestant working class identification and solidarity, especially given the changes 
that have eroded the traditional industrial modes of employment in Northern Ireland. 
Both the UDP and the PUP hoped to gain votes in this area, which necessitated drawing 
support away from the DUP. The strength and nature of the appeal of both new 
loyalism and 'no' loyalism to this target group is therefore a factor that would provide 
an indication of the long-term prospects of any new loyalist project.
88 McAuley, JW 'The emergence of new loyalism' from Coakley, J (ed) Changing Shades of Orange and 
Green: Redefining the Union and Nation in Contemporary Ireland (Dublin) University College Dublin 





How can citizenship be combined with the co-existence of different cultural 
groups which only communicate between themselves with the deafness of 
resentment? 1
As was outlined in the introductory chapter, two models of new loyalism have been 
constructed for the purposes of testing the Ulster Democratic Party and the 
Progressive Unionist Party. The literature review in the previous chapter considered 
existing literature on the parties and the possible definitions of what was novel about 
their agendas. From this was drawn elements of a positive model of new loyalism, 
relating to the creation of a social democratic political movement that could play a 
part in transcending sectarian social relations. This chapter completes the framework 
for testing the concept of new loyalism
This task requires consideration of the work of Norman Porter. 2 He dissects what he 
sees as the two main perspectives within unionist thinking, cultural and liberal 
unionism. He identifies weaknesses within them that undermine the coherence of the 
case they make for the perpetuation of the union between Northern Ireland and Great 
Britain. He offers his own form of unionist political and cultural expression contained 
in the concept of civic unionism. Civic unionism rests on the idea that Northern 
Ireland is a unique place within the British Isles, which requires cultural and political 
recognition that there are two national groups on the territory.
'Leca, J 'Questions on Citizenship' From Mouffe, C Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism. 
Citizenship. Community (London) Verso 1992, p30
2 Porter, N Rethinking Unionism (Belfast) Blackstaff 1996 and The Elusive Quest: Reconciliation in 
Northern Ireland (Belfast) Blackstaff 2003
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In order to provide a critique of Porter's work and consider whether it can be used as 
the basis of constructing a model of civic loyalism, his work will be placed in the 
context of a wider debate around ideas of multicultural citizenship. This debate 
focuses on two questions. Firstly is it possible for a state to be liberal and democratic 
in character if certain rights are granted on a group, rather than an individual, basis? 
Secondly, will recognising the political and territorial claims of certain groups destroy 
or preserve allegiance to the state?
These concerns partly inform the debate on consociational (or power-sharing) 
political settlements. Consociational democracy is defined by Lijphart as a "culturally 
divided democracy which is stabilised by an agreement among the leaders of the 
different subcultures to join in the government of the country". 3 Lijphart advocates 
consociationalism as a means of ensuring sufficient consensus in societies that are 
fractured along cleavages such as ethnicity, religion and ideology, and which lack 
cross-cutting cleavages of equal political resonance. Opponents of consociational 
settlements argue that instead of promoting moderation and consensus such proposals 
encourage the entrenchment of ethnic identities and ignore the possibilities for 
reconciliation offered by common citizenship and a civil society that can support the 
pursuit of a plurality of interests. Taylor, for example, argues that "it is neither 
obvious nor logical that ethno-nationalism can be cured by prescribing more of it 
through constitutional engineering".4
Examining these debates puts Porter's work in a wider theoretical context because he 
argues that institutionalised recognition of difference within Northern Ireland is 
required as a first step to encouraging nationalists to recognise a commonality of 
interests with supporters of unionism. It is also important because the parties that are 
the subject of this study were signatories to a consociational agreement, whilst 
espousing political programmes that were meant, in part, to encourage political
Lijphart, A 'The Northern Ireland problem: cases, theories and solutions' British Journal of 
Political Science Vol. 5 1975, p99
4 Taylor, R 'consociation or social transformation?' from McGarry, J ed Northern Ireland and the
Divided World: Post-Agreement Northern Ireland (Oxford) Oxford University Press 2001, p37
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activity along the cleavage of social class. Balancing recognition of difference with 
encouragement of common interest is the project of Porter's civic unionism and in 
evaluating Porter's work it will be considered if this could be the basis of a civic 
brand of loyalism.
3.2 Citizenship
Liberal democracy is a system of representative government by majority rule in 
which some individual rights are nonetheless protected from interference by the 
state and cannot be restricted even by an electoral majority. 5
It should be made explicit that this chapter is concerned with the politics of liberal 
democracy. As the above quotation shows, liberal democratic states protect certain 
rights accorded to individuals from the vicissitudes of electoral politics. Literature 
concerning the tension between these rights and group rights uses these liberal norms 
as the template for a just society. These are conflicting views as to whether according 
rights to certain cultural or national group destabilises a constitutional framework 
based on individual rights, or whether it can aid equality between individuals as 
regards the ability to utilise the protection and opportunities for participation offered 
by civil rights.
These individuals are citizens - they have the one type of membership that officially 
accords them personhood. 6 A state may offer protection to children or to visitors to 
the territory, but it is only citizens who enjoy political rights and obligations. Walzer 
offers a basic definition of citizenship:
A citizen is, most simply, a member of a political community, entitled to 
whatever prerogatives and encumbered with whatever responsibilities are
5 Dunleavy, P & O'Leary, B Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy (Basingstoke) 
MacMillan 1987, p3
6 Janoski, T Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in Liberal. 
Traditional and Social Democratic Regimes (Cambridge) Cambridge University Press 1998
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attached to membership. 7
By this definition a citizen must fulfil certain duties (for example, the payment of 
taxes or military service). Additionally they are protected by legal and civil rights and 
are free to exercise their political rights.
However, in tracing the history of citizenship and its meanings, Walzer detects a 
debate about the nature of citizenship. It can be presented as a means by which 
members of a political community fulfil their basic obligations in return for state 
protection, which guarantees their ability to pursue freedom and happiness in the 
private sphere. Alternatively, it can be defined as the obligation of regular 
participation, required to maintain citizenship as the primary loyalty and identity 
within that community.
Leca traces the evolution of these passive and active definitions from two positions in 
classic political theory. There is the idea of citizenship as a contract and of citizenship
Q
as participation. Held too, examines the development of these two perspectives. He 
demonstrates that early liberal works, such as those by Hobbes and Locke, centred on 
the idea of individuals making a contract with the state for protection. Later writings 
by theorists such as J.S. Mill, argued that people must participate in political life 
because this creation of direct interest in the activity of government was required as 
the "basis for an involved, informed and developing citizenry". 9
Turner denotes this difference in definitions of citizenship as between top down where 
individuals are the recipients of rights and bottom up where they are the bearers of 
rights. 10 Rather than locating this in the development of political theory he contrasts
Walzer, M 'Citizenship' from Ball, T Farr, J Hanson, R Political Innovation and Conceptual 
Change (Cambridge) Cambridge University Press 1989, p211
8 Leca, J 1992 Op cit
9 Held, D 'Central perspectives on the modern state' from McLennan, G Held, D & Hall, S The Idea 
of the Modern State (Milton Keynes) Open University Press 1983, p44
10 Turner, B 'Outline of a Theory of Citizenship' From Mouffe, C 1992 Op. cit.
53
the gradualist nature of the British state in expanding its body of citizens, with the 
violent struggle for rights in France creating this bottom-up momentum for 
membership.
These different versions of citizenship relate to perspectives on the relationship 
between an individual and both the state and their fellow citizens. Contractarian 
definitions focus on creating space between us and the state implying that many of our 
desires can be pursued in arenas other than the state. Participatory definitions do not 
preclude this pursuit. However, in participatory definitions citizenship is the most 
important identity we possess and constitutes more than membership of a society, 
entailing benefits and obligations. We must participate regularly in the political 
institutions and decision-making processes of the state in order to earn our citizenship.
Participatory definitions are criticised for being impractical. Walzer points out that the 
society where citizenship worked best as the primary identity and focus for the 
fulfilment of demands and obligations was the Greek city-state of Athens. This was a 
relatively small community, which excluded the female and enslaved sections of the 
population. Modern states would lack the "moral unity" of the small and homogenous 
band of Athens citizenry. 11
The impractical nature of participatory concepts of citizenship would lead to some 
losing their membership. Full and constant participation in political office and 
decision making would be unworkable. Only an elite would have the time and 
resources to take part. Those who did not would be shirking their obligations to the 
point where they could be seen as renouncing their citizenship.
Passive definitions of citizenship could be construed as inadequate. Janoski argues 
that passive recipients of limited rights could be found living within a benevolent 
dictatorship. 12 We require rights to participate, to make decisions and seek the
1 ' Walzer, M 1989 Op. cit, p214
12 Janoski, T 1998, Op. cit.
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settlings of our claims by the state. However, taking into account that we are rarely 
active, Walzer argues that "we must have a state open to our sometime involvement" 
rather than a state that enforces a high degree of participation as an obligation. 13
The nature and extent of an individual's participation should not define whether they 
are a citizen. However, an active element of citizenship is seen as part of the 
"ensemble of moral qualities" that informs the modern understanding of the term. 14 
Skinner relates this moral quality to the idea of civic duty whereby "we can only hope 
to enjoy a maximum of our own individual liberty if we do not place that value above 
the pursuit of the common good". 15 A sense of civic duty is lauded as a guard against 
ills such as corruption and tyranny, which could reverse the endowment of rights. 
Bearing this in mind it seems that even if we do not continually invoke our rights of 
participation the idea of citizenship should be valued and protected by a reasonable 
degree of activity by members of political community. A possible area for this 
activity is the space between private life and the state known as civil society.
3.3 Citizenship and Civil Society
The words 'civil society' name the space of un-coerced human association and 
also the set of relational networks - formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, 
and ideology - that fill that space. 16
Walzer's definition of civil society at first seems to describe the separation of society 
from the state, that it is where people pursue interests and identity that are important 
to them in a private manner, free of state interference. According to Pierson, civil 
society "has been used to define a realm outside of, often contrasting with or indeed
13 Walzer, M 'The civil society argument' From Mouffe, C (ed) 1992 Op. cit, p!05 
I4 Leca,J 1992 Op. cit, pi8
15 Skinner, Q 'On justice, the common good and the priority of liberty' From Mouffe, C (ed) 1992 Op. 
cit, p221
16 Walzer, M 1992 Op. cit p89
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counter-balancing the jurisdiction of that state". 17 However, as Walzer examines the 
concept further, he presents state and civil society as inter-linked rather than separate 
entities. He argues that the state "frames civil society and occupies space within it". 18
Civil society and the concept of citizenship interact in two ways. First, as Walzer 
argues, citizenship is the pre-eminent membership within the state because of the 
state's power. Therefore, though we may rarely take an active role in the state we 
require the participatory element of citizenship to protect us from tyranny. However, 
rights such as the right to free assembly enable us to pursue many of our desires and 
claims at levels other than the state. Space for this activity can be found in the 
relational networks of civil society. It is suggested that this ongoing sub-state activity 
can help generate the sense of civic duty where "citizens living within the nooks and 
crannies of civil society are obliged to exercise vigilance in preventing each other and 
their political rulers from abusing their powers and violating the spirit of the 
commonwealth". 19
Secondly, Dworkin argues that one of the key tenets of liberalism is that there is no 
one definition of the good life. 20 Liberty is maximised by allowing the pursuit of 
one's own definition of the good life. Walzer argues that civil society is the best 
forum for testing and pursuing versions of the good life, rather than attempting to 
create a communitarian concept of citizenship, which would mean that the state would 
impose an unsupportable number of common ends on members of the political 
community. A strong and vibrant civil society would therefore maintain the 
legitimacy of the state and the faith of its members in the value of citizenship.
However, Kymlicka and Norman suggest that to claim civil society breeds civic virtue 
"is an empirical claim, for which there is little hard evidence one way or the other. It
17 Pierson, C The Modern State (London) Routledge 1996, p 67
18 Walzer, M 1992 Op. citplOS
1 Keane, J Civil Society - Old Images. New Visions (Cambridge) Polity Press 1998, p88
20 Dworkin, R Taking Rights Seriously (London) Duckworth 1977
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is an old and venerable view, but it is not obviously true". 21 They argue that there is 
no method for quantifying the level of civic virtue required to elevate citizenship from 
its thin conception of legal status to its thicker status of "citizenship-as-a-desirable- 
activity". 22 Neither can it be proven that activity within civil society generates this 
virtue: we may join voluntary associations and informal networks for uncivil activities 
that seek to keep out others.
To conclude this discussion of citizenship it seems that in modern liberal democracy 
the concept rests partially on the passive receipt of rights but there are also active 
rights of participation. Whilst the Jacobin ideal of reviving city-state participatory 
democracy seems unworkable in modern states, which are diverse and densely 
populated, participation is held up as a civic virtue which reinforces the legitimacy of 
the state. Constant participation is difficult or undesirable for many citizens. 
However, citizenship is deemed the most important identity a member of a political 
community can hold because of the power of the state.
This does not mean that the deliberative processes of state institutions must settle all 
decisions about the pursuit of citizens' goals. Individuals have different desires and 
identities, which can be pursued within civil society, the space between the family and 
the state. The actions of civil society lessen direct demands made upon the state but it 
is also presented as the arena which generates the sort of activity that encourages 
people to value and protect their citizenship. However, this virtue is hard to quantify 
and civil society can also be a site of discord and closed-mindedness.
21 Kymlicka, W & Norman, W 'Return of the citizen: a survey of recent work on citizenship theory' 
Ethics Vol.104, No.2 1994p362
22 Kymlicka, W and Norman, W 1994 Op. cit, p353
57
3.4 Citizenship and Equality
Citizenship is passive and active membership of individuals in a nation-state 
with certain universalistic rights and obligations and a specified level of 
equality. 23
There are two points to be made before considering the relationship between group 
rights and liberal democracy. The first point is that the concept of citizenship relates 
not just to freedom, but to equality. The meaning of equality in the context of 
citizenship is open to debate. It could mean simple equality before the law and the 
endowment of equal civil and political rights. It could also relate to the distribution of 
material resources and social goods such as education that would make citizenship 
meaningful. It is possible to assert that mere formal equality does not guarantee the 
ability to utilise the rights of citizenship or to fulfil the obligations.
The second is that it is implicit in writings about the distribution of rights and 
obligations that the community discussed is limited: the theoretical framework is not 
global. Rawls, for example, takes his unit of decision-making as a society, which he 
defines as "a more or less self-sufficient association of persons who in their relations 
to one another recognise certain rules of conduct as binding and who for the most part 
act in accordance with them".24 Walzer makes this idea of a limited community 
explicit when he devotes a chapter of his theory of just distribution of social goods to 
membership and what criteria is acceptable for conferring membership on those 
entering from outside. 25
The development of ideas of both liberalism and democracy have run parallel to, and 
interacted with, the development of nationalism and nation-states as the most 
legitimate form of administration. T.H. Marshall championed social rights as one of
23Janoski, T 1998 Op. cit, p9
24Rawls, J A Theory of Justice (Oxford) Oxford University Press 1999, p4
25 Walzer, M Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford) Martin Robertson and 
Company 1983 Ch.2 Membership pp31-60
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the three parts of citizenship, along with civil and political rights defining these rights
as:
The whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security 
to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a 
civilised human being according to the standards prevailing in that society. 26
Marshall also states that "the citizenship whose history I wish to trace is, by 
definition, national".27 He relates the evolution of citizenship to the development of 
national laws and institutions. The term national here seems interchangeable with the 
actions of the state but states and nations do not always correspond. Sizeable numbers 
of citizens may value a different social heritage or mode of civilised living to the 
prevailing standards of society.
Many rights granted in a liberal democracy allow individuals to pursue some versions 
of the good life, whilst balancing this freedom against notions of harm to others. In 
addition the discourse of civic, or social, nationalism deems residents of a territorial 
unit to be members of the nation, rather than defining membership by ethnic blood-
78
ties . Thus, once membership of a civic nation-state is obtained one is meant to be 
full and equal member within that society.
However, there can be tension between a theoretical framework that offers formal 
equality and self-defined communities and national groups who make claims of 
group-differentiation. Immigrants from other states do not automatically discard their 
old sense of nationhood when they are issued with a new passport. There may be an 
aboriginal people on the territory, who have been historically excluded from full 
citizenship, and who now seek to maintain this sense of difference.
26 Marshall, TH Citizenship and Social Class (London) Pluto 1992, p8
27 Marshall, TH 1992 Op. citp9
28 Kellas. J The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (Basingstoke^ MacMillan 1998
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It is this tension, and possible modes of resolution, which inform Kymlicka's work on 
group-differentiated rights. His discussion of liberalism and ethno-pluralism seeks to 
encourage the allegiance of citizens to states through some measures of recognition of 
difference, which he does not believe are at serious variance with liberal norms.
3.5 Kymlicka and Group-Differentiated Rights
People are owed respect as citizens and as members of cultural communities. In 
many situations, the two are perfectly compatible, and in fact may coincide. But 
in culturally plural societies, differential citizenship rights may be needed to 
protect a cultural community from unwanted disintegration.29
Hadden argues that since the concept of human rights was first articulated it has been 
taken to refer to either groups or individuals.30 The American and French revolutions 
granted rights to individuals against the tyranny of the group. Since then the 
pendulum has swung between that view and the view that human rights should be 
accorded to groups. Hadden argues that this latter view is currently gaining 
dominance. He also argues that individual rights and group rights require completely 
different legal and political structures.
Kymlicka's concept of group-differentiated rights stands in opposition to this latter 
argument. Kymlicka argues that a false dichotomy has been created between 
individual rights and group rights. Instead what Kymlicka seeks to establish is ways 
in which certain claims should be settled by the differentiation of rights in order for 
everyone within a state to have full and equal citizenship. His contention is that this 
can be done without violating liberal citizenship norms based on individual rights.
29 Kymlicka, W Liberalism. Community and Culture (Oxford) Oxford University Press 1989, pi51
3 °Hadden, T 'Northern Ireland' from Miall, H (ed) Minority Rights in Europe: The Scope for a 
Transnational Regime (London) Pinter 1994
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Kymlicka's opening premise is that the freedom that is central to liberalism relies on 
an established societal culture. An individual's understandings of the choices they 
can make are informed by the culture they are making those decisions within. 
Kymlicka defines a societal culture as:
A culture which provides its members within meaningful ways of life across the 
full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, 
recreational and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. 
These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared 
language. 31
McCrone argues that nations and states are often seen as synonymous terms and that 
in nation-states there is a tacit assumption that the cultural membership of the nation 
and citizenship are coterminous:
It is implied that the cultural and the political are in alignment, that the 'people' 
who are governed by the institutions of the state are by and large culturally 
homogenous in having a strong and common, linguistic, religious and symbolic 
identity. 32
However, Kymlicka recognises that for many (if not most) states in the contemporary 
world the borders of the state do not correspond solely and completely to one societal 
culture. Re-drawing the global map so that they do is not feasible. Groups are inter- 
mingled on the same territory; social, political and economic factors make 
immigration desirable for some and a necessity for others; some nation-states would 
not be self-sustaining.
Given his belief that multi-nation states constitute a feature of global administration 
that is unlikely change in the immediate future, Kymlicka seeks to facilitate the
31 Kymlicka, W Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford) Oxford University Press 1995, p78
32 McCrone, D The Sociology of Nationalism (London) Routledge 1998, p7
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establishment of a shared identity within them. This shared identity will not be 
established by the suppression of other national identities rather:
People from different national groups will only share an allegiance to the larger 
polity if they see it as the context within which their national identity is 
nurtured, rather than subordinated. 33
From this position Kymlicka seeks to establish a criteria for the granting of group 
differentiated rights - that is rights that protect aspects of a group's societal culture. 
He believes that the types of claims made and the types of group who make them 
must be identified and that the granting of these claims facilitates allegiance to the 
wider societal culture that is dominant within the (liberal and democratic) state.
Kymlicka defines two types of group, immigrant groups and national groups. The first 
are immigrant ethnic minorities who have grown up within a defined societal culture 
in another territory. The second type are national groups. These national groups can 
be aboriginal in nature, such as the Inuit of Canada. These groups have already 
constructed their societal culture on the territory of the state, but have been shifted 
from dominance by historical factors relating to colonisation. Kymlicka also applies 
the term national group to a people like the Quebecois, who have arrived on a territory 
as a consequence of empire building and have established a distinct societal culture 
within the larger state.
These groups make two types of claim, internal and external. Internal claims ask the 
state to intervene in intra-group affairs to preserve orthodox beliefs and practices. 
External claims are about reducing the vulnerability of the group to being dominated 
by the majority group within the state.
33 Kymlicka, W 1995 Op. citp!89
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Kymlicka advances three methods of group-differentiated rights to meet external 
claims. Polyethnic rights allow members of a group to maintain a cultural practice in 
a way that does not conflict with participation in wider society. An example of a 
polyethnic right would be the exemption for Sikhs from wearing a hat as part of the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police uniform. Special representation rights would allow 
for groups to have guaranteed representation within public sector employment or in 
the state legislature. Self-government rights would grant a measure of political 
autonomy to a group, which could require re-organising the state on a federal basis.
On the whole, Kymlicka does not regard the claims of immigrant groups as having the 
same strength as those of a national group. Immigrants are judged to have voluntarily 
sought membership of the state. This, along with the fact that they no longer have the 
cement of the territory where their societal culture was constructed, means they do not 
have the right to recreate their societal culture entire in their new home. Refugees are 
not voluntary migrants, but Kymlicka says that since no other state has an obligation 
to allow them to recreate their culture, their grievance must be re-dressed by changes 
in the state that forced them to leave or they must simply bear the injustice.
Kymlicka does not allow for any internal claims to be made on the state. The state 
cannot allow for groups to enforce orthodoxy and tradition if members within the 
group are catalysts for change. Otherwise group-differentiated rights become a means 
for elites within groups to oppress individuals and abuse their rights.
The basic premise of Kymlicka's multicultural citizenship is that creates a sense of 
allegiance in a multination state. This is because it lowers possible barriers to 
participation and therefore opens up access to the dominant societal culture. In 
addition it grants national groups on the territory a recognition of cultural distinctness 
and certain measures of autonomy based on that recognition. Kymlicka advances 
group differentiation as a means of resolving tensions between cultural membership 
and state membership and therefore allow individuals to pursue the choices on offer to 
them.
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Reviewing the literature devoted to accommodating cultural identities within liberal 
democratic states four main arguments can be discerned that oppose Kymlicka's 
position. These arguments will now be evaluated in turn.
3.6 Critiques of Group Differentiated Rights
3.61. Group differentiation is not compatible with liberalism
The first criticism to consider is that group differentiated rights are collective rights 
by another name, and that this is a concept at variance with the individual rights of the 
citizen. Kukathas argues that "liberal theory does not begin with the assumption that 
the world is made up of isolated atomistic individuals". 34 However, he avers that 
whilst a liberal theorist may accept that individuals belong to groups, this does not 
mean that the moral claims of any group can be supported by a liberal state. 
Liberalism does not promote any particular membership within a society beyond 
citizenship so it cannot privilege any groups. The only freedoms that apply to groups 
are freedom of association and the freedom to leave a group. These freedoms apply at 
the individual level: there are no collective group rights.
Kymlicka responds to this criticism by arguing that interpretations of liberalism have 
evolved over time and that currently "we need to judge for ourselves what liberalism 
requires under our own conditions of ethno-cultural pluralism."35
Kymlicka is keen to stress that the states these claims are made against are in 
themselves based on a dominant societal culture and it is erroneous to assume that 
"the liberal state, in its normal operation, abides by a principle of ethno-cultural
34 Kukathas, C 'Are there any cultural rights?' Political Theory 20 (1) 1992, pi 10
35 Kymlicka, W 'The new debate over minority rights' from Requenjo, F (ed) Democracy and National
Pluralism (London) Routledge 2001, p!9
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neutrality." A civic nation state is imbued with values from its dominant grouping. 
The assumptions of the societal culture can bar members of groups from full 
participation, and therefore the equality of civic membership within that society. 
Kymlicka sees this as a problem experienced at the individual, rather than collective, 
level. Not every Sikh wanted to join the Royal Canadian Mounted Police but until the 
uniform change, practicing Sikhs who did were excluded.
Kymlicka then goes on to argue that liberalism is fundamentally about choice and that 
group differentiation rights are about equality in freedom of choice, again between 
individuals. He regards cultural membership as important because of the context it 
provides for our choices:
Deciding how to lead our lives is, in the first instance, a matter of exploring the 
possibilities made available by our culture. However, some minority cultures 
may need protection from the economic or political decisions of the majority 
culture if they are to provide this context for their members. 37
Kymlicka presents this as maximising the freedom of individuals and not placing 
them within a collective will. Additionally, because Kymlicka 7 s framework accepts 
no internal claims, the liberal state cannot be invoked to enforce members to maintain 
complete cultural orthodoxy to the detriment of their individual choice.
According to Kymlicka, the principle of group-differentiated rights is not at variance 
with liberalism for two reasons. Firstly they are about promoting the choice and 
participation of the individual citizen. Secondly they recognise that the state is not a 
idealised neutral entity but one shaped by a dominant culture. However, this mainly 
applies to the range of rights he defines as polyethnic. Polyethnic claims are based on 
the assertion that the state is governed by a societal culture that can sometimes adhere 
to one ethno-cultural perspective to the detriment of members with different cultural
36 Kymlicka, W 2001 Op. cit p21
37Kymlicka, W 'the rights of minority cultures' Political Theory 20 (1) 1992, p!40
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values. The adjustment of symbols, regulations and oaths eases potential obstructions 
to participation but this is a different project to the granting of representation rights or 
measures of autonomy.
3.6.2 Group Differentiated Rights Artificially Perpetuate Group Identities
A second argument advanced in Kukathas's critique of Kymlicka's thesis is that it 
accepts cultural identity as a given.
The most seductive and dangerous move in that politics [of identity] asserts that 
identity is not political but somehow, natural or original. But identity is not 
natural or original, or permanent, or even necessarily particularly enduring. It is 
fluid, ever changing (to varying degrees) and inescapably political. 38
The examples Kymlicka uses to illustrate practical instances of differentiated rights 
are drawn mostly from Canada. One of the main groups making claims on the 
Canadian State are the Quebecois, who seek powers of self-government and state 
recognition of their linguistic difference from the Anglophone majority. However, 
there is no corresponding Creole movement in the U.S.A. Historical differences may 
over time be diminished, or vanish altogether. Identities do evolve and dissolve.
Kymlicka argues that if interests of culture, language and identity are ignored by the 
state "then people will feel harmed - and indeed will be harmed - even if their civil, 
political and welfare rights are respected and the result can be serious damage to 
people's self-respect and sense of agency". 39 Even if this is true, this is not an 
argument for group-differentiation in itself. The statement does not explain why 
pluralism at the level of civil society could not accord respect for a variety of 
identities and cultures. It also assumes that people value their cultural identity as the 
essence of themselves, the power that activates their sense of agency, where they may
38Kukathas, C 'Liberalism, multiculturalism and oppression' from Vincent A (ed) Political Theory: 
Tradition and Diversity (Cambridge) Cambridge University Press 1997, p!50
39Kymlicka, W 2001 Op. cit, p30
66
in fact seek no political recognition for such differences as language.
Whilst campaigners for national and cultural claims often present their identity as 
primordial and essential, one does not have to agree in order to acknowledge these 
claims. Differentiation can instead be interpreted as a means of dealing with the fact 
that some cultural identities have developed increasing political salience, rather than a 
belief that these identities are innate and unchanging. This becomes clearer if the 
concept of differentiation is seen as a method of reformulating self-determination. 
Kymlicka asserts that it is implicit in most liberal writings that "cultures of nations are 
basic units of liberal political theory".40 Kymlicka seeks to promote differentiation as 
a means of maintaining the territorial unity of a state, whilst granting lesser measures 
of autonomy to national groups who demand them, as an alternative to conflict and/or 
secession.
3.6.3 Group Differentiated Rights are not Differentiated Enough
Parekh's assessment of Kymlicka offers criticism from a different perspective to 
Kukathas and Miller. Parekh contends that Kymlicka's theories are limited because 
they implicitly regard liberalism as superior when what is required is "a theoretical 
framework capable of appreciating and accommodating plural understandings of 
culture".41 Instead Parekh proposes a "dialogically constituted multicultural society"42 
in which state institutions are engaged in a near continual process of defining what 
constitutes equal treatment across different groups. This project is supported by a 
body of citizens whose activities embody "such essential political virtues as mutual 
respect and concern, tolerance, self-restraint, willingness to enter into unfamiliar 
worlds of thought, love of diversity, a mind open to others' needs, and the ability to
40 Kymlicka, W 1995 Op. cit, p93
41 Parekh, B Multiculturalism. Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Basingstoke) MacMillan 2000, 
p!08
42 Parekh, B 2000 Op. cit, p340
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persuade and live with unresolved differences".43
The burden of expectation that Parekh places on citizenship is unacceptable. As 
Miller argues, a process of debate between cultural groups cannot guarantee 
endorsement or understanding.44 In addition it is questionable whether a love of 
diversity is an essential political virtue. Bryant argues that "civil society is marked by 
civility not fraternity"45 which suggests that, for the most part, polite indifference may 
work best in matters of cultural plurality. As discussed in the opening sections of this 
chapter, the Jacobin ideal of participatory citizenship is hard to put into practice and, 
in addition to this, many citizens may not wish to present themselves in the political 
arena as bearers of a cultural identity that must be continually acknowledged.
3.6.4 Group Differentiated Rights Privilege Ethnic Elites
The final criticism of group-differentiated rights comes again from Kukathas, who 
asserts that cultural rights do not distinguish between the elite and the mass of a 
group's membership. Elites move within dominant society, the arena where claims 
are advanced and settled. This separates their daily experience from the mass 
membership of the national group. In addition Kukathas argues that a more financially 
secure elite advances cultural claims whilst the more impoverished bulk of the group 
would benefit from state policies concerned with redistribution of social and 
economic goods.
43Parekh, B 2000 Op. cit, p340
44 Miller, D Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge) Polity 2000
45Bryant, C 'Citizenship, national identity and the accommodation of difference' New Community 
April 199723(2), pi58
46 Kukathas, C 1992 Op. cit.
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Kymlicka only really addresses the issues of differences within the group when he 
discounts internal claims. Here he argues that group leaders cannot enforce orthodox 
practice on the group. He does not consider how elites, who are in the position to 
advance claims, can use this to institutionalise orthodoxy and sideline other claims 
within the group.
3.6.5 Summary
Kymlicka's framework for group differentiated rights seeks to accommodate 
differences without damaging equality of citizenship. Kymlicka presents this as a 
solution to the problem, which he perceives as a gap between the dominant societal 
culture of the state the diversity of those who reside within its borders.
The weakest part of Kymlicka's argument is that he draws too strong a link between 
individual agency and cultural identity. He cannot use this as the sole basis of his 
framework of rights as he gives greater weight to national identities historically linked 
to the territory in question, which would suggest inequality of treatment between 
identities. In addition he does not address the power of elites within national groups, 
and therefore does not answer whether there is a conflict between granting cultural 
justice and social justice.
It would be better to characterise Kymlicka's work as a pragmatic tool used to 
redefine self-determination to maintain the integrity of existing states. States are 
presented as imbued with a dominant societal culture and not as a neutral framework 
of rights and institutions. Kymlicka's measures are designed to encourage allegiance 
to the wider polity by increasing the opportunities for participation in state institutions 





The universe of cases to which consociational theory is supposed to apply 
consists of countries with cultural segmentation. This term means that there 
exists clearly distinguishable cultural groups each managing its own identity: it 
means further that these cultural identities have political relevance.47
Consociational theorists contend that certain states contain societies that are highly 
segmented and lack cross-cutting cleavages. A consociational settlement is proposed 
by supporters as a means of guaranteeing both stability and an acceptable level of 
democratic decision-making in such societies.
Four European democracies have formed the practical basis of studies of 
Consociationalism: The Netherlands, Austria, Belgium and Switzerland.48 Lorwin 
characterises them as examples of segmented pluralism:
segmented pluralism is the organisation of social movements, educational and 
communications systems, voluntary associations, and political parties along the 
lines of religious and ideological cleavages. 49
Steiner, J 'Research strategies beyond Consociationalism' Journal of Politics Vol. 43, p!242
48 Luther notes that the inclusion of Switzerland in studies of Consociationalism is controversial. 
Sciarini and Hug concede that the Swiss state is federal rather than consociational and that there are 
cross-cutting cleavages. However, they argue that Swiss political life is imbued with the consociational 
characteristics of accommodation, proportionality and concentration of power. See Luther, KR 'A 
framework for the comparative analysis of political parties and systems in consociational democracy' 
and Sciarini, P and Hug, S 'The odd fellow: parties and Consociationalism in Switzerland' Both from 
Luther, KR and Deschouwer, K (eds) Party Elites in Divided Societies: Political Parties in 
Consociational Democracy (London) Routledge 1999
49 Lorwin, VR 'Segmented Pluralism' Comparative Politics Vol. 3 No.2 1971 p!41
70
Lorwin argues that no society is completely segmented, rather that for societies such 
as the Netherlands in the immediate post-war period, segmentation was a dominant 
feature.
Lijphart proposes that "overarching cooperation at the elite level can be a substitute 
for cross-cutting affiliations at the mass level". 50 The elites of different groups are 
drawn into a power sharing agreement comprising four elements; coalition at the level 
of the executive, proportionality in decision making, the power of mutual veto and 
segmental autonomy. 51 It is envisaged that this type of settlement will encourage 
moderation and compromise amongst elite leaders and encourage allegiance to the 
state from groups who would be excluded from power under a majoritarian system of 
democracy. 52
Consociational theory is based on the premise that segmental divisions "have to be 
accommodated and cannot simply be ignored or wished away". 53 This 
accommodation must take place at the executive level of the state - association within 
the sphere of civil society is not sufficient. The special representation and self- 
government modes of group differentiation must be enacted. Opponents of 
consociational theory disagree with this and argue that the entrenchment of identities 
within the constitution damages democracy and does not create stability.
Consociationalism is seen as inimical to democracy for three reasons, which will now 
be considered. These arguments are that firstly the level of consensus required 
unfairly curtails the dynamism of debate and opposition that makes democracy 
function. Secondly consociational settlements are accused of fomenting extremism
50Lijphart, A The Politics of Accommodation (Berkley and Los Angeles) University of California 
Press 1968, p2000
51 Lijphart, A 'Definitions, evidence and policy: a response to Matthijis Bogaard's critique' Journal of 
Theoretical Politics Vol. 12 No. 4 October, 2000, p425
52Lijphart, A Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries 
(New Haven) Yale University Press 1999
53 Lijphart. A Power-sharing in South Africa (Berkley) University of California 1985, pi 08
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rather than encouraging moderation and compromise. Thirdly it is argued that 
consociational theory reinforces cultural orthodoxy and homogeneity within segments 
to the detriment of the agency of individual citizens. 
3.7.2 Are consociational democracies insufficiently democratic?
A basic element of a consociational democracy is a grand coalition of the relevant 
elites. Horowitz argues that the structure of consociationalism does not allow for a 
proper parliamentary opposition, which is a check on executive power. 54 Dixon 
contends that the 'top-down' form of power sharing advocated by consociational 
theorists is distinctive because of its "scepticism of democracy". 55 This scepticism is 
evident in the insulation of elites from the supposedly more extremist masses. Dixon 
contrasts the consociational model with a civil society model where interaction of 
groups from the bottom of society upwards creates a conducive environment for a 
stable democracy. Civil society in consociational settlements is perceived as 
segmented and cultural autonomy is embedded in constitutional arrangements.
Luther has formulated a framework of parties in consociational democracies. 56 He 
argues that participation in these democracies is high, but it is mostly symbolic. 
Parties need to mobilise their subculture as a show of strength to parties from other 
segments. For these elites quantity, not quality, of participation is key. Advocates of 
these settlements do accept that consociational democracy is slow to promote change 
and generate debate, but Lijphart asserts that for plural societies "the only choice is 
between consociational democracy and no democracy"57 and that the lack of 
dynamism is compensated for by the endurance and stability of the settlement.
54 Horowitz, D 'The Agreement: clear, consociational, risky' from McGarry, J (ed) Northern Ireland 
and the Divided World (Oxford) Oxford University Press 2001, pp89-109
55Dixon, P 'Paths to peace in Northern Ireland' (I) Civil society and consociational approaches' 
Democratisation Vol.4 No.2 1997, p2
56 Luther, KR & Deschouwer, K (eds) 1999, Op. cit.
57 Lijphart, A 1985 Op. cit, pi09
Reynolds states that:
The consociational philosophy rests on the argument that in bitterly divided 
societies the stakes are too high for politics to be conducted as a zero-sum game. 
The risks of governmental collapse and civil instability are too great for parties 
to view the executive branch of government as a prize to be won or lost. 5. 58
However, the next criticism of consociational theory to be considered is the 
accusation consociationalism facilitates a different zero sum game, one of implacable 
ethnic demands, encouraging extremism rather than compromise.
3.7.3 Do consociational settlements promote extremist ethnic movements?
Barry argues that emphasis on elite accommodation undermines rather than promotes 
consensus within a state because "if there is to be a leadership of an ethnic group that 
is not in danger of being undercut by challengers, it must be inevitably seen to be 
talking up an extreme position in defence of the group's interests". 59
Barry's argument assumes that ethnic demands are by their nature extreme and 
therefore ethnic group leaders will not be able to reach a middle ground because they 
will not be able to compromise. Demands by ethnic group need not necessarily tend 
to extremism and may well be catered for by control over areas such as education. 
Barry cannot prove that ethnic movements must tend towards polarisation.
Barry's arguments suggest that ethnic extremism is, by its nature, inimical to 
consensus and moderation. In order to avoid being undercut by a rival within the 
subculture, a party must promote a manifesto that cannot be outbid in terms of
58 Reynolds, A 'A constitutional pied piper: the Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement' Political 
Science Quarterly Vol. 114 1999-2000, p617
59 Barry, B 'Political accommodation and consociational democracy' British Journal of Politics Vol. 5
1975, p506
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defending that subculture's interests. This view of parties operating within a 
consociational framework will be examined in relation to party competition since the 
Good Friday Agreement.
Consociational systems are meant to encourage moderation and compromise. What is 
open to question is what centripetal forces would encourage a society of segmented 
subcultures to engage with this type of consensual politics. Bogaards60 asserts that 
advocates of consociational theory have offered favourable factors that enhance the 
probability of the survival of a consociational settlement. These factors include 
segments being of equal size, segmental isolation and the presence of external threats, 
which enhance a sense of common interest. However, Bogaards argues that these 
theorists have not resolved whether any of these factors are either necessary or 
sufficient for a successful consociational democracy.
Pappalardo agrees that this task must be undertaken if works on consociationalism are 
to include a predictive aspect, analysing the potential success of future consociational 
settlements. Not to do so "has its costs, especially if one relies on the voluntaristic, 
rational and intentional aspects of human behaviour when inquiring into the future of 
a political system, which in fact risks giving merely presumptive answers".61
Barry's criticism suggests that elites must tend to extremism to appease the masses. 
Consociational models tend to prescribe the insulation of elites in order to encourage 
the freedom to compromise. An alternative perspective comes from Kukathas' 
criticism of group-differentiations privileging of elites. As was discussed earlier. 
Kukathas suggests that elites can be concerned with the granting of cultural rights 
rather than the distribution of social goods, and in that way can be detached from 
those they claim to represent. This does not mean that elites always will push for
Bogaards, M 'The favourable factors for consociational democracy: a review' European Journal of 
Political Research Vol. 33 1998, pp475-496
Pappalardo, A The conditions for consociational democracy: a logical and empirical critique' 
European Journal of Political Research Vol.9 1981, p366
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cultural autonomy over social justice, or that if they do these demands must tend 
towards intransigence and extremism. However, whilst it cannot be argued that 
consociational settlements must by their nature encourage ethnic extremism without 
an adequate theoretical explanation of why they should not, it is harder to accept that 
study of existing consociational settlements can be used as a template for other 
divided societies.
3.7.3 Do consociational settlements undermine common citizenship?
A third criticism of consociationalism relates to the second. Supporters of social 
transformation models of conflict resolution present consociationalism as a project 
that undermines the promotion of a common identity. Instead it entrenches and 
privileges differences in cultural identity. Rupert Taylor states:
By reducing the dynamic nature of human action to the common denominator of 
ethno-nationalism, the consociational position displaces the question of human 
freedom and action and is ill prepared to grasp the dynamics of social change. 62
This echoes the criticisms of group differentiation in general, that sectionalism and 
separatism can be defused by the promotion of an active citizenry sharing an identity 
that is neutral enough to encourage allegiance. Supporters of social transformation 
theories look to socio-economic measures that will ease inequalities and increase 
participation in the civil society and state spheres of political action.
Advocates of consociationalism would argue that the kind of settlement they propose 
does not create the problem. In certain states some cultural identities have already 
developed a momentum that propels them to demand certain forms of self- 
determination. McGarry and O'Leary argue that "consociationalism does not involve 
the unilateral invention of ethnic groups, but rather the recognition of those groups
62 Taylor, R 'Northern Ireland: consociation or social transformation?' From McGarry, J 2001 Op. cit,
p40
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which assert their presence through popular protest, insurrection or democratic 
politics".63
However, this does not mean that consociational theorists necessarily accept these 
identities as fixed and inflexible. Instead consociationalism can be advanced as a 
means of allowing the political salience of cultural identities to be diminished. 
O'Leary argues that the advantage of consociationalism is that "if it succeeds, it 
becomes dispensable". 64 McGarry echoes this belief by defining a "consociational 
paradox" where recognising difference is the first stage to easing differences between 
citizens.65
It has already been noted that consociational theory has been drawn from comparative 
political analysis, which enables both McGarry and O'Leary to offer Austria and the 
Netherlands as examples of states that have used the stability of consociational 
elements in political activity to eventually transcend difference. However, these 
European democracies combined severe cultural division with an overarching national 
identity. Lijphart's assessment of the Dutch system of accommodation66 showed that 
whilst Catholic, Calvinist and secular education systems taught different 
interpretations of Dutch history, they were still teaching the history of the Netherlands 
to which all subcultures were perceived to belong.
Wilson and Wilford argue that the potential of consociationalism to transform 
segmented societies depends on the nature of the society to which this style of 
democracy is applied:
If consociationalism derives from consensus rather than conflict (as it did in the 
Netherlands) it will tend to wither away to intercultural civility; if it is a
63 McGarry, J & O'Leary, B 'Proving our points on Northern Ireland (and giving reading lessons to 
Dr. Dixon) Irish Political Studies Vol. 11 1996, p 151
64 O'Leary, B 'The limits to coercive consociationalism in Northern Ireland' Political Studies Vol. 37 
1989, p572
65 McGarry, J 'Northern Ireland, civic nationalism and the Good Friday Agreement' From McGarry, J 
(ed)2001 Op. cit, p214
66 Lijphart, A 1968 Op. cit.
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response to conflict it will tend (as in Belgium) to reinforce communal
separation. 67
Lorwin suggests that the development of national television channels has partially 
superseded the segmented print media of the Netherlands, and it is factors such as this 
that have diminished the salience of cleavages in Dutch society. 68 Wolinetz argues 
that "almost all liberal democracies have been subject to similar sources of 
realignment and dealignment" as consociational societies, in particular the rise of 
environmental politics and the re-emergence of the populist right.69 Luther and 
Deschouwer state that these analogous trends "have a potentially especially systemic 
implication for consociational democracies". 70 In particular these parties undermine 
bases of support and mobilisation. Luther notes that new far right parties, such as the 
Freedom Party of Austria (FPO), have made capital out of criticising 
consociationalism for perpetuating patronage and therefore corruption. 71
The consociational paradox, whereby politically salient differences between citizens 
are diminished, could be due to other forces at work in these societies. In addition, 
some transformations, such as realignment around the platform of far-right parties, 
might not be the kind of social change that consociational theorists had in mind. 
However, supporters of consociational settlements argue that they create the stability 
that allows change to take place and that such systems contain and transform 
extremism. For example, Kriesi has predicted that the effects of the success of the 
far-right SVP (Swiss People's Party) in the 2003 elections will be tempered by the 
consensual Swiss system, as the FPO were in Austria meaning that "the collegial
67 Wilson, R & Wilford, R Northern Ireland: a Route to Stability? (Birmingham) ESRC Devolution 
Policy Paper 2003, p7
68 Lorwin, VR 1971 Op. cit.
69 Wolinetz, SB 'The consociational party system' from Luther, KR and Deschouwer, K (eds) 1999 
Op. cit, p241
Luther, KR and Deschouwer, K 'Prudent leadership to successful adaptation? Pillar parties and 
consociational democracy fifty years on' from Luther, KR and Deschouwer, K (eds) 1999 Op. cit, p251
71 Luther, KR 'A framework for the comparative analysis of political parties and party systems in
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72system won't change, although its exact composition might".
More recent studies of consociational settlements have expanded the range of 
democracies studies to take in cases such as Northern Ireland and Cyprus. There are 
practical difficulties in such extrapolation. For a start the conflict between segments 
has been more intense. Horowitz points out:
We cannot quite be sure whether the western cases are conflicts that are 
moderate because they have effectively been controlled or whether they are 
effectively controlled because they are moderate conflicts to begin with. This is 
the problem with advocates of "consociational democracy" on the model of 
Arend Lijphart. 73
In addition these conflicts often lack the overarching national identity that the 
European democracies studied could rely on to create some degree of consensus.
Lijphart argues that social science can only deal with the probable and the success of 
consociational settlements cannot be guaranteed. 74 However, Lijphart's theories 
require a greater discussion of what encourages citizens to feel allegiance to a state, 
especially when the society within that state is a very segmented one.
consociational democracy" from Luther, KR and Deschouwer, K (eds) 1999 Op. cit, pp3-19
'Far-right victory could shatter Switzerland's magic political formula' www.channelnewsasia.com 
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3.7.4 Consociationalism: a transitional phase?
The best normative case for consociational arrangements is that they involve the 
self-government of the relevant communities, and they are better than the 
alternatives: majority domination, bloody partition, secessionist warfare and the 
unthinkable options of population transfers and genocide. 75
Consociational theory contends that stability in a divided society can be encouraged if 
elites are persuaded to cooperate, compromising on some demands in return for a 
large measure of cultural autonomy. This leads to a slower and less dynamic form of 
democracy, but the supposed advantage is that the stability that results produces 
conditions conducive to the diminishing of division.
Some critiques of consociationalism, such as those who offered by Barry and Taylor 
tend to depict a false dichotomy between a neutral civil politics and ethno-national 
politics which must, by its nature, tend to extremism. Ethno-nationalist goals need 
not necessarily be extreme and nationalist demands are not necessarily material 
demands articulated through the guise of nationalism.
Consociationalism proposes one means of providing a mode of self-government that 
stops short of secession. However, there are weaknesses in this theory. 
Consociational settlements are presented as solutions grounded in pragmatism and yet 
have a tendency to idealise elites as superbly adept at statesmanship. Social 
transformation theorists such as Rupert Taylor create a dichotomy between ethnic 
demands and social demands, which suggests two different systems that can only 
answer one set of these claims. However, consociational 'top-down' settlements 
cannot hope to evolve as a middle path between these demands without a host of very 
favourable factors.
74 Lijphart, A 1985 Op. cit
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Consociational settlements correspond with ideas of group differentiation in terms of 
offering special representation and self-government mechanisms. Proponents accept 
these solutions make for a slow paced democracy, with this emphasis placed on 
compromise, especially at the elite level.
Group differentiation is not a politics of difference that holds all cultural identities to 
be fixed and of equal resonance. The essence of differentiation is that the state retains 
supreme authority, but offers the devolution of powers and responsibility that it 
presents as a form of self-determination to groups who have defined themselves as a 
nation. One criticism of both differentiation and consociationalism is that these modes 
of politics undermine the common political identity of equal citizenship and damages 
the agency of those citizens.
Proponents of consociational settlements, such as McGarry and O'Leary, have argued 
that these settlements have the paradoxical effect of transcending difference. 
However this optimism is qualified by Horowitz. He points out that the comparative 
study of European consociational democracies is yet to produce a clear indicator of 
whether elements of stability and consensus can be attributed to the actual system of 
elite accommodation or whether they predate it. He asks "which in other words is the 
dependent and which the independent variable?"76 The idea that consociational 
democracy is a pragmatic alternative to zero-sum politics becomes more problematic 
if it is viewed as a result of consensus, rather than the creator of it.
Both sides of this argument need to be considered in relation to the constitutional 
arrangements for the governing of Northern Ireland laid down in the Good Friday 
Agreement. The above discussions have set the context for debating the nature of the 
claims for recognition, autonomy and self-determination in Northern Ireland and the 
means for accommodating. These will now be outlined.
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3.8 Northern Ireland; Two Claims for Self-Determination
In Northern Ireland rival nations and rival understandings of national self- 
determination have been locked in combat. 77
Lorwin excluded Northern Ireland from his studies of segmented pluralist societies on 
the grounds that it was "neither state nor nation and which has not created a system of 
segmented pluralism out of its fierce religious hostilities."78 He preferred to 
concentrate on those European states that combined a low degree of conflict with a 
higher degree of segmentation than found in Northern Ireland. In particular, he laid 
stress on a segmented trade union movement.
The unionist and nationalist divide is often represented in the simple religious terms 
of Catholic and Protestant, but terms such as two traditions and two communities are 
also regularly used. Little notes that the term communities could be problematic if the 
use of the word implied being prescriptive about the ideas and actions of those to 
whom the label was being applied. He states that "whilst communities may well have 
an idea of who is and is not a member of their community...this does not mean that 
internal relations are necessarily cohesive or consensual". 79 Therefore the use of a 
term such as community should not preclude understanding of internal diversity.
Hadden profiles the nationalist and unionist communities and concludes that both 
have aspects that entitle them to claim self-determination: they have distinctiveness 
drawn from language, culture and religion. Both groups have a shared sense of history 
and a commitment to maintain a communal identity, which is associated with a 
territory. 80 This cultural distinctiveness is supplemented by claims to two political
76 Horowitz, D Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley) University of California Press 2000, p572
77 McGarry, J and O'Leary, B Explaining Northern Ireland (Oxford) Blackwell 1995, p!4
78 Lorwin, VR 1971 Op. cit p44, footnote 4
79 Little, A 'The problems of antagonism: applying liberal political theory to conflict in Northern 
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80 Hadden, T 1994 Op. cit. The revival of the Gaelic language has been associated with Irish 
nationalism since the nineteenth century. More recently some unionists have promoted Ulster Scots as 
a language rather than an archaic dialect. However, English is both the official and the vernacular 
language of Northern Ireland.
81
identities, British and Irish. Both nationalists and unionists accord with the groups 
entitled to articulate a claim to group differentiation by Kymlicka's criteria. The 
nationalist community can establish themselves credibly as an aboriginal group, 
whilst the societal culture of unionism has been established and developing on the 
same territory since the 17th Century.
Realising self-determination or self-government for both groups by the measure of re- 
partitioning the province is not a viable solution. Despite increasing segregation in 
some areas, there is no easy line of re-partition. Tonge points out that Belfast now has 
a Catholic majority, but "unless the new border were based on unprecedented 
contortions, Belfast would remain in Northern Ireland". 81 The two communities are 
not separated enough for a 'clean' partitioning of Northern Ireland.
In addition to the practical difficulties entailed in a re-partition, it would be wrong to 
equate religion automatically with constitutional preference. Tonge argues that this 
proposal would be "based upon the fallacy that all Catholics would support a 
redrawing" and not on the actual strength of Irish nationalist sentiment in an area. 82 
Analysis of electoral surveys carried out between 1989 and 1998 by the Centre for 
Research into Elections and Social Trends (CREST) shows that ten per-cent of 
Catholics list their national identity as British and one per-cent describe themselves 
politically as unionists. 83 Finally, partition would not serve the interests of those 
minorities within Northern Ireland who have no association with either tradition, if 
the redrawn boundaries encouraged religious affiliation as the sole marker of 
belonging.
In summation, the communities have cultural distinctiveness and their societal 
cultures have been established on the territory in question for a substantial period of
81 Tonge, J Northern Ireland Conflict and Change (Harlow) Pearson 2002, p205
82 Tonge, J 2002 Op. cit p205
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time. However, for the reasons discussed above repartition would not deliver a 
workable or just solution.
3.9 The Good Friday Agreement
The Good Friday Agreement is the clearest example of fully blown 
consociationalism that exists today. 84
Wilford et al describe the Good Friday Agreement as "consociational plus" as it 
combines "constitutional, political and security issues" with "issues of social and 
economic inclusion and human and cultural rights". 85 O'Leary avers that the 
Agreement has the four elements of a consociational settlement: a power-sharing 
executive, proportionality, cultural autonomy and power of veto. However, this 
internal consociational model is built into "overarching confederal institutions". 86 
External and internal elements are interlinked. The existence of north-south bodies are 
dependent on the survival of the assembly and vice versa.
When Lijphart first examined the prospects for consociationalism in Northern Ireland 
he was not hopeful due to the fact that there was no multiple power balance. Instead 
there were two groupings of unequal size. Also there was a distinct lack of national 
solidarity. The most hope he could offer was that the requisite statesmanlike qualities 
could be encouraged amongst elites. 87 O'Leary argues that the lack of elite motivation
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and domination in Northern Ireland required a measure of coercion, which was 
achieved by the insistence of the British government to unionists that the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement could only be superseded by a negotiated settlement. 88
The prospects of the Agreement rest on three hopes. The first is a belief that a 
sufficient number of political actors in Northern Ireland will acquiesce with 
consociationalism as the only settlement that internal groupings and external 
governments will endorse. Secondly the Agreement is intended to enforce a style of 
consociational politics that is about compromise, rather than encouraging extremism. 
The interlinked nature of the elements of the agreement means one cannot pick and 
choose between institutions.
The third theme of the Agreement is the concept of parity of esteem, which deals with 
aspirations and identities. The agreement states:
Whatever, choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern 
Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there shall be 
exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all people in the diversity of 
their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full 
respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom 
from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal
OQ
treatment for the identity, ethos and aspirations of both communities. 
Carmichael believes that the Agreement constitutes an:
accommodation that denies no-one their identity and which accepts that 
sovereignty must be understood as a more complex phenomenon in a more 
intrinsic system of governance, without explicitly downplaying the reality of the 
more narrow legal aspect of sovereignty (that Northern Ireland remains 'British'
88 O'Leary, B 'The limits to coercive consociationalism' Political Studies Vol.37 1989 pp562-588
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and coloured to that effect - albeit a paler shade of pink - on the map). 90
The Good Friday Agreement is not about co-sovereignty or joint-authority over 
Northern Ireland. It accords with the aims of differentiated rights, because it offers a 
measure of group differentiation that is designed to encourage nationalist participation 
in government. Hazelton argues that "the emphasis becomes "internal" self- 
determination; that is democratic self-government, meaningful participation, human 
rights, safeguards, communal autonomy, and equal protection for minority
communities."91
Tonge presents co-identity as one of the components of the settlement, which means 
"there is no such thing as disloyalty in Northern Ireland. The agreement allows a 
range of identities; British; Irish; British-Irish. It does not discriminate between 
them". 92
The Agreement is founded on consociational prescriptions for a settlement. However, 
there is a civil society component, which is weak but still present within the ethos of 
the agreement. What needs to be considered now is the nature of party competition 
within this consociational settlement. As has already been noted critics of 
consociational settlements such as Barry, argue that they promote ethnic extremism 
because parties must protect themselves against intra-bloc rivals. The alternative of a 
civil society settlement will then be considered.
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3.9.1 Extremism and Moderation
Wilson and Wilford have identified four elements of the Good Friday Agreement 
"which arguably have entrenched sectarian division" and prevented the development 
of an overarching allegiance. 93 These are the either/or constitutional preference; the 
single transferable vote (STV) electoral system, the requirement of communal 
registration; and use of the D'Hondt mechanism for executive formation. Horowitz 
concurs with the view that, for segmented polities, the alternative vote system is 
preferable to STV because it is more likely to encourage vote pooling and inter-ethnic 
transfers. 94 Mitchell disputes this and argues that STV does encourage "pre-electoral 
co-operation and potentially even accommodation". 95
The Good Friday Agreement has created a consociational settlement but there is no 
single framework to which all consociational agreements conform. Supporters of 
consociational settlements in general and the Agreement in particular can still express 
dissatisfaction with certain elements. O'Leary for example worries that the dual 
premiership has proved to be a major weakness.96 The effect of different elements of 
the Agreement can be debate, but it is now time to return to Barry's argument that by 
their nature consociational settlements must engender a party system based on ethnic 
extremism.
Horowitz believes that the peace process that led to the Good Friday Agreement 
brought extremes in at the exact point where the popular mood demand they be kept 
out:
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The irony is that the participants in the Belfast negotiations had set their face 
against a government of the moderate middle at the very moment when the 
moderate middle had grown strong. The participants embraced the extremes 
when the public was repelled by the violence of the extremes. 97
Sinn Fein and the DUP are recognised as the extremes operating within the post- 
Agreement party system. Bew believes that the rise to predominance of these parties 
would destroy the Good Friday Agreement because it would mean the "victory of two 
parties whose raison d'etre lies in harking back to past grievances". 98
Horowitz links the label of extremism to violence implying that paramilitary 
representatives were the only extremists to be embraced. The DUP, which has 
recently succeeded in outbidding the UUP for the role of toughest defenders of the 
union, is not affiliated to any paramilitary movement. They were included in the 
nascent peace process before any public overtures were made to representatives of the 
IRA, UVF and UDA.
Groups who utilise the most strident ethnic rhetoric do not necessarily back this up 
with violence. In fact, the republican movement which has now embraced concerns 
such as language and culture has perpetrated less violence than it did in the early 
1970s when it was steeped in the discourse of civic republicanism and socialist 
transformation.
Mitchell, O'Leary and Evans recognise that post-Agreement party competition has 
increased the popularity of the DUP and Sinn Fein and do attribute this to their power 
to outdo their rivals on issues that can be linked to the interests of their relevant 
subculture. In particular, they note that the SDLP's position has been undermined 
very quickly and state that "especially for younger nationalist voters, the question
97 Horowitz, D 'The Northern Ireland Agreement: clear, consociational, risky' from McGarry, J (ed)
2001 Op. cit, plOl
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increasingly arises: why not vote for the fresher and more assertive brand?"99 
However they argue that this party competition has been aided by covert moderation:
Despite misleading rhetoric to the contrary, both 'extreme' parties moderated 
their platforms, and may continue to do so, and this softening of their positions 
partly explains their electoral successes. 100
Emerson predicted that the DUP's 'No' stance would continue to be moderated if they 
overtook the UUP at the 2003 Assembly election:
If the DUP top the polls though, holy writ will just have to be re-wrote and the 
track record of the DUP's ministers indicates they are prepared to deal. With 
their cover blown and Sinn Fein on the policing board, the Agreement will 
begin to work not from the middle ground out, but from the extremes in - and be 
all the more stable for it. 101
Consociational settlements rest on moderation and consensus. There is a sense that 
the script has been rewritten, in that the SDLP and UUP were envisaged by the British 
and Irish governments (and themselves) as the main beneficiaries of this settlement 
because they would reap the rewards of their moderate stance. Supporters of 
consociational democratic arrangements lay stress on the rewarding of Sinn Fein for 
moving away from violence and there is now support for the idea that, far from being 
marginalised by the UUP, the DUP will end up moderating their own militancy and 
remain within the system.
Luther believes that in a consociational system "the highly conflictual nature of much 
action-orientated ideological language might be expected to reduce the scope for
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entering into the compromises which such accommodation requires". 102 Therefore an 
initial stage whereby supporters are mobilised by extreme rhetoric must eventually be 
transcended. Luther also notes that parties wishing to mobilise a subculture must 
address material or instrumental values as well as ideational ones in order to 
demonstrate that they are capable of delivering rewards. They cannot trade on 
rhetoric forever. However, an alternative view of transcending difference is provided 
by a civil society model where the emphasis is placed on centripetal forces that 
emanate from the bottom-up rather than from top-down elite accommodation. It is 
this model that will now be considered.
3.9.2 Consociation or Civil Society?
The failure of civil society to deliver support for power-sharing does not 
necessarily mean that the mobilisation of civil society during the current peace 
process cannot propel politicians towards compromise. Northern Ireland is not 
trapped in history and the past does not have to repeat itself. 103
Dixon contends that proposed methods of conflict resolution for Northern Ireland 
have oscillated between a top-down consociational model and a bottom-up civil 
society model. British optimism about the potential of civil society has been dashed 
continually, one example being the failure of the TUC's back-to-work march during 
the Ulster Workers' Council strike of 1974. During the peace process leading up to 
the Agreement of 1998, Dixon says this optimism was again confounded by the low 
showing for the UDP, PUP and Women's Commission at the Forum elections in 
1996. Dixon argues that this despair pushes policy makers towards elite 
accommodation, on the erroneous assumption that because civil society models have 
failed they always will.
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Dixon's thesis assumes that the framers of the peace process were disappointed and 
surprised by the results of the Forum elections. However, the elections were 
organised in such a way that one per-cent was enough to give the Women's 
Commission two seats and entry to negotiations. Cochrane presents their campaign as 
mounted "from a standing start" only six weeks before the election was held. 104 The 
electoral system was designed to catch any stray organisation that was dedicated to an 
agenda other than the intransigence of the DUP. It was also a way of drawing in the 
political representatives of the loyalist paramilitaries. As will be shown in the 
following chapters, they charged themselves with selling the benefits of participating 
in negotiations their comrades and to a wider loyalist working class constituency and 
the convoluted electoral mechanism guaranteed that they would be kept within that
negotiating process. 105
The Good Friday Agreement is a form of bi-national settlement, but there is potential 
within it for non-communal political debate. The referendum for the agreement 
encouraged political activity in the civil society mode as trade unions, churches and 
business organisations formed a company to co-ordinate a non-party campaign for a 
yes vote. 106 Additionally, as Hazelton argues, there is potential for cross-community 
political action in that "people are free to transcend communal divisions through the 
Civic Forum in Strand One, through the North/South Ministerial Council in Strand 
Two, and the British-Irish Council in Strand Three." 107 Woods acknowledges that the 
Civic Forum is "viewed with some scepticism by many elected representatives", but 
he argues that the potential of the forum "lies in bringing the resources and goodwill
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of civil society to bear in support of the work of the assembly". 108 Beyond this, there 
is scope in the normal functioning of the assembly for co-operation on socio- 
economic matters, which was denied to the parties during direct rule.
The Agreement is consociational, but there are spaces within the institutional 
arrangements for the articulation of demands that cut across the main national groups. 
The fulfilment of this potential depends in part on whether political actors utilise 
them. This is where the importance of individual parties and their manifestos 
becomes pertinent to this discussion. Luther and Deschouwer believe that "parties do 
matter. They are not mere passive respondents to sociopolitical factors, but strategic 
actors". 109
To put the manifesto of new loyalism in context the focus of this chapter will now 
move to the work of Porter who advances a model of civic unionism that encourages 
debate and participation. Porter's work is important because he asserts that a civic 
political spirit of participation and co-operation can be generated within a settlement 
that has institutionalised separate national identities. This is significant in light of the 
UDP and PUP's commitment to social democratic politics as the basis of cross- 
community action, which they held whilst negotiating and signing a bi-national 
consociational settlement.
3.10 Norman Porter - Rethinking Unionism
Wrestling with political issues of identity is not in itself a sign of abnormality 
though wrestling with virtually nothing else is. 110
Porter seeks to articulate a mode of unionist political thought and action that supports 
a framework of institutions that grants recognition to British and Irish identities as a
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starting point for a Northern Irish way of life that encourages allegiance and 
reconciliation. His opening argument is that currently unionism suffers from a lack of 
vision. It is about maintaining the union for the union's sake, rather than debating 
what life within that union should be about. Porter identifies two dominant 
perspectives within unionism, which he terms cultural unionism and liberal unionism. 
He assesses both positions and deems them inadequate for dealing with the challenges 
that unionism faces. He seeks to establish a mode of unionist engagement with 
nationalists that facilitates a process of reconciliation. He argues that this engagement 
"entails risks and vulnerability, as we expose ourselves to others in a critically 
reflective way". 111
The challenges to unionism come from a number of different directions. Unionism is 
weak through internal division. It is challenged by the conspicuously different 
treatment it receives from Westminster. The Irish Government offers a series of 
challenges both because it offers unionists a permanent invitation to join the Irish 
State and because it seeks involvement in Northern Ireland as a guarantor of the 
nationalist community's rights. The European Union generates debates within the 
United Kingdom on the subject of sovereignty and national self-determination. Porter 
even considers the possibility that that this could encourage the development of a 
distinct English nationalism, which would challenge unionists to answer which 
peoples the union was between.
Finally there are challenges within Northern Ireland which Porter relates to the 
concept of 'parity of esteem'. He argues that parity of esteem is the basis of a 
discourse that informs the actions of the nationalist community and both the British 
and Irish governments. He says that it is also a profoundly important idea for non- 
nationalist groups in Northern Ireland:
The non-nationalist challenge to unionism transmitted indirectly through a 
politics of civil society has a significance that far exceeds the electoral strength
1 '' Porter, N The Elusive Quest: Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Belfast) Blackstaff 2003, p95
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of non-nationalist political parties. 112
Porter argues that the current dominant unionist positions cannot respond to these 
challenges. Their politics are intransigent and do nothing to guarantee the existence of 
the union as the constitutional framework for a vibrant and relatively uncontested 
polity.
3.91. Porter's Thesis
Porter's thesis is two-fold. Firstly he argues that we interpret events in the context of 
a horizon of meaning, a "particular horizon that defines the parameters of significance 
for those who share it". 113 This context should be capable of being revised in the light 
of experience, but primarily as a result of dialogue with those who interpret events in 
the context of a different horizon of meaning.
Secondly, Porter reasons that we cannot step outside ourselves or detach ourselves 
from our cultural background, but we do have a "capacity of critical reflection" by 
which we can revise and adopt different understandings within our cultural 
tradition. 114 This critical reflection is also primarily aided by dialogue, which must 
involve recognition and reciprocity.
In short, Porter argues that although we make choices within the context of a cultural 
tradition, this horizon of meaning will become restrictive, or our actions will become 
more and more inconsistent with our cultural background, unless we constantly 
recognise the worth of other horizons of meaning and revise our understandings of 
our motives through dialogue. As proof of this thesis, Porter offers us cultural and 
liberal unionism as instances of horizons of meaning that are blinkered and therefore
112 Porter, N 1996, Op. cit p!2
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weak. He then offers civic unionism as a means by which unionists are encouraged to 
recognise the worth of nationalist identity and nationalists are in turn encouraged to 
value the worth of a citizenship they share with unionists.
3.9.2 Cultural Unionism and Liberal Unionism
Porter characterises cultural unionism as the expression of an Ulster way of life that is 
framed by a Protestant horizon of meaning. Since the dissolution of Stormont it has 
been expressed in the actions of paramilitaries, in loyalist murals and in the Orange 
Order, as it has lacked adequate institutional expression. Cultural unionism rests on 
the idea that Protestantism is essential to liberty. British-ness should be about 
rejoicing in the Williamite settlement, which guarantees civil liberties under the 
auspices of the Protestant Crown. The defence of the Protestant people against the 
illiberal and disloyal Catholic presence in Ireland forms a historical narrative 
stretching from the massacre of settlers in 1641 to the undoing of Sunningdale in 
1974. These events are the basis of:
A grand cultural unionist narrative which emphasises three themes: the 
precariousness of Protestant experience in Ireland, the right of Protestants to 
belong in the north as a distinctive British presence, and the ongoing willingness 
of Protestants to make ultimate sacrifices for the sake of Britain in general and 
the Ulster unionist way of life in particular. 115
This narrative and the Protestant horizon of meaning that frames it is deemed 
unacceptable by Porter for three reasons. Firstly, examination of experience 
elsewhere demonstrates that Protestantism is not the sole guarantor for liberty in a 
state, and that at various times it has been the guiding force in a despotic state (Porter 
gives the example of Calvin's Geneva). Historically and in the contemporary world 
Protestantism has been demonstrated to be neither a sufficient nor a necessary 
condition of a liberal settlement. Because adherents of cultural unionism do not
115 Porter, N 1996 Op. cit, p90
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engage in any form of dialogue they do not acknowledge this.
Secondly, this horizon of meaning alienates nationalists since it shuts them out from 
full membership of the political community. It encourages no dialogue between the 
two groups.
Thirdly, this horizon of meaning makes the cultural unionist position 
incomprehensible to the rest of Britain. The mistrust and bitterness generated by this 
incomprehension further isolates cultural unionists within their supposed larger 
community of the United Kingdom. Porter argues that this affects cultural unionists' 
self-understanding of their Britishness and exacerbates their isolation. Dialogue with 
outside groups is cut off along with opportunities for unionists to re-appraise the 
union and what kind of life it should support.
Liberal unionism, on the other hand, proclaims its support for a British political way 
of life. Liberal unionism purports that "unionism is a necessary condition of a liberal 
society in Ireland". 116 A liberal settlement would rest on co-operation between the 
British and Irish states which would overcome nationalist intransigence by 
establishing Northern Ireland as an integral and fully integrated part of Great Britain. 
Expressions of Irish-ness would be found at the non-political level as the settlement 
would include toleration of cultural diversity.
Porter argues that liberal unionism is as closed off and uncompromising as cultural 
unionism for two reasons. Liberal unionism does not enter into dialogue with the 
nationalist community because it seeks to belittle their claims. The previous 
experience of devolved government in Northern Ireland under the supposed auspices 
of a liberal democracy was an alienating one for nationalists, but liberal unionists 
choose to ignore the implications of this. Liberal unionism also chooses not to 
recognise the strength of nationalist claims to difference, believing that it would be a 
straightforward matter for the British and Irish governments to ensure that the position 
of Northern Ireland was no longer contested.
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Additionally liberal unionism is inadequate because it offers a "thin conception of 
citizenship" based purely on legal rights. 117 There is no consideration given to the idea 
that citizens need to be able to form a sense of attachment to institutions for the state 
to be reasonably uncontested. Porter maintains:
It is hard not to conclude that liberal unionists, with their gaze fixed 
unwaveringly on the goal of unsullied political British-ness, seem oddly 
oblivious to the political responsibilities of living in a deeply divided society. 118
Liberal unionism fails to recognise its own emotional investment in British-ness and 
therefore presents a procedural citizenship stripped of an overarching civic identity 
that would encourage participation by nationalists. As it eschews examination of its 
own horizon of meaning and dismisses that of nationalists, it too is unable to answer 
enough of the challenges to unionism in the contemporary world.
3.9.3 Cultural and Liberal Unionism as Theoretical Models
Whilst Porter's critiques of cultural and liberal unionism are incisive, there are two 
problems with the use of these theoretical models. The first of these concerns the 
concept of cultural unionism, specifically the emphasis on a Protestant horizon of 
meaning. Porter asserts that loyalist paramilitaries have been some of the staunchest 
adherents of the grand cultural unionist narrative of a besieged people. Yet these 
paramilitary groups were formed for reasons other than the defence of the Williamite 
settlement. It is problematic to name a Protestant horizon of meaning linking 
politicians, paramilitaries and the Orange Order. It does not explain the continuing 
resonance of what Porter has termed an Ulster way of life in a Northern Ireland that is 
becoming more secular. It does not explain the ability of cultural unionism to adapt
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even without dialogue with others. There is the additional danger both of conflating 
Protestantism with anti-Catholicism when, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
importance of Protestantism within unionist identity is complex and can have more 
than one meaning.
The second problem with these models is the lack of discussion of the scope for 
interaction between them. Aughey argues that:
The situated (unionist) self assumed by Porter's communitarianism is a 
caricature of the multiple contradictory and diverse influences which together 
constitute unionist politics in particular and the situation in which unionists find 
themselves in general. His unionist - of whatever variety - is an abstraction 
from a complex and contradictory reality. 119
Aughey himself has outlined two visions of 'the people' within unionism. The 
constitutional people are tied to British-ness via the institutions of the state, whilst the 
sovereign people are unwilling to fully transfer their sovereignty to the United 
Kingdom. However, these are not two distinct political groupings. As Aughey puts it:
If the policy of the British Government appears to undermine the rights of the 
constitutional people, then the uncivil state of the sovereign people may be a 
way to assert those rights. 120
Unionist politics can express sentiments of rationality simultaneously with a cultural 
identity. For example, despite differences between the UUP and the DUP it cannot be 
said that one is the representative of liberal unionism and the other of cultural 
unionism.
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Porter does concede that Orangeism can have an emotional pull on those who would 
fit into his liberal unionist model but these models are still very prescriptive. He 
inserts another cleavage, that of pro and anti-Agreement and sites the PUP in the 
cultural unionist yes camp and Trimble's supporters in the liberal yes camp, 
sidestepping the issue of the UUP's Orange Order connections .'121
These criticisms do not invalidate Porter's discussion of how unionists cut themselves 
off from dialogue with nationalists. However, the extent to which cultural and liberal 
unionism interact with each other and the manner in which they have evolved within 
their own horizon of meanings should be noted.
3.9.4 Civic Unionism
That Northern Ireland in all its complexities and contradictions might be the site 
of a way of life that is peculiarly its own is a disturbing thought to those whose 
sights remain firmly set on Westminster or Dublin, and one distorted beyond 
recognition by those who claim 'Ulster' as the exclusive home of their tribe or 
tradition. 122
Porter is seeking to advance the idea that there is a distinctive Northern Irish way of 
life. Northern Ireland is presented as a site where British-ness and Irish-ness meet 
and mutate into different forms with special meaning to those on the territory. Porter 
argues that this way of life is one worth having. It is an already existing way of life 
but one that is rarely recognised. Porter argues that two steps are required to bring this 
way of life to the fore and protect it.
Porter holds that the union is legitimate because Northern Ireland is recognised in 
international law as part of the United Kingdom and because of the consent principle.
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However, whilst the consent principle relates to the majority of the province bearing a 
British political identity Porter argues that there must be "a recognition of an Irish 
identity in public institutions". 123 This is both to reflect the political identity of a 
substantial minority and to open up nationalist and unionist horizons of meaning to 
dialogue.
The second step concerns the relationship between the state and civil society. Porter 
asserts that political, legal and socio-economic institutions and practices are required 
to encourage the development of healthy political life in Northern Ireland, comprising 
an active civil society, protection and representation of citizens, and social justice to 
ensure a more equitable distribution of goods. Porter is looking to ensure a sense of 
civic pride and duty that would reinforce the legitimacy of Northern Ireland as a 
defined territorial unit. Legal equality would be granted within the framework of the 
British State, but social justice and institutional recognition of an Irish identity would 
help make that equality meaningful in different ways and thus encourage 
participation.
In order to assess this model of civic unionism an evaluation of Porter's assumptions 
about citizenship, identity and political participation needs to be undertaken. This 
will involve a discussion of civil society in Northern Ireland and existence of a 
Northern Irish sense of identity.
3.10 Porter and Citizenship
Porter acknowledges that his work rests on classic republican theories of citizenship 
and the benefits of political participation. He says "a recurring republican theme is 
that a good society is conceivable only if there are good citizens". 124 Therefore, he 
believes that the development of civic virtue is vital. In particular citizens in Northern
123 Porter, N 1996 Op. cit, pi77
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Ireland need to develop three qualities to enable them to transcend conflict; 
forgiveness, magnanimity and reasonableness. Porter's work tackles the question of 
how these qualities can be developed within a framework that institutionalises 
political identities.
3.10.1 Citizenship and Identity
Porter's work engages with parity of esteem which he terms due recognition. He 
argues that esteem for aspirations and identities cannot be equal whilst Northern 
Ireland remains with the jurisdiction of British sovereignty. This means that Northern 
Ireland tends towards British-ness politically. However, due recognition provides for 
the equal respect of both identities and accompanying aspirations by granting the 
recognition each is due in institutional and non-institutional settings. This recognition 
is due to individuals, cultural groups, and political identities.
Porter's concept of due recognition is an adaptation of the work of Charles Taylor on 
the politics of recognition, a philosophical standpoint based on the premise that "due 
recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital need".
Taylor's argument is that political action has become framed by the "modern ideal of 
authenticity". 126 This is an ideal that states one must be true to one's own nature, 
which is assumed to derive from a cultural tradition that constitutes one's people or 
nation. This nature depends on recognition. Mis-recognition is the product and cause 
of discrimination and the marginalisation of an identity. Recognition is assured partly 
through "dialogical relations with others" 127 but it also requires some accommodation 
within state provision such as education. Taylor opines that there must be a starting
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point of presumption of the equal worth of a culture, but not all aspects of cultures can 
be accommodated in a larger society governed by liberal mores of individual 
freedoms. The challenge is to establish what levels of a liberal state can 
accommodate recognition of identities and what must remain inviolate and 'difference 
blind.'
Waldron proposes a counter-argument to Taylor, discounting any claims to 
institutional recognition for identities. He argues that identity politics have affected 
people's conception of responsible civic participation. Civic participation is the duty 
to "come to terms with one another and set up, maintain and operate the legal 
frameworks that are necessary to secure peace, resolve conflicts, do justice, avoid 
great harms, and provide basis for improving the conditions of life." 128 In addition 
Waldron argues that the politics of recognition rests unjustly on "which culture X's 
identity was forged in" rather than "what particular identity X forged within that 
culture". 129
Waldron's concept of civic participation echoes Miller's defence of republican 
citizenship. He defends this ideal against what he sees as a sectional "politics of 
difference". 130 Miller says that:
There is no reason to think that a republican conception of citizenship, which 
sees the citizen as someone who plays an active role in shaping the future 
direction of his or her society through political debate and decision making, 
places groups such as women or ethnic minorities at a disadvantage. 131
Miller is seeking to reassert the primacy of citizenship, which grants equality for
128 Waldron, J 'Cultural identity and civic responsibility' From Kymlicka, W and Norman, W (eds)
Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford) Oxford University Press 2000, pi55
129 Waldron, J 2000 Op. cit, p!58
130 Miller, D 2000 Op. cit, p7
131 Miller, D 2000 Op. cit, p30
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individuals and allows them to hold a number of other identities concurrently, which 
can be expressed at levels other than the state. What is interesting is that Porter also 
lauds the benefit of a republican ideal of citizenship, whilst suggesting that this ideal 
can be pursued in parallel with a settlement that accommodates different identities at 
the elite levels of the state.
3.10.2 Civic Unionism, Civil Society
Waldron and Miller's charge that the politics of difference undermines civic unity 
cannot be easily applied to an entity that has never enjoyed the unqualified support of 
a substantial number of residents. Irish nationalism has traditionally equated self- 
determination with the withdrawal of British sovereignty, although, as has been 
discussed, there is a diversity of constitutional preferences amongst nationalists in 
Northern Ireland. Additionally the civic nationalist case includes Northern Irish 
Protestants within this claim to self-determination, even though they themselves have 
resisted this interpretation. Waldron and Miller's arguments fit with the liberal 
unionist case that Porter has criticised for belittling or discounting the nationalist 
claim to political recognition.
Porter makes the connection between parity of esteem and due recognition because he 
sees it as a means of reinterpreting self-determination, which is the first step towards 
the creation of what he terms expansive citizenship: the dialogue that will bring his 
Northern Irish way of life to the fore. Porter argues that lack of dialogue, and 
therefore recognition of worth, has been the greatest obstacle to civic participation. 
However, Porter also seeks to settle claims based on identity in order that claims 
based on other cross-cutting cleavages can be advanced. It his belief that:
It is only as nationalists as well as unionists are persuaded fully to invest in 
political life in Northern Ireland that an identity based on concerted actions
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becomes conceivable. 132
Porter's civic unionism is being advanced as a method of creating unity by, 
paradoxically, recognising difference. It echoes Kymlicka's insistence that 
subordination of different national identities aids alienation rather than assimilation. 
Porter depicts a form of unionism that has the generosity of spirit towards nationalists 
and others that stems from a union made secure by the quality of the social and 
political life within it. This is consistent with his thesis that unionists must be able to 
revise their horizon of meaning through dialogue with those who would challenge 
them.
Porter's use of the word civic relates to the moral qualities of civic duty outlined by 
Skinner, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Citizenship is in its most basic sense 
derived from the freedoms granted by a liberal state, but a degree of participation is 
required to affirm allegiance to the political community in which we find ourselves.
Porter sites most of this dialogue and activity at the level of civil society. This is 
partly because he believes this is the sphere where an active and organic Northern 
Irish way of life could develop separate from institutions that have incorporated 
political British and Irish identities in order to guarantee simple acquiescence. This 
emphasis on civil society is also important, considering the arguments set out in the 
earlier sections of this chapter. Political activity at the sub-state level is meant to 
lessen the number of common ends imposed upon citizens and allows for choice and 
diversity of identity rather than Waldron's feared imposition of state-approved 
hegemonic cultural identities.
By linking a politics of civil society to the non-nationalist parties that challenge 
unionism, Porter seems to be suggesting that civil society represents a middle path 
between unionism and nationalism. His relaxed attitude to the institutionalising of
132 Porter, N 1996 Op. cit, p201
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British and Irish identities seems related to his belief that civil society is an effective 
counter-weight to this elite accommodation.
There are organisations and individuals within Northern Ireland that do not define 
themselves by national identity, or who are not connected to the traditional unionist 
and nationalist communities. However, civil society in Northern Ireland does not 
operate independently of nationalism and unionism. McGarry and O'Leary point out 
that the two biggest organisation in civil society are the G.A.A. and the Orange 
Order and the churches themselves are involved in the civil and social activity of 
the province. Cochrane and Dunn's study of the voluntary sector impact on conflict 
resolution found that "the attitude of many groups is governed by a desire to see a 
broadening of political dialogue and an inclusion of civil society within the 
debate". 134 However, they note that many of these groups are themselves single 
identity groups concerned with working within one community only.
This does not necessarily discount Porter's defence of civil society as an arena 
suitable for his project of encouraging unity through promoting diversity. However, 
Porter seems to gloss over the ways in which division manifests itself here. Without a 
greater discussion of this and of what constitutes the non-nationalist challenge, the 
phrase civil society seems in danger of being as bland and unhelpful as references to a 
reasonable or silent majority.
3.10.4 British, Irish, Northern Irish
The answer of assimilation mishandles the claims of difference, just as the 
answer of prioritising difference mishandles the claims of commonality. The 
slightly more hopeful answer of balancing the interests of rivals sets of 
difference, such as those of unionism and nationalism, does not succeed either,
133 McGarry, J and O'Leary, B 1995 Op. cit
134 Cochrane, F and Dunn, S People Power? The Role of the Voluntary and Community Sector in the 
Northern Ireland Conflict (Cork) Cork University Press 2002, p83
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as it curtails concerns of commonality for the sake of placating the interests of 
difference. 135
Porter believes that "we can admit plurality without forfeiting hope of commonality" 
because making identity claims does not exempt us being reasonable or from 
engaging in debate and political action across political lines. 136 He argues that we can 
all recognise a common humanity even if we accept that citizens are culturally 
encumbered. However, he also seeks to establish the "possibility of a civic identity 
developing through the qualities of character that are appropriate to them". 137
Porter's civic unionism is based on a Northern Irish way of life, and so it would seem 
to follow that there is a connection between a civic identity and a sense of Northern 
Irish-ness.
The 2002 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey shows that whilst British and Irish 
are still the most popular identities, 'Northern Irish' is an identity held by nearly a 
fifth of respondents (nineteen per-cent). Catholics (twenty-five per-cent) are more 
likely to describe themselves as Northern Irish than Protestant (fourteen per-cent). 
The identity is much more likely to be chosen than the label of 'Ulster' (one per-cent 
of Catholics and six per-cent of Protestants described themselves thus). 1138
The survey breaks down political attitudes by age group, religion and gender. It does 
not break down results by the identities of British, Irish, Ulster and Northern Irish and 
so does not provide empirical data as to the political attitudes of those who feel that 
Northern Irish is the label that best describes them. A sense of Northern Irish-ness
135 Porter, N 2003 Op. cit, p!34
136 Porter, N 2003 Op. cit, pi42
137 Porter, N 2003 Op.cit, p!72
138 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 2002 www.ark.ac.uk/nilt. The question asked was do you
think of yourself as British/Irish/Ulster/Northern Irish?
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could be about a simple sense of belonging, a cultural sense of identity. It does not 
necessarily follow that it can be the basis of civic virtue and a shared political identity. 
This does not mean that the model of civic unionism is rendered invalid as a means of 
testing unionist horizons of meaning. However, Porter's enthusiasm for the potential 
of a new politics based republican citizenship must be qualified by doubts about the 
significance of 'Northern Irish' as an identity as well as the divided nature of civil 
society in Northern Ireland.
Concerns have already been noted about the viability of a Jacobin ideal of a band of 
citizens engaged in a constant process of debate and action. Porter's model of civic 
unionism relies on specific civic virtues he identifies as aids to dialogue and critical 
reflection. Whilst Porter's model may rest on a very favourable view of the potential 
of civil society and political activity therein, he does provide a model that offers 
unionists room for manoeuvre within a bi-national settlement.
3.11 Civic Loyalism
The hypothesis that guides this work is that new loyalist parties must mark a 
sophisticated and coherent progression from populist resistance to the unionist 
hierarchy. The Protestant working class have participated in and generated different 
political movements, which have oscillated between sectarianism and labourism. A 
new loyalist politics can be equated with civic unionism for three reasons: a concern 
with social justice; a willingness to engage in debate with challengers; and an 
acceptance that holding an Irish national identity is not tantamount to disloyalty.
These three elements of civic unionism are important to any idea of a new loyalism 
because they manage to combine security about the current state of the union with a 
vision of what life within that union should be about. Parity of esteem, as understood 
through the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, still places greater weight on British 
sovereignty. A new loyalist party should use this as the starting point to stress the 
importance of a variety of identities that would encourage cross-community political
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action and prevent the bi-national settlement from ossifying.
Bearing in mind Porter's insistence on the importance of dialogue as a means of 
providing dialogue as a means of critically reflecting upon one's own understanding, 
cross-community alliances would also mark new loyalists' willingness to enter into 
dialogue with traditional opponents. However, dialogue could also be used by new 
loyalist politicians to respond to the challenges that Porter identifies as facing 
unionism. This response could offer challenges to nationalists to rethink their horizon 
of meaning.
The political programme a new loyalist party offers should be one that addresses 
issues of social justice as a means of representing groups within loyalism who are 
excluded from dialogue due to material deprivation, as well as a method of 
encouraging political activity along a cleavage other than ethnicity.
These tenets of new, or civic, loyalism would need to rely on two factors. Firstly new 
loyalist groupings would have to deal with challenges from within unionism in order 
to withstand constitutional uncertainty. Otherwise they could eventually meet the fate 
of the Northern Ireland Labour Party whose support crumbled as inter-communal 
conflict resurfaced.
Secondly, if a new loyalist party is to be part of a spontaneous evolving political life 
within Northern Ireland it would have to demonstrate increasing electoral support, in 
particular from the Protestant working class who are meant to be new loyalism's 
constituency. This is vital if new loyalists are to engage in an active role in Northern 
Irish politics as the representatives of the community they claim to speak for.
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3.12 Conclusions
Citizens are members of limited political communities. Civil and political rights grant 
citizens the power of state protection and protection from the state itself. Rights also 
enable citizens to pursue their version of the good life away from state institutions. 
However, there is not a clear distinction between the state and civil society. Instead, 
the two spheres are inter-linked. There is debate about the passive and active nature 
of citizenship and about whether participation in political activity in both spheres can 
generate virtuous civic qualities that reinforce the legitimacy of the polity.
There are more self-proclaimed nations in the modern world than there are states. 
Measures of group-differentiation have been advanced by liberal theorists such as 
Kymlicka as means of maintaining allegiance to a wider civic state by granting 
measures that recommend the right of national groups to a measure of autonomy. 
Group-differentiation also informs proponents of consociational solutions to the 
potential conflicts within highly segmented societies.
Kymlicka and Norman admit that some measures of group differentiation may 
encourage secessionist politics, although they have proposed them as a means of 
reinforcing the integrity of the state. They believe that ultimately, for multi-nation 
states "it is an open question what holds such a country together". 139 It is as hard to 
address this question satisfactorily as it is to quantify the civic virtue held up by many 
as the basis of a vibrant and unified citizenry.
Consociationalism and the critics of this style of democracy have been discussed 
above. Particular attention has been paid to the idea of the consociational paradox, 
that these settlements can aid the transcendence of the differences they 
institutionalise. Horowitz, for example, has highlighted the difficulty in applying the 
experience of post-war European consociational democracies to societies beset by 
more intense instability and aggression.
139 Kymlicka, W and Norman, W 1994 Op. cit, p377
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These theories deal with the design of the constitution and political institutions. 
However, this thesis is concerned with the ability of a new loyalist party to operate at 
this elite level and within grassroots politics. Reviewing Porter's concepts of cultural, 
liberal and civic unionism serves as a context for testing new loyalism because of his 
belief that a bi-national settlement need not preclude the bolstering of a civic Northern 
Irish politics. This could shift the focus away from identity and encourage activity 
along other cleavages. This relates to the confidence of a new loyalist party as 
regards the security of the union, and to the breaking of the binary understanding of 
loyal and disloyal political allegiances. This informs the construction of the optimistic 
model of new loyalism, which, along with the pessimistic model, will be used to test 
the PUP and UDP in the following chapters.
109
CHAPTER FOUR - THE ROOTS OF NEW LOYALISM 1966-1982
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters the concept of new loyalism has been evaluated. The ideal 
model of a new loyalist manifesto would be one that had a sophisticated approach to 
working with nationalists and dealing with the challenges posed by the concept of 
parity of esteem. A new loyalist manifesto would address issues of deprivation and 
distribution of resources in a manner that would marginalise sectarianism. This 
manifesto would have to attract a stable level of electoral support amongst the 
Protestant working class, the group that both the UDP and have claimed to represent, 
and it would be sufficiently rigorous and developed to deal with internal tensions. This 
ideal model amounts to a comprehensive definition of new loyalism.
The purpose of this chapter is to assess previous projects within unionism that could be 
said to contain elements of this model of new loyalism. The first political agenda to 
consider is that of Terence O'Neill, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland between 1963 
and 1969. He believed that encouraging cross-community activity in Northern Irish 
civil society would be enough to reconcile nationalists to the state. It will be shown that 
O'Neill's ambitions were actually very limited, and his reform programme modest. 
However, his actions raised nationalists hopes and unionist fears and the resulting 
tension developed into violent conflict by the end of the 1960s. The resulting political 
and social breakdown forced O'Neill to resign, and it also overwhelmed the Northern 
Ireland Labour Party.
The NILP leadership had also committed themselves to reach out to the nationalists. 
They sought to do this by encouraging alignment around social and economic issues, 
rather than constitutional preference. When the conflict began, it became apparent that 
it was not possible to supplant constitutional issues with politics based on social class,
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because it was quite possible to combine a commitment to socialism with a unionist or 
nationalist identity.
The final projects to be considered in this chapter are the historical antecedents of the 
PUP and the UDP. This entails charting the development of the UVF and the UDA as 
paramilitary organisations and considering the attempts of some within these 
organisations to develop other roles through electoral and community politics. This 
will set the manifestos and activities of the UDP and PUP in a historical context and aid 
consideration of what, if anything, is genuinely new about new loyalism.
Although both the UVF and the UDA became more formally organised throughout this 
period it must be noted that neither were completely centralised organizations. The 
UDA, in particular, rested on a loose federal structure. This reflected the fact that it 
developed out of the amalgamation of a number of groups that had developed 
spontaneously within local communities. The UVF was smaller in size than the UDA 
and the organisation's self-image was of a tightly knit military unit. However, it too 
lacked complete control of its members, many of whom affiliated themselves to it 
rather than being inducted into a clear hierarchical structure.
The UVF and the UDA contained members with a variety of political positions and 
many who were opposed to any form of political action. These groups had been formed 
for military purposes and many felt that a political direction was antithetical to the brief 
they had set for themselves: the military defence of Ulster. Therefore, when discussing 
political activity associated with the UVF and UDA, it is the thinking of the dominant 
grouping with those organisations that can be observed.
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4.2 The Formation of the UVF
4.2.1 The New UVF
The formation of the UVF pre-dates the Troubles; The Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association (NICRA) was officially formed on 1st February 1967, but in the months 
preceding this armed men in the North Belfast area were undertaking terrorist acts 
using the name, the Ulster Volunteer Force. The original UVF had been raised in 
preparation for armed resistance to Home Rule in Ireland. Most of this force was killed 
in the Battle of the Somme, where they fought as the 36th (Ulster) Division.
Fighting in the Great War seemed to be a testament to the UVF's loyalty to the British 
State and empire. Their resolve to defy Home Rule would seem to contradict this, but 
to unionists in the North-East of Ireland this apparent disloyalty was both necessary and 
legitimate to defend the integrity of the United Kingdom against the secessionist 
intentions of the Irish nationalist movement. The sense of legitimacy was reinforced by 
the Curragh Mutiny of 1914 where it became apparent that the British Army could not 
be relied upon to curtail the activities of a unionist paramilitary force.
The modern UVF emerged in the 1960s when a series of attacks on Catholic-owned 
property took place in Belfast. On 7th May 1966 a home on Upper Charleville Street in 
the Shankill area was petrol bombed and the tenant, a 77-year-old Protestant called 
Matilda Gould, died later of her injuries. The Catholic proprietor of the off-licence next 
door owned the house and the properties were similarly decorated, appearing from the 
outside to be one building.' Two murders of Catholics took place in the following 
weeks: John Patrick Scullion and Peter Ward.
Whilst these events were occurring there were also a spate of incidents designed to 
suggest that the IRA had resumed their campaign of violence, for example another
Cusack, J & McDonald, H UVF (Dublin) Poolbeg Press 2000, p5
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shooting incident at the home of a North Belfast Unionist politician called John 
McQuade. This was be a trick that the UVF would repeat as the civil rights movement 
gained momentum. On 19th October 1968, an explosion at the Silent Valley reservoir 
was designed to give the impression the IRA were active.
Against this backdrop the new UVF identified itself publicly. A phone call to the 
Belfast Telegraph from "Captain William Johnston" of the UVF claimed Scullion was 
an IRA man. On 21 st May 1966 an anonymous phone call to the newspaper announced 
on behalf of the UVF:
From this day we declare war against the IRA and its splinter groups...we are 
heavily armed Protestants devoted to this cause. 2
This new grouping were proscribed on the 25th June after the murder of Peter Ward. 
The UVF's leader, Augustus 'Gusty' Spence, was later imprisoned for the crime, for 
which he still denies responsibility. O'Neill denounced the UVF as evil and during the 
Stormont debate on the proscription of the new organisation he made a clear distinction 
between the old UVF and the new. He informed the house that "as honourable 
members may know I flew back last night from France. The purpose of my visit there 
was to honour the men of the Thirty-Sixth (Ulster) Division" and he made clear that he 
saw no connection between them and "a sordid conspiracy of criminals prepared to take 
up arms against unprotected fellow citizens". 3
In 1966 the UVF were in the position of having to manufacture an IRA rebellion. 
Nelson argues that the UVF "gave literal expression to the traditional Protestant notion 
of the public band" defending themselves against the Catholic rebels in their midst.4
2 Quoted in Cusack, J and McDonald H 2000 op cit, p8-9
O'Neill, T Ulster at the Crossroads (London) Faber and Faber 1969, pi21 
4 Nelson, S Ulster's Uncertain Defenders (Belfast) Appletree Press 1984, p62
113
However, the IRA had ended its border campaign four years earlier and there was little 
concrete evidence of imminent Catholic insurgency. 1966 was the fiftieth anniversary 
of the Easter Rising in Dublin and this event was commemorated by republican groups 
in Northern Ireland. However, the threat that the UVF were reactive to was not simply 
the danger of republican action.
4.2.2 O'Neill the Modernizer
Terence O'Neill had become Prime Minister of Northern Ireland in 1963. O'Neill's 
approach was ostensibly to pave the way for modernization in the province. Northern 
Ireland desperately needed foreign investment and increased trade, a fact that 
necessitated opening up the economic system to outside intervention. O'Neill argued 
that "although Britain was the first country in the world to develop an industrialised 
economy, many countries are now more productive and more efficient". 5
Harris says that, in the post-war period, Northern Ireland suffered from low growth in 
the manufacturing sector. This was at the root of problems such as "high unemployment, 
high outmigration, low wages and therefore a high incidence of poverty and general 
social deprivation". 6 Indigenous industries were coming under increasing international 
competition and the interlinked nature of the local economy meant that there was a need 
for a new and more diverse manufacturing base. For example, linen was produced by 
one set of firms and then processed into goods by other local companies.
A way out of this slump was suggested by the Matthews Report of 1963 and the Wilson 
Report of 1965. The former laid out a strategy for developing new towns with 
developed infrastructure to encourage regional growth, while the latter identified forms
5 O'Neill, T 1969 Op. cit, p!03
6 Harris, R Regional Economic Policy in Northern Ireland 1945-1988 (Aldershot) Gower 1991, pi6
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of public investment to attract new businesses to Northern Ireland.
Patterson argues that "decades of Unionist party rule had produced a style of leadership 
which focused obsessively on intra-Protestant relations to the virtual exclusion of 
changes within Northern Ireland". 7 O'Neill's tenure in office did not mark a departure 
from this. Buckland says that O'Neill sought to maintain unionist ascendancy by 
transforming the economy and the changing the tone, if not the structure, of
n
government". Economic modernisation would win back working class support for the 
party. This change would also benefit, and therefore mollify, Catholics without the 
need for any structural reform that might give unionist voters the jitters.
O'Neill believed that new towns and new industries, based on innovations such as 
synthetic materials, would generate prosperity that would benefit all, arguing for 
example that "new industries for Newry mean new hope for all its people". 9 In addition 
to economic modernization, O'Neill offered a friendlier image to the nationalist 
community, through public relations gestures.
Mullholland believes that "O'Neill's gestures to the minority - visiting Catholic schools 
and inclusive, if anodyne, rhetoric of social and economic advancement - were 
designed to ease Catholic assimilation into civil society". 10 Mullholland argues that 
O'Neill had a strong faith in the power of civil society to assimilate Catholics into 
Northern Irish society and that this process would allow him to sidestep the difficult 
issue of whether the Unionist Party should canvass for Catholic support as a means of 
promoting reconciliation.
7 Patterson, H 'Northern Ireland 1921-1968' From Aughey, A and Morrow, D Northern Ireland Politics 
(London) Longman 1996, plO
g Buckland, P A History of Northern Ireland (Dublin) Gill and MacMillan 1981, pi 06
9 O'Neill, T 1969 Op. cit, pi 30
10 Mullholland, M 'Assimilation versus segregation: unionist strategies in the 1960s Twentieth Century 
British History' Vol. 11 No.3 2000, p298
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To this end he developed Civic Weeks and the PEP (Programme to Enlist the People), 
which were designed to encourage voluntary work across community boundaries. 
Convinced of the healing power of such civic-minded activity he asked:
Is it, for instance, too visionary to look forward to Protestant young people 
helping to redecorate a youth club in Andersontown or a young Catholic reading 
to a bed-ridden lady on the Shankill Road? 11
This accommodation and reconciliation was not the main focus of O'Neill's agenda. 
Bew believes that the most pressing issue when he took office was the need to 
consolidate Protestant working class support for the Unionist Party:
O'Neill made it clear to his memoirs that he assumed, when he took over as 
premier in 1963 that the Northern Ireland Labour Party, not nationalism, was the 
main problem. The question of politics was why is Northern Ireland the least 
prosperous part of the United Kingdom? The issue of Irish unity was apparently 
marginalized. 12
However, within the nationalist community, this message of change presented an 
opportunity to organise and demand structural reform. The Campaign for Social 
Justice, founded in 1964, was the first step towards the development of a civil rights 
movement that would lobby for equality of citizenship through the removal of electoral 
malapportionment, discrimination in housing and employment, and the draconian 
security set-up, which was underpinned by the Special Powers Act.
11 O'Neill, T 1969 Op. cit,p!31
12 Bew, P 'The Union. A concept in terminal decay?' from Boyce, D.G. and O'Day, A (eds) Defenders 
of the Union (London) Routledge 2001, p321
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The formation of the UVF was a reaction to O'Neill's tentative modernization 
programme. Modernization generated uncertainty and the reaction of the nationalist 
community suggested that the Unionist Party were now set to preside over the 
concession of power to a nationalist community perceived as disloyal and insatiable in 
its demands.
4.2.3 Paisley the Protester
The UVF did not constitute the only visible reaction to the uncertainties of the 1960s. 
Other organizations formed around this time also reflected this tension. One of the most 
notable figures to emerge was lan Paisley. Paisley was a fundamentalist preacher from 
County Armagh. He founded his own church, the Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster, in 
1951. Buckland states that "he was a bitter opponent of fashionable ecumenism and 
would have no truck with Rome or church unity". 13 His campaigning against O'Neill 
seemed primarily based on the perception that the prime minister was pushing Northern 
Ireland down an ecumenical path; one which would inevitably lead to damnation. 
However his critique fed into a wider populist sentiment that O'Neill's reforms would 
destroy the province and this raised his profile considerably. Wichert avers:
His fundamentalist evangelicalism appeared to provide a political as well as a 
religious answer; while the redundant Protestant worker had probably little 
interest in the intricacies of Protestant theology, ecumenism appeared to be 
supported by not only those people who had the jobs but also those who were 
offering more to Catholics. Thus keeping their Protestantism fundamentalist 
implied keeping Catholics out and preserving Protestant privileges in jobs, 
housing and power.
13 Buckland, PI 981 Op. cit, pi 19
14 Wichert, S Northern Ireland Since 1945 (Harlow) Pearson Education Limited 1999, p95-6
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Paisley's populist message was played out in street protest throughout the 1960s. 15 His 
criticism of O'Neill and the unionist hierarchy incorporated recognition of the poverty 
of many working class Protestants. Coogan points out that the "the wretched state of 
Northern Ireland's housing stock was a political issue. [Paisley] made capital out of the 
fact that O'Neill and his like lived in 'Big Houses', while many poorer Protestants lived 
in 'kitchen houses' with no flush toilets". 16 This reinforced the simple message that 
now, more than ever, was not the time to be making concessions.
This aided Paisley in the establishment of a protest movement, the Ulster Protestant 
Volunteers (UPV) co-ordinated by the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee into 
rallies and marches against O'Neill. At the same time Tara emerged from within the 
Orange Order. Led by a British Israelite 17 William McGrath, this grouping was pledged 
to defend Ulster by any means necessary.
Some UVF members belonged to these organisations and used them as recruiting 
grounds. However, whilst groups like the UPV avoided proscription, the UVF had 
managed to get itself declared illegal and have its leader arrested within weeks of 
declaring war on the IRA, which stunted its potential for channeling loyalist unrest. 
Paisley positioned himself outside of straightforward party politics until he perceived 
that the O'Neill premiership was vulnerable. He moved out from the base of his own 
church towards populist organisations that suggested a willingness to defy the law, 
without undertaking the murderous acts the UVF had.
15 for example Paisley's actions provoked rioting in the Falls Road area of Belfast during the 1964 
election by campaigning to force the RUC to remove a tricolour flag from a Sinn Fein office in Divis 
Street.
16 Coogan, T.P. The Troubles (London) Arrow Books 1996, p57
17 Bruce defines McGrath's status as a British Israelite as a belief "that the original Ulster people were 
one of the lost tribes of Israel" and Irish Celts had usurped their rightful place on the Island. Bruce, S The 
Red Hand (Oxford) Oxford University Press 1992, p23 
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What the UVF shared with its namesake was a belief that extra-constitutional activity 
was legitimate to shore up the constitution. There was also a similarity in perceptions 
of what Northern Ireland was endangered by. Whilst the original UVF was prepared to 
defend itself against the secessionist intentions of Irish nationalism, it was also a 
reaction to the Liberal party's championing of home rule. If Westminster politicians 
failed to understand the nature of the threat then unionists would have to take matters 
into their own hands. The UVF of 1966 took the same view of the patrician O'Neill and 
determined to keep down the 'rebels' until the unionist hierarchy recovered its common
sense.
Throughout the late sixties the UVF remained a small secretive grouping. 18 This was 
partly because the self-image of the organisation as an elite military body but, crucially, 
there were other, legal, organisations that Protestants could join to express their 
frustrations with O'Neillism. When large-scale violence broke out the UVF were not in 
the position to monopolise paramilitary activity and there was space for other groups to 
form.
As internal divisions developed within the Unionist Party, Paisley felt that it was time 
to enter electoral politics. O'Neill just managed to hold him off when he challenged for 
the Prime Minister's Bannside seat as a candidate for his first political party, the 
Protestant Unionist Party in 1969. He won the seat in a by-election in 1970. In 
September 1971 he founded the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) with the Shankill 
MP, Desmond Boal. Boal said that the party would be "right wing in the sense of being 
strong on the Constitution, but to the left on social policies". 19 Being strong on the 
constitution meant initially being supportive of the imposition of direct rule. Bew and 
Patterson state:
18 Garland estimates that the core membership of the UVF in Belfast in 1969 was thirty. (Garland, R




The formation of the DUP, the alliance with Boal and the associated emphasis, at 
least in the rhetoric, on social radicalism, was aimed at expanding the party's 
support in Belfast. The support for direct rule and integration was purely 
opportunist. Paisley quite correctly calculated that direct rule would be a body 
blow to the Unionist Party, robbing it of control of the local state apparatus. 20
The DUP constituted one reaction to the escalating conflict in Northern Ireland and the 
faltering unionist hierarchy. However, a more immediate reaction on the streets of 
Northern Ireland was the formation of vigilante groups. These groups, or defence 
associations, as they were known, would become the basis of a new paramilitary 
organisation.
4.3 Reactions to Conflict
4.3.1 The Ulster Defence Association
The original defence association was the Shankill Defence Association, a community 
group formed to improve the condition of Shankill housing stock. As violence 
increased throughout the summer of 1969 the brief of the organisation changed to 
pressuring Catholics out of their homes. At the same time other defence associations 
sprang up in the Belfast area. These vigilante groups lacked a central leadership and 
seemed to developed spontaneously. The strongest and most organised was the 
Woodvale Defence Association which would become the base of the UDA.
The event that played the biggest part in the merging of these organisations was the 
introduction of internment in 1971. The imprisonment without trial of Catholics 
fuelled riots and recruitment to the IRA. Here was the rebel threat manifested on the
20 Bew, P and Patterson, H The British State and the Ulster Crisis: From Wilson to Thatcher (London) 
Verso 1985, p41
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streets and one of the main forces of containment, the B specials, had been dismantled. 
Over the Summer of 1971 UDA meetings were held, attended at first by a handful of 
people, a figure which grew to approximately three thousand. 21 By 1972 the UDA was 
a mass movement with membership estimated to be between forty and fifty thousand.22
One noteworthy aspect concerning the formation of the UDA was the overlap with 
trade unionism. Shop stewards such as Billy Hull and Glenn Barr were attracted to the 
organisation and the UDA aligned itself with the Loyalist Association of Workers 
(LAW) under the auspices of the United Loyalist Council in October 1972. LAW, 
formed by Billy Hull and Hugh Petrie, was an attempt to coordinate the frustration of 
loyalist workers at the situation in Northern Ireland. The Harland and Wolff shipyard 
was a particular site for the expression of grievances. 23
So the UDA was a organisation with a working class membership and from the 
beginning there was an alliance with labour organisations. However, it had sprung 
haphazardly from a collection of separate vigilante groups. Bew and Patterson argue 
that after its formation "the UDA was still very much a set of local organisations that 
lacked any clear strategy".24 The UDA was not formed as a political movement and 
while events in Northern Ireland provided the organisation with a mass membership 
there was no guarantee that the association could hold on to, or direct, the mass of 
loyalist protest.
21 Bruce, S The Red Hand (Oxford) Oxford University Press 1992, p5
22 Gillespie, G and Bew, P Northern Ireland: A Chronology of the Troubles 1968-1999 (Dublin) Gill and 
MacMillan 1999, p39
23 For example on 28th June 1970 approximately 500 Catholic workers were expelled from the shipyard. 
A walkout was also staged from the yard in March 1971 in protest at the murder of three off-duty Scottish 
soldiers. This murder was also the inspiration for groups of loyalist youth to label themselves as 'tartan 
gangs'. These groups were mostly absorbed into the burgeoning UDA
121
The UDA attracted thousands of members at the beginning of the troubles. In contrast 
to the UVF they remained legal and would in fact avoid proscription for twenty years. 
The developing UDA leadership took advantage of the opportunities this provided for 
public marching and displays of strength. The panic and outrage sparked by the 
protests of nationalists and by the dismantling of long standing bulwarks against such 
dissent (The B Specials and the Special Powers Act in particular) gave impetus to the 
development of the UDA. However, there was no guarantee that this momentum could 
be maintained.
The UDA formed at a time when law and order seemed to be breaking down irreparably, 
and the new organisation aimed to present itself as a legitimate force of defence. This 
was initially enhanced by the fact that the British Army's strategy was to concentrate on 
insurrection in nationalist areas. The 'Ainsworth Avenue stand-off of 3rd July 1972, 
where the army gave up on the project of dismantling loyalist barricades, was used as 
direct proof that the army was as reluctant to fight against unionists as it was in 1914.
Barricading was developed in nationalist areas to keep both the army and loyalists out. 
The UDA copied this technique in the Waterside area of Deny, as a means of protesting 
against similar action taking place in the Bogside and Creggan areas of the city. 25 
However, the technique was also copied to provide the same message to the army and 
the British government that their authority was being called into question. A 
co-ordinated barricading of streets in Belfast on 9th June 1972 sealed off the normal 
flow of traffic and people through the city centre. The Belfast Telegraph reported that 
"men in military style uniform were drilled in broad daylight behind some of the scores 
of Protestant barricades".26
24 Bew, P and Patterson, H 1985 Op. cit, p64
25 'We'll carry on with our policy: UDA' Belfast Telegraph 22nd May 1972 Twenty- four hour 'no 
go' area set up in Deny' Irish Times 5th June 1972
26 'UDA drill behind barriers' Belfast Telegraph 1 Oth June 1972
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Barricading was one means of demonstrating the UDA's power and enhancing the 
legitimacy of the role sought by the organisation. A UDA statement released on 11th 
July 1972 stressed that:
Our future role will be to help the security forces by keeping peace among the 
people unless the security forces fail to get a grip of the situation in Northern 
Ireland...The UDA will take the offensive against the IRA and do our level best to 
eliminate and destroy them as Mr. Whitelaw and the Heath Government should 
have done a long time ago.27
4.3.2 Violence and Legitimacy
On 24th March 1972 the Prime Minister, Edward Heath, announced that, as of 30th 
March, Stormont was to be suspended for twelve months. This marked the beginning of 
direct rule. Discussions within the Conservative Government demonstrate that this was 
seen very much as a temporary measure:
The alienation of the minority population is growing and world opinion is 
becoming increasingly critical. A purely military solution could not guarantee 
success and made a political initiative more urgent. The implementation of our 
plan might well involve an interregnum, during which Northern Ireland would be
f\ Q
subject to direct rule.
The combination of a resurgent republican movement and the prospect of political 
change served to heighten anxiety amongst unionists that Northern Ireland's
27 Pledge by UDA to keep the peace' Belfast Telegraph 12th July 1972
28 Notes of Ministerial Committee on Northern Ireland 9th February 1972. Document reference CAB 
130/650 Public Records Office www.pro.gov.uk
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constitutional position could be about change and that IRA violence would force them 
out of the United Kingdom. The IRA called a ceasefire on 26th June 1972 but this 
broke down in a few weeks and on 21st July, now known as Bloody Friday, they set off 
twenty-two bombs in Belfast, killing nine people. 29
For some loyalists the turmoil of the early 1970s led to a desire to take action against 
republicanism before Northern Ireland was lost. Michael Acheson remembers 
attending a Vanguard rally, which strengthened his belief that something needed to 
be done:
One of the most heart-rending things for me was a mass rally called in Grove Park 
by Craig and Vanguard and all that was there. I'm sure Paisley was there, I can't 
remember. It was massive: hundreds turned out for it. And this politician, 
whoever he was, stepped up and said where are the young men of Ulster? You 
know, this whole Carson thing, where's the young men of Ulster, our police are 
being killed. You know, that terminology, our police is being killed. But I just 
had this feeling that the whole crowd was focusing on me - sort of what are you 
doing? You were sitting there, just sitting with a turmoil within yourself. It's 
hard to explain. And I think that's why I started looking toward the paramilitaries. 
I just sort of take myself back to that time when the cry was the young men of 
Ulster. You know, your country's dying and you're just sitting watching there 
instead of doing whatever's possible, you have to do something. I'm trying to go 
back to that. At that time we thought that the IRA were winning the war, that 
nothing was done by the police and the army because their hands were tied for 
whatever reason. So yes, I suppose at that time, it seemed that the IRA were 
winning, that there had to be other means to try and challenge them. 30
29 1972 had the highest number of deaths due to the conflict. 103 soldiers were killed along with 41 
police/UDR officers and 323 civilians. The IRA's ceasefire had been called to enable them to enter into 
dialogue with the British Government, although no headway was made.
30 Interview with Michael Acheson 12th March 2001
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William Smith echoes this sense that the security forces were being prevented from 
taking necessary action:
Within the Protestant community, it was seen that the security forces' hands were 
tied and they should have went [sic] and basically shot people. It was a hard line, 
you'll always hear that phrase, they should take the gloves off. There was that 
type of opinion in all shades, where you saw the security forces defending 
loyalism or Protestantism. Prior to 1969, loyalists or Protestants would have 
joined the B specials or they would have joined the police force. As long as they 
had a badge of authority they felt, if I shoot a Catholic or a republican, as long as 
I have a badge of authority that's OK. 31
The loss of the B Specials was keenly felt and the sense that security forces were 
constrained prompted people like Michael Acheson and William Smith to consider 
the role of extra-constitutional force. However, many other unionists did not take 
this action and they continued to wish for the legitimacy of a badge and a uniform, as 
Smith describes above.
Notes of a meeting between the Defence Secretary and four Northern Irish Ministers 
on 4th October 1971 record the thoughts of Harry West regarding the new Ulster 
Defence Regiment:
Mr. West reverted to the subject of the UDR. He doubted if the British 
government was really aware of the extent of the damage being done by terrorists 
to the fabric of social and economic life in Northern Ireland, or of the desperate 
need for a massive build-up in the manpower available to the security forces. If 
people wanted to join the UDR with a limited commitment to serve in their own 
neighbourhoods, they should be allowed to do so; and if that smacked of the B
31 Interview with William 'Plum' Smith 18th January 2002
125
specials, this hardly seemed the time for ministers in London to be fussing about 
the susceptibilities of the Labour Party in that regard. 32
The growth of the UVF and especially the UDA were a reaction to the constitutional 
uncertainty and increasing violence of the 1970s. Members sought to remedy what 
they saw as a breakdown in law and order and believed this had to be done outside of 
the security forces. This was because they believed that the British Government was 
reluctant to allow the police and the army to use the full amount of force necessary to 
quell republicanism.
However, not all unionists shared this view and many were uncomfortable with the 
idea of taking such direct action. Some politicians indulged in stirring rhetoric 
invoking past struggles but were short on actual action. In 1975 McKittrick noted:
As recently as two months ago, Mr. Paisley made a call for Protestants to band 
together for "the defence and preservation of our country". He did not however, 
spell out specifically what form such defence would take. 33
This gap between Paisley's stirring speeches and his actions would be a constant source 
of frustration and anger amongst loyalist paramilitaries.
It must be noted that after Bloody Friday, the army embarked on the removal of 
barricades in no-go nationalist areas. This served as a visible demonstration of the 
security forces re-imposing constitutional order on the streets. Although the UDA 
remained a legal organisation, the security forces remained the recognised 
constitutional defenders of the state.
32 Document Reference Prem 15/472 www.pro.gov.uk
33 'Paisley hits out at 'Loyalist Killers' Irish Times 20th March 1975
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4.4 Sunningdale and the Ulster Workers' Council Strike
4.4.1 The Sunningdale Settlement
The imposition of direct rule was intended to be a temporary measure. The restoration 
of devolved government was envisaged as part of a settlement that would earn the 
allegiance of nationalists. This took shape in the Northern Ireland Constitutional 
Proposals published on 20th March 1973. The proposals centred on a new 
power-sharing coalition government with a non-executive Council of Ireland.
From the beginning the Council of Ireland was a problematic concept for many 
unionists. A similar measure had been included in the legislation that had created 
Northern Ireland. The idea behind it had been that the two devolved governments 
would be free to transfer powers to this body. Incorporating the Council of Ireland into 
the 1973 proposals gave unionists cause for concern, as they feared it would become the 
administrative centre of a future united Ireland. The Agreement also gave cause for 
concern as it stated that "the governments concerned will co-operate under the auspices 
of a Council of Ireland through their respective police authorities". 4 This 
synchronisation of policing policy was termed necessary in the Agreement because:
It was broadly accepted that the two parts of Ireland are to a considerable extent 
inter-dependent in the whole field of law and order, and that the problems of 
political violence and identification with the police service cannot be solved 
without taking account of that fact. 35
The tensions developing in Northern Ireland from the late 1960s onwards had spawned
34 The Sunningdale Agreement December 1973. Point 15
35 The Sunningdale Agreement December 1973. Point 13
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paramilitary and other groups seeking to secure the status of the province against the 
intentions of both nationalists and Westminster. The unionist hierarchy had also come 
in for heavy criticism as it seemed the Unionist Party had played a significant role in the 
development of the current situation. The Unionist Party was facing electoral 
challenges to its dominance, whilst the rule of law was facing challenges in the form of 
loyalist paramilitaries and trade union protest. Yet there was no cohesive challenge to 
those who had over-seen the previous status quo. Unionism was becoming more 
fragmented but it had not split into discrete blocs.
The Ulster Loyalist Council's first attempt at a general strike on 7th March 1972 (in 
protest over internment of Protestants) was a failure. The violence and intimidation 
alienated many unionists, especially as it led to the murder of a fireman on duty in 
Sandy Row. The reaction to the strike signalled the demise of LAW, which was already 
riven by leadership disputes and allegations of financial impropriety. However, the 
ULC had never claimed the exclusive loyalty of its members. It was a coalition of 
groups who had their own prescription for change and who fed into other groups most 
notably Vanguard.
Vanguard was launched as a movement, rather than a party, on 9th February 1972. At 
the head of the movement was William Craig, a Unionist Party minister who had been a 
harsh critic of O'Neill, Chichester-Clark and Faulkner because he believed they had 
failed to bring the security situation under control. Craig modelled Vanguard on 
resistance to home rule and his speeches echoed that fight unmistakably with allusions 
to armed defence and solemn covenants36 . Vanguard's links with LAW and the UDA 
had given rise to rallies and strikes that had reduced the output of power stations.
36 See for example 'Craig talks of armed defence' Belfast Telegraph 12th June 1972. This article states 
"Mr. William Craig, the Vanguard loyalist leader, has revealed that loyalist organisations are now in a 
position to take up arms to defend democracy in Ulster".
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On 27th March 1973 a motion was put before the Ulster Unionist Council to reject new 
constitutional proposals. This motion was defeated by 381 votes to 231. This spurred 
Craig to leave and form the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party, which was 
determined to resist the implementation of the proposed settlement. This did not mean 
that the Official Unionists left were now united in support of the white paper. In the 
forthcoming district council elections Official Unionist candidates were open about 
whether they pledged support to the white paper or not. What it did mean was that 
Craig was at the head of a political party whilst at the same time he had built up contacts 
among trade union and paramilitary organisations allowing him to retain the flexibility 
of methods of protest that the looser Vanguard movement had given him. However, as 
the events that followed the inauguration of the executive showed, he was not the sole 
or supreme leader of dissent within unionism.
4.4.2 The Ulster Workers Council Strike
The first attempts to destroy the proposals were in the electoral arena. Unionists 
opposed to the settlement put themselves forward for election as assembly members. 
However the results of the election on 28th June 1973 gave a majority to those who 
supported the paper and Brian Faulkner prepared to head a new executive. Of 
candidates linked to the coalition of shop-steward led and paramilitary movements, 
only Glenn Barr and Hugh Smyth were elected. With the executive due to take office on 
New Year's Day 1974, the idea of a strike was floated by the Ulster Army Council (a 
new co-ordinating body comprising loyalist paramilitary representatives) and former 
LAW members who were reconstituting their organisation as the Ulster Workers' 
Council (UWC). However, another opportunity at electoral protest arose unexpectedly 
when Edward Heath declared a general election for 28th February 1974. 
Anti-Sunningdale candidates fared much better here. The DUP, VUP and anti-Faulkner 
OUP members organised themselves into the United Ulster Unionist Council. Their 
opponents could not organise in the same way, divided as they were between unionist,
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nationalist and avowedly non-partisan parties. The UUUC took 11 out of 12 seats, 
which seemed to provide a strong mandate to demand the end of the executive.
However, the executive still seemed insulated from protest and the idea of a strike 
re-asserted itself under the auspices of the new UWC. From within the assembly there 
was another attempt to bring down the executive with a loyalist motion calling for the 
rejection of the Sunningdale agreement which was defeated by 44 votes to 28. The vote 
served as the perfect backdrop for the first planned step of the strike - the public 
announcement in the Stormont press room by Harry Murray and Bob Pagels that 
Northern Ireland's workers were to begin a strike that would only end when fresh 
assembly elections were organised.
Given the lack of success of the last attempt at a general strike, and in view of the 
amount of intimidation required to kick-start industrial action, the strike was not 
recognised as a genuine threat to the new constitutional arrangements. However, the 
strike held and intimidation bolstered support. In particular the UWC capitalised on the 
militancy they had previously relied on amongst power station workers. The UWC and 
UAC proved adept at managing and distributing supplies. Fisk argues their legitimacy 
was further aided by the BBC, because it ended up performing the role of information
T7
service for the UWC by broadcasting its statements about rationing and distribution.
This adroit management of the situation contrasted with the inability of the Labour 
Government at Westminster to grasp that the strike commanded strong support. They 
put a lot of faith in a back-to-work march organised by the TUC, which turned out to be 
a pointless and embarrassing exercise. In his memoirs, Faulkner said of the march that 
"in the executive the idea was treated with some levity and regarded as another example 
of the sad incomprehension with which our well-meaning secretary of state and his
37 Fisk, R The Point of No Return: The Strike that Broke the British in Ulster (London) Andre Deutsch
1975
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ministers were approaching the whole affair". 38
This lack of political judgement culminated in Wilson's disastrous condemnation of the 
strike. He implied that all Protestants were spongers and seemingly equated the UWC 
with the IRA with rhetoric such as "the people on this side of the water, British parents, 
have seen their sons, vilified and spat upon and murdered". 39
As the strike maintained its momentum, politicians such as Paisley and Craig put their 
support firmly and openly behind it. Paisley's initial reluctance was something that 
would be brought up again and again as relations between him and the paramilitaries 
grew increasingly sour. An ambiguity could be detected amongst UUUC members 
who began to understand that the strike could force the Labour government's hand, 
where the general election result had not. In a debate in the House of Commons on 20th 
May 1974 Captain Orr, MP for South Down argued that "while one may not concede to 
the strike, one should concede to the result of the ballot box".40 Whilst UUUC MPs 
feted the striking masses when the executive crumbled (on 28th May 1974) there was 
little evidence that these politicians were enthused about continued co-operation with 
the paramilitary elements of the strike.
38 Faulkner, B Memoirs of a Statesman (London) George Weidenfield and Nicolson 1978, p267
39 Quoted in Anderson, D Fourteen May Days: The Inside Story of the Loyalist Strike of 1974 (Dublin) 
Gill and MacMillan 1994, p!30
40 Parliament Column The Times 21st May 1974
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4.5 The Northern Ireland Labour Party
The strike had another consequence for Northern Irish politics because the division it 
created in the Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) was the final blow for a party that 
was already hemorrhaging support, and whose remaining members were more and 
more divided amongst themselves. The NILP is important to the study of new loyalism 
for two reasons. Firstly, the party's actions in the 1960s constitute another attempt by a 
unionist party to accommodate nationalists within the British State, one that had 
differences from and similarities to O'Neill's project. The second is the NILP's 
emphasis on social class and a belief in the possibility of realignment from 
constitutional to economic issues.
The NILP had experienced a surge of support in 1945, which more than halved in the 
1949 Stormont elections. 41 The creation of the Republic of Ireland in 1949 was 
exploited by the Unionist Party and sufficient NILP members felt that the time had 
come to resolve the party's stance on the constitution. From then on the NILP 
campaigned as a unionist party. Although, the party still hoped to receive nationalist 
votes the party was more concerned with developing a unionist support base and did not 
actively seek Catholic support in the 1950s.
The low impact of the IRA's border campaign of 1956-62 meant that the republican 
threat was not such a feature in the 1958 election, where the NILP gained sixteen 
per-cent of the vote and returned four members to Stormont. Four members were also 
elected in 1962 and the party gained twenty-six per-cent of the vote. Rumpf and 
Hepburn state that the NILP dealt with issues such as rent rises and unemployment:
41 In the 1945 Stormont election the NILP returned two MPs out of 15 candidates and gained 18.6% of 
the vote. Two MPs were also returned in the 1949 election out of 9 candidates but the party only gained 
7 2% of the vote. The average vote per candidate in 1945 was 4,404 and in 1949 2,981. Results from 
Elliot, S Northern Ireland Parliamentary Elections 1921-1972 (Chichester) Political Reference 
Publications 1973
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Stormont in this analysis was characterised not as repressive or sectarian, but as 
incompetent and part-time, 'the laziest parliament in the world'.42
Emboldened by success, the NILP Chairman, Charles Brett announced in 1963 that 
"the time has come when we must challenge the Catholic vested interests as well as the 
Protestant ones".43 Constituency associations were set up in Catholic parts of Belfast 
and it was hoped that urban Catholic support for republican and republican labour 
candidates could be converted into votes for the NILP. However, there were concerns 
about this whether this strategy would lose Protestant votes and there was disquiet in 
the party about this change of direction. In 1964 NILP councillors in Belfast had a 
serious falling out over the perennial issue of chained-up swings on Sunday.
As has already been noted by Bew, O'Neill made it clear in his autobiography that he 
regarded the NILP as the main threat to the Unionist Party and he records with delight 
that at the 1965 election "they were practically annihilated".44 O'Neill saw the 1965 
result as a vindication of his strategy of rapprochement. This suggests he viewed the 
NILP as the only vehicle for dissatisfaction with his gestures of reconciliation and that, 
even by the time, he retired to write his memoirs, he had failed to grasp why lan Paisley 
had risen to such prominence. In addition it must be noted that Bew and Patterson 
characterise his 1965 campaign as one of personal attacks on NILP candidates. 45 He 
put them in the same camp as the Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, who he said 
was committed to the Irish nationalist cause.
The reaching out to Catholic voters by the NILP meant that it attracted the attention of
42 Rumpf, E & Hepburn, AC Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth Century Ireland (Liverpool)
Liverpool University Press 1977, p205-6
43 Rumpf, E and Hepburn, AC 1977 Op. cit, p206
44 O'Neill, T The Autobiography of Terence O'Neill (London) Rupert Hart Davis Ltd 1972, p75. 
Although the NILP lost two seats they still gained twenty per-cent of the votes, which was hardly 
annihilation.
45 Bew, P and Patterson, H 1985 Op. cit.
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student politicians involved in the nascent civil rights movement. Queen's University 
students such as Michael Farrell campaigned for the NILP in 1965, but they hoped that 
they could move the party away from its official unionist position. Arthur notes that 
Farrell was one of the activists involved in the formation of the Council of Labour in 
Ireland, a discussion forum for the NILP, Irish Labour Party and Republican Labour.46 
At the 1967 party conference the Queen's labour group were behind the successful 
motion calling for a British government enquiry into Northern Ireland.
As tension in Northern Ireland escalated into conflict many party activists sought 
stronger affiliation, and even merger, with the British Labour Party. At a special 
meeting in February 1970 four out of thirty constituencies voted yes to seeking 
discussions with the British Labour Party on increasing their links with the NILP. 
However, the British Labour Party were not receptive to suggestions of merger and 
tried instead to keep the NILP afloat with a package of funding to aid the party's 
campaign for the next Stormont election. 47
Whilst the majority of constituency parties had backed greater integration, two of the 
four who did not were Falls and Deny. The Falls MP, Paddy Devlin, became a founder 
member of the SDLP. One of the Deny delegates at the merger meeting was the civil 
rights campaigner, Eammon McCann. These activists sought to channel their 
commitment to socialism or social democracy towards institutions that could bring 
about a new, united Ireland. They sought to get the NILP to withdraw its official 
unionist position, and did not welcome the idea of closer links with the British Labour 
Party, even while it was in power in the UK.
As well as facing criticism from nationalist members and activists the NILP was losing 
unionist support. The association drawn by some unionist voters between the NILP, the
46 Arthur, P The People's Democracy 1968-1973 (Belfast) Blackstaff 1974
47 'End of road for six county labour?' Sunday Press 11 th October 1970 'British party to help NILP in 
election' Irish Times 3 rd February 1971 134
Labour Party and NICRA could not help but harm their electoral prospects. In 1969 
Billy Hull had resigned from the NILP, a move he felt demonstrated his opposition to 
the British Labour Party's decision to disband the B Specials. The 1969 Stormont 
elections were marked by infighting in the unionist party and a challenge from Paisley. 
The NILP were increasingly marginalized and their electoral popularity decreased to 
eight per-cent of the vote.
The formation of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Alliance meant 
that the NILP were facing new contenders in the middle ground of Northern Irish 
politics. Alliance did not challenge the NILP on its class-politics basis, but as a new 
party committed to neutrality on the constitutional issue, they offered an alternative to 
some NILP supporters who wanted a political party that could transcend communal 
difference. Although the SDLP emerged out of the civil rights movement, the founders 
were committed to dealing with social and economic issues. The NILP was doubly 
wounded by this new party because, as has already been noted, it lost an MP, Paddy 
Devlin, to this group.
James Callaghan said "I believed that the British Labour Party should pin its official 
support to the NILP because of its close links with the trade union movement which 
have always been a non-sectarian force in the north".48 To this end he tried to encourage 
trade union members to back a Northern Ireland Council of Labour, which would serve 
as the backbone of future NILP election campaigns. In 1971 Callaghan and British 
trade union leaders toured Northern Ireland trying to get the council off the ground and 
were heckled and picketed at each meeting - by Catholics or Protestants, depending on 
the area.
In the 1973 assembly elections the NILP won one seat, whilst Alliance secured eight. 
As well as losing support the party became increasingly divided about the way forward.
Callaghan, J A House Divided: the Dilemma of Northern Ireland (London) William Collins, Sons & 
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In 1971 Faulkner had taken the former NILP chairman, David Bleakly into his 
government giving him the rather unappetising post of Minister for Community 
Relations. Most of the party backed Bleakly, but others thought that this was not the 
time to join a unionist cabinet. 49 There was anxiety that future political arrangements 
would marginalize economic and social political issues. 50
The NILP was also divided about the benefits of the Sunningdale Agreement, and there 
was particular anxiety about the Council of Ireland. In the early days of the new 
power-sharing arrangement, the party issued an official statement in which it said it 
deplored "the unfounded belief that the council of Ireland would open the door to an 
all-Ireland republic". 51 However, a few days later, the party secretary, Douglas 
Mclldoon said that Sunningdale was ill considered and he expressed anxiety about the 
potential for the Council of Ireland to develop executive functions. 52 After the strike, 
the Coleraine NILP constituency party issued a statement issues statement aligning 
itself with "the majority in Northern Ireland [who] said "no" to a Council of Ireland" at 
the General election of February 1974. 53
The UWC strike put further pressure on the party. Some NILP members backed a 
memo to Rees and Orme sent on 19th May 1974, asking them to meet with the UWC 
and find some way of accommodating loyalist views into the executive. 54 Other 
members were angered by this and declared that it was a mistake for the NILP to court 
the unionist working-class vote and leave the nationalists to the SDLP. An invite to
49 Bleakley- 'North Labour may split again' Irish Press 10th May 1971
The NILP Paper on Power-sharing 1972 argued that proportional representation would be enough to 
ensure adequate representation of Catholics in government. The paper stated that each committee in a 
future power-sharing government should be chaired by a member who represented the ideological 
majority within it, in order to give the government programme sufficient cohesion.
51 'NILP hits out at 'dishonest politicians" Newsletter 9* January 1974
52 'NILP man hits out at pact' Belfast Telegraph 16* January 1974
53 'Britain 'incited strike' Newsletter 28th May 1974
54 Anderson,D 1994 Op. cit.
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discuss the way forward for the party contained the assertion:
The end of the line for many long-serving members was reached when the small 
clique of these NILP office-holders called for the recognition of the UWC, even 
before the 'loyalist' leaders had openly endorsed the stoppage, thus starting the 
bandwagon which gave the stoppage its ultimate success. 55
Rumpf and Hepburn argue that the NILP was always far more divided by constitutional 
issues than by ideology. 56 The constitution diminished in relative salience during the 
late 1950s and early 1960s and this gave the party the space to mount a challenge to the 
Unionist Party. The resurgence of the border as an issue was therefore bound to 
damage their electoral prospects and to promote internal division. However, this time 
the pressures proved fatal to the party. O'Connor argues that "a cautious response to the 
crisis of August 1969 offended Catholic supporters, without reassuring Protestants".57 
The NILP became increasingly divided about the way forward and the supporters were 
presented with more electoral options.
The fate of the Northern Ireland Labour Party is relevant to the study of new loyalist 
parties because of the forces that destroyed it. The party increased in popularity at a 
time of relative security about the union. When that disappeared the space for a social 
democratic critique of government in Northern Ireland was diminished. The party 
found it increasingly difficult to maintain a unionist working class base whilst reaching 
out to Catholics. Class-based political issues did not in themselves create unity because 
nationalists could demand a socialist Ireland and unionists a socialist UK. It seems that 
the party also found itself damned by association with the British Labour Party and its 
attempts to foster a civil society solution from within the trade union movement at a
Invitation to meeting on 25th July regarding the NILP and the current situation 16th July 1974
56 Rumpf, E and Hepburn, A 1977 Op. cit.
57 O'Connor, E 1996 Op. cit, p53
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time when some shop stewards were using their role to foster links with paramilitary 
protest.
The NILP's project was different from O'Neill because the party believed that 
economic regeneration would have to be coupled with mechanisms for redistributing 
the resulting wealth. However, like O'Neill, the NILP did not see why any structural 
changes were required to accommodate nationalists within the state. O'Neill's 
prescription was increased civic virtue; the NILP's was organised commitment to 
social justice. It was assumed that if politics in Northern Ireland prioritised social and 
economic issues, then aspirations for Irish self-determination could be marginalised. 
However, as the conflict emerged in the late 1960s it became apparent that class 
identity was not a substitute for national identity but that instead the two could be held 
concurrently.
After the strike both the UVF and the UDA began to discuss and formulate political 
alternatives to what was being offered by the Ulster Unionists and the new Democratic 
Unionist Party. The salience of class was an important feature of these discussions. By 
the time these political alternatives were launched, the NILP had dwindled away to 
insignificance. However, given the fate of the NILP, it should have been apparent that 
offering a programme based on socialist principles was not a popular or straightforward 
way of resolving the conflict or changing the focus of politics in Northern Ireland.
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4.6 The Collapse of the UWC
Whilst the UWC had proved victorious, the end of the strike also marked the end for 
this loose coalition. Both the UVF and the UDA had been involved in the strike through 
the Ulster Army Council, although the UDA had taken the bigger role especially 
through the brigade leader Andy Tyrie's management of intimidation tactics. In the 
period immediately after the strike confidence ran high about the power of people who 
were not cast in the role of the traditional politician to defy Westminster and ensure 
demands were met. The UWC Journal proudly declared:
The constitutional stoppage in May 1974 was a concerted victory for the Ulster 
Loyalist people, after years of Republican rebellion - and political deceit by the 
then leaders of the OUP and the Westminster Government. In the wake of the 
constitutional stoppage, Westminster belatedly realised that the ordinary people 
of Ulster could not and would not accept the Sunningdale sell-out. 58
The questions now for those involved in the strike were what could be done with this 
power and what was the way forward?
The first major forum for debate after the strike was a conference in June 1974 funded 
by the Joseph Rowntree Organisation on the way forward for unionists. Paisley, Craig 
and Harry West were pointedly not invited on the grounds that they had not backed the 
strike until victory. Hugh Smyth wrote in Combat that "Since it was the workers who 
made the real sacrifices, they and they alone must make the decisions through the 
council". 59 The implication was that the UWC could now be used to forge political 
demands that would put pressure on the unionist hierarchy.
This did not happen. Instead the UWC disintegrated. The focus of the council was the
58 UWC Journal No.l 1975 cain.ulst.ac.uk
59 Quoted in Daily Telegraph 'UWC Conference Snub' 17th June 1974
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strike and now that was gone. Though the initial elements had assembled in the 
Harland and Wolff shipyard, the workers of LAW and later the UWC included rural 
agricultural workers as well as organised urban industrial groups. The final victorious 
rally at Stormont was marked by farm workers "driving in from the Newtownard area 
on tractors, trucks, horse-boxes and agricultural machinery". 60 The UWC did not have 
a space where policies could be formulated that could reconcile a rural and urban base, 
instead it was collapsing from within, spurred on by a dispute about dialogue with the 
IRA.
Harry Murray of the UWC made a speech at a British and Irish Association conference 
calling for the end of the internment and talks with the Provisional IRA. An official 
UWC statement was released disassociating itself from Murray's comments and he 
resigned on 9th July 1974.61 The UDA had shown itself open to the idea of dialogue 
(under ceasefire) with both wings of the IRA at the Joseph Rowntree Conference. On 
20th July 1974 the UDA resigned from the UWC and invited Catholic representatives 
to enter into dialogue with them. The UWC continued to fragment and dwindled away.
Without the focus of the strike the UWC collapsed and loyalist politicians such as 
Paisley and West asserted themselves once more as elected representatives. For the 
UDA and the UVF their role in the downfall of the Sunningdale executive generated a 
sense of legitimacy and popularity that encouraged an optimistic view about the 
participation of the paramilitaries in the political life of the province. It seemed these 
groups were in a position to do more than defend. Before exploring the first political 
initiatives emanating from these groups, the republican attitude to the aftermath of the 
strike will be considered.
60 Financial Times 'Stormont Crowd Cheers Attack on Executive' 29th May 1974
61 'Murray quits UWC' Daily Telegraph 10th July 1974
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4.7 The Republican Perspective
During this period both the UVF and UDA showed themselves open to discussing 
Northern Ireland's future with Catholic representatives, including the IRA. Before the 
strike the UVF had declared themselves open to dialogue between "ordinary rank and 
file people" of any religion within the province, an offer that Maire Drumm, the 
Vice-President of Sinn Fein welcomed as an appreciation "that the only people who can 
reach an agreement are the militants on both sides of the community". 62 A UDA 
bulletin circulated immediately after the strike appealed to Catholics, arguing that "you 
don't need free staters. We don't need outsiders. We can run our own country together 
if they will leave us alone." This offer came with the proviso that "If you are not 
prepared to do this then we have only one alternative - we will rule alone". 63
The Sunningdale Agreement had been opposed by Sinn Fein and the IRA, although for 
the opposite reason to loyalists. As English observes:
While loyalists and unionists opposed Sunningdale (considering it to have gone 
too far in a nationalist direction), republicans too were hostile to the 1973 
compromise (thinking it not to have gone far enough). 64
The destruction of Sunningdale was a welcome event and it sparked debate within 
republicanism on the possibility of shared interests with loyalists. Both sides had been 
affected by security measures such as internment and both sides had made reference to 
a sense of resentment with a ruling class. A reaction to the UDA offer to run the 
country together appeared in An Phoblact:
Sinn Fein welcome UVF appeal to people' Irish News 4th February 1974 
Quoted in 'UDA's olive branch with strings' Irish Independent 30th May 1974 




The first thing that the UWC must hammer out is its relationship to Britain. The 
old connection is gone, smashed by the loyalist rebellion against Westminster as 
characterised by the UWC strike...Is Westminster likely to forgive or condone 
this rebellion?65
Articles in An Phoblact suggested that loyalists were finally on the brink of realising 
that "the interests of working people north and south, Catholic, Protestant, dissenter and 
atheist are the same all over Ireland". 66 Belfast based Republican News was less 
charitable, depicting the Ulster Workers Council as one face on the "hyrda headed 
beast", the Orange Order. However the same article also saw that:
Now, when England is washing her hands of the embarrassment of "loyalists" she 
does not want, is the time for the disowned and disinherited to recognise that 
Ireland can be their country if they choose it. 67
Whether the loyalists were rebellious or disowned, there was a perception that class 
consciousness, along with confrontation with the British state, could be the basis of 
political unity in a new Irish Republic. However, the strike had been marked by 
intimidation of Catholic owned businesses which resulted in the murder of two brothers 
who ran a pub in Ballymena. The paramilitaries were not relying solely on popular 
protest to achieve their aims.
On 17th May 1974 two car bombs were detonated in Monaghan and Dublin, in the Irish 
Republic, killing 28 people. The UVF were quick to rebut accusations that the bombs 
were their doing, although it was widely believed that they were responsible.
65 'Partnership with UWC?' An Phoblacht 7th June 1974
66 'Sunningdale for peace?' An Phoblacht 31st May 1974
67 'England washing her hands of loyalists' Republican News 22nd June 1974
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We want to make it quite clear that we are appalled by these explosions. It is 
indiscriminate and definitely against our own policy...we at the moment are 
engaged in the political field of Northern Ireland and we believe that the political 
solution to Northern Ireland can only be found democratically by the people of 
Northern Ireland within Northern Ireland. Therefore we are not concerned with 
the policy of Eire or indeed the dictates of Westminster politicians/68
Rees had released the UVF from proscription in order to facilitate their participation in 
a political solution. Admitting to the bombing could have endangered this new status.69 
However, the Dublin and Monaghan bombs continued a pattern of bombing in the 
Republic that had been going on for the previous two years. Whilst the UVF and the 
UDA proclaimed themselves to be in search of political solutions in the early 1970s, 
attacks continued to take place against Catholic civilians and not just suspected 
republicans. The rationale behind this was that the nationalist community should be 
persuaded that 'harbouring' the IRA was not a sensible tactic. Billy Mitchell sums up 
the attitude to targeting nationalist civilians during this period:
We developed a policy of, if the IRA's action was to terrorise the British 
Government into giving Northern Ireland up, then we'll terrorise the nationalist 
community into calling the IRA to stop. And basically the loyalist war, it was a 
war, it was a counter-revolution. If the IRA were revolutionaries, then we were
68 'UDA, UVF deny being responsible' Irish Times 18th May 1974
The UVF finally admitted responsibility for the bombings in a statement on 15th July 1993. This was 
in reaction to a Yorkshire Television documentary that suggested the UVF colluded with the security 
forces to plant the car bombs. The UVF statement affirmed that the operation was "carried out by our 
volunteers, aided by no outside bodies". No-one has been arrested in connection with the murders but the 
documentary implicated [dead] UVF men Billy Hanna and Horace Boyle, who are also named in two 
books on the subject: Bowyer-Bell, J In Dubious Battle: The Dublin and Monaghan Bombings 1972-4 
(Dublin) Poolbeg Press 1996 and Mullan, D The Dublin and Monaghan Bombings (Dublin) Wolfhound 
Press 2000. In 2003 Mr. Justice Barren published a report on his judicial enquiry on the bombings and 
subsequent Garda investigation. "In his report Judge Barron said "there are grounds for suspecting that 
the bombers may have had assistance from members of the security forces". However, he said any 
collusion between the UVF bombers and the security forces remained a matter of inference". Irish 
Examiner www.examiner.ie 11 th December 2003
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counter-revolutionaries. And the object was to terrorise their community. You 
can't dress that up in nice language, it wasn't a nice thing. It was brutally, if youse 
are supporting the IRA we'll kill you. 70
The Republic of Ireland was seen as part of this nationalist community. Not only was 
the Republic deemed insufficiently concerned with issues such as border security, 
senior Fianna Fail politicians (including future prime minister, Charles Haughey) had 
been charged with smuggling arms to the IRA. 71 This rationale was one that allowed 
the UDA and UVF to claim a large number of targets as legitimate, despite victims 
being non-combatants.
The strike and the months following it saw the UVF and the UDA engaged in 
discussions about finding a way forward through political action. However, when 
considering the initiatives undertaken within these groupings, it must be emphasised 
that the military was not abandoned in favour of the political.
4.8 The First Political Initiatives
4.8.1 Independence for Ulster
The UDA, in the immediate period after the strike, seemed open to the possibility of an 
increasingly political role and conferences were held in an attempt to thrash out tactics 
and policies. The notes of one such meeting at the Fromer Hotel in March 1975 record 
that:
70 Interview with Billy Mitchell 12th March 2001
71 All defendants were acquitted between May and October 1970
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The objective of the UDA from the beginning has been to maintain the status quo 
in the fact of the threat to destroy Ulster by the IRA. However, it was now 
recognised that the UDA did not seek to bring back all the trappings of the old 
unionist government with the disadvantages for working class people which had 
characterised the last fifty years. 72
This did not lead to the formation of a socialist political party. The UDA was also much 
exercised by the debate over negotiated independence. This idea was most assertively 
argued for by Glenn Barr, who had declared at Stormont in November 1973:
Let it be put on record that I stand here as an Ulster nationalist. 73
The idea of negotiated independence, or of dominion status for the six counties of 
Ulster contained within the boundaries of Northern Ireland, suggested a solution to 
sectarian conflict by offering equality of Ulster citizenship to all. In 1975 fourteen 
UDA commanders accepted the invite of the European Council of Churches to observe 
the Dutch system of power-sharing. 74 Although the constitutional reforms that they 
would eventually propose did not rest on consociationalism, there was a commitment 
from the beginning of these political discussions to earn Catholic support for a new 
Ulster.
There was also little support for a straightforward political party because of a fear of 
failure. The Fromer Hotel conference minutes show a reluctance to engage in activity 
that would split the Protestant vote and a belief that the border question would have to 
be settled before other types of politics could be practiced. Therefore the way forward 
was to develop policy initiatives that encouraged "the firm commitment of the Catholic
72 UDA Conference notes 27th - 29th March 1975 cain.ulst.ac.uk
73 Quoted in Gillespie, G & Bew, P 1999 Op cit, p68
74 'UDA in study of Dutch system' Newsletter 31st January 1975
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community in Ulster to the future of Ulster".75
So from the inception of political debate within the UDA circles the idea of developing 
a civic nation of Ulster was highly influential. This would be a solution to the crisis 
because it would isolate Ulster from the treachery of Westminster and Dublin and allow 
for a stable and legitimate Northern Ireland State. Barr was the most ardent and 
articulate supporter of this position:
We need to create a system of government, an identity and a nationality 
to which both sections of the community can aspire. The only common 
denominator that the Ulster people have whether they be Catholic or 
Protestant is that they are Ulstermen. And that is the basis from which 
we should build the new life for the Ulster people, a new identity for 
them. Awaken them to their own identity. That they are different. That 
they're not second class Englishmen but first class Ulstermen. And 
that's where my loyalty is. 7
This initial policy was to have a strong bearing on future initiatives from within the 
UDA. Though documents from this period express sentiments of resentment about the 
treating of working class loyalists by their unionist 'betters' the over-riding concern 
was with speaking for the people, who would be awakened to their membership of the 
nation of Ulster. The UDA would be the midwife for this new nation and this would be 
the source of their legitimate right to represent 'the people', rather than a mandate from 
the ballot box.
75 UDA Conference 27-29"1 March 1975 cain.ulst.ac.uk
76 Quoted in Bruce, S 1992 Op cit. p231
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4JL2 The Formation of the Volunteer Political Party
In contrast to the UDA's position, the UVF decided to take the conventional political 
party route. In 1973 an Ulster Loyalist Front had been started by some within the UVF, 
concerned mainly with the rights of loyalist prisoners but also a forum for ideas such as 
industrial democracy. The show of strength by working class people during the strike 
suggested that a party could be organised and could field candidates for positions 
higher than that of local councillor. This led to the formation of the Volunteer Political 
Party in June 1974.
Initially the UVF seemed attracted to ideas of an independent Ulster in a similar manner 
to the UDA. Desmond Boal, the former chairman of the DUP, had floated a plan for an 
amalgamated federal Ireland, which caused Paisley to distance himself further from his 
former colleague.77 The UVF's favourable reaction to discussing the plan hinted at 
independence as an article written at UVF brigade headquarters for the Sunday News 
for others to follow their lead in the realisation that "life in Ulster can only be enjoyed to 
the full by the creation of a new society". The article also stressed that "Britain must be 
told in no uncertain terms that in future the people of Ulster will plot their own destiny 
and govern their own internal affairs". 78
However, this statement sought the destruction of "the proposed 32 county provisional 
parliament for Ireland established at Sunningdale" and was deliberately ambiguous 
about the link with Britain. 79 Boal's plan had also been welcomed by senior members 
of Sinn Fein. According to the Sunday Independent "Mr. Ruairi O'Bradaigh was 
reported earlier last week to have said that if Mr. Boal's plan reflected the views of
77 «In 1974, after he had given up the chairmanship of the DUP, [Boal] announced support for an Irish 
federal parliament holding the powers reserved to Westminster under the 1920 Government of Ireland 
Act and the restoration of the Stormont parliament with its old powers". Elliot, S & Flackes WD 
Northern Ireland. A political Directory 1968-1999 (Belfast) Blackstaff 1999, pi86
78 'UVF policy for a lasting peace' Newsletter 4th Feburary 1974
79 Newsletter 4th February 1974 op. cit.
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loyalists in the north he would feel able to suggest to the Provisional IRA that they 
should call a ceasefire". 80 Although the article made reference to Catholics and 
Protestants as Ulstermen, the UVF's main concern was building support within the 
loyalist community and flirting with constitutional proposals that Sinn Fein approved 
of was not the way forward. A few months later a Combat editorial stressed "Ulster's 
destiny always has, and always will, lie not just within the UK but with the British 
Commonwealth of nations and we must support every measure that will serve to instil 
patriotism into our politicians."81
The Volunteer Political Party was launched in the UVF journal Combat. The party was 
billed on the front cover as "a progressive and forward thinking unionist party" but not 
a socialist party. 82 This followed the ULF which Derek Brown noted in The Guardian 
"has a policy of defending and promoting the interests of the Protestant working class -
QT
although it does not espouse socialism".
The V.P.P was born out of a feeling that working class loyalism had no political voice 
in Northern Ireland but the policies of the party were not sharply developed. The 
invitation to join the new party included the opportunity to "submit to the political 
executive their proposals for inclusion into the policy document" which was unwritten 
at the time of the VPP's foundation. 84
The V.P.P seemed clearer about what they were against (principally internment and any 
ideas of an independent Ulster) than what they wanted to achieve. However, there was a 
clear link between the improvement of working class people's lives and the
80 'UVF back Boal's unity plan' Sunday Independent 13th January 1974
81 'Remain British appeal by UVF' Newsletter 17th August 1974
82 Combat Voll.No.26 1974
83 Outlawed loyalist group turns to polities' Guardian 30th March 1974
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maintenance of the union. A demand for parity with Scotland and Wales made this 
clear:
Our demand is to be treated like the other smaller British nationalities, not as 
second class citizens of the UK. In whatever local assembly is set up as a result of 
the convention we will support any evolution that will work for the good of all the 
people, not just the fur coat brigade as the old Stormont governments did not for a 
United Ireland as the SDLP did in the executive.85
This defence of working class interests extended to fielding candidates for election, 
even if it meant splitting the unionist vote. The founders of the VPP had originally 
hoped that they would be accommodated within the UUUC but Bruce notes:
At the first hurdle the VPP failed. It applied to join the UUUC coalition of loyalist 
parties but was turned down. This was hardly a surprise, given that, since the end 
of the strike, the politicians had been moving as fast and as far as they could from 
the paramilitaries. 86
The second general election of 1974 was held on 10th October and, despite the 
knock-back from the UUUC, the VPP selected Ken Gibson from the UVF to stand in 
North Belfast. Gerry Fitt retained the seat for the SDLP. Gibson polled approximately 
2,600 votes. Whilst this was a reasonably respectable return it was nowhere near 
enough to get elected and the VPP was dealt a fatal blow by the failure. Those within 
the UVF who were more committed to the military than the political capitalized on the 
VPP's poor performance and rose to ascendancy within the organization.
84 'Volunteer Political Party statement' Combat Vol. 1 No.14 1974
85 'Volunteer Political Party - for God and Ulster' Combat Vol.1 No.26 1974
86 Bruce, S 1992 Op. cit, pi22
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The election had also brought to light the growing breach with the UDA, following the 
unity of action displayed during the strike. The UDA backed the DUP/UUUC 
candidate for West Belfast, John McQuade. McQuade had initially pulled out of the 
election after death threats. The UDA advised him to "reconsider his retirement" which 
he did. 87 This political row highlighted a growing feud between the UVF and the UDA, 
which spilled over into violence and lasted into the summer of 1975. Whilst policy 
statements emanating from the UVF and UDA both spoke of working class 
advancement and unity, it seemed that loyalist paramilitaries could not manage this 
amongst themselves.
Though the VPP disintegrated the UVF still had political representation in the form of 
Hugh Smyth, who maintained a link with them whilst standing as an independent. A 
Progressive Unionist Group was formed by UVF members in 1977, becoming the 
Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) in 1979, of which Smyth was a member. During this 
time political elements within the UVF were marginalized. However, from the earliest 
political forays, there was a stronger commitment to articulating class politics than the 
UDA had demonstrated. The UVF were not looking for a new nation to claim 
allegiance to and the issues of deprivation and inequality within the union were the 
basis of VPP policy.
4.9 The UVF: The Men Behind the Wire
One only has to look at the Shankill Road, the heart of the empire that lies torn 
and bleeding. We have known squalor. I was born and reared in it. No one knows 
better than we do the meaning of deprivation, the meaning of suffering for what 
one believes in, whatever the ideology. In so far as people speak of fifty years of 
misrule, I wouldn't disagree with that. What I would say is this, that we have 
suffered every bit as much as the people of the Falls Road, or any other
Rivalry for loyalist seat' Guardian 21st August 1974
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under-privileged quarter, in many cases more so. 88
UVF Political groups from the ULF to the PUP concerned themselves with the rights of 
prisoners and the iniquities of practices such as internment. The UVF journal Combat 
also concentrated on welfare groups and protests against measures such as the diplock 
system of trial without jury. Prisoners were defended, protected and mythologised by 
the organisation on the outside. However, as the UVF hardened its military stance from 
1975 onwards their 'men behind the wire' were engaged in a process of 
self-examination that dovetailed with early UVF political thinking about the 
importance of social class.
Gusty Spence had been in prison since 1966. Before his involvement with the UVF, 
Spence had belonged to Ulster Protestant Action, an organisation that lobbied for 
Protestants to receive preferential treatment in employment. He had also headed groups 
of unionist voters in scams to impersonate voters in local government elections which 
he says he saw as "a continuing service to the Union - the end-all and be-all of 
everything". 89
A career in the army had imbued Spence with an old-fashioned Irish unionist identity. 
Spence joined the Royal Ulster Rifles in 1957. The ceremonial life of the regiment 
drew on Irish symbols such as the toast of Slainte, the shamrock and the harp. Within 
the army these traditions seemed to blend easily with Orange marches and Somme 
commemorations. Spence believed that "all those things awakened in me the feeling 
that we're Irish. We're British of course, but we're also Irish". 90
Gusty Spence quoted in Boulton, D The UVF 1966-1973. An Anatomy of Loyalist Rebellion 
(Dublin) Gill and MacMillan 1973, p!72
89 Quoted in Garland. R Gusty Spence (Belfast) Blackstaff 2001, p38
90 Quoted from Garland, R 2001 Op. cit, p31-2 151
Spence's incarceration, with a short spell of illegal liberty after breaking parole 
conditions in 1972, had induced him to articulate his political position. The quotation 
cited here about the bleeding heart of the Shankill provides a succinct example of 
Spence's thinking. He argued that Stormont had been a disaster for all working class 
people in Northern Ireland because it had failed to tackle deprivation and inequality. In 
addition, prison allowed him the time to pursue his interest in Irish history and his 
conviction that Irish-ness and British-ness were compatible identities deepened.
Spence undertook the task of encouraging new UVF prisoners to engage in this process 
of self-criticism and analysis. This coincided with the British Government granting 
special category status to paramilitary prisoners. Prisoners aligned themselves to 
paramilitary organisations and lived within these groupings. A measure of debate 
opened up between all groups on practical matters and there was also a limited political 
debate.
Spence undertook this political debate in the spirit of breaking down barriers through 
dialogue arguing that:
Borders and walls are coming down in today's world and it could come about that 
Ireland will be united some day. But it will not be united until the hearts and 
minds of the people are united. 91
Garland stresses that Spence's partners in this dialogue were usually the Official, and 
not the Provisional, IRA. Garland states that "Gusty found that the proves had little to 
offer loyalists" and quotes Spence's assertion that "The proves didn't have a political 
agenda". 92
91 Gusty Spence quoted In Garland, R Seeking a Political Accommodation: The UVF Negotiating 
History (Belfast) Shankill Community Publications 1997, p6
92 Garland, R 2001 Op. cit. pi20
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UVF prisoners who wished to debate with Republicans found that the Official IRA 
were keener to explore inter-community class loyalties. Furthermore Provisional 
prisoners were uncomfortable with and often hostile to initiatives such as a 'downtown 
office' for prisoner welfare because of the amount of co-operation with British 
authorities that it required.
With politics more marginal to the running of UVF operations on the outside, the 
prisoners were an isolated group and Bruce argues that the leadership "was dominated 
by people who thought [Spence] had 'gone soft'". 93 Nelson contends that this did not 
stop the prisoners viewing their organisation as a socially progressive force who could 
undertake a war that would be just and legitimate. 94
In light of the above it could be argued that the political re-evaluation undertaken by 
prisoners was a naive and irrelevant process. The emphasis on cross-community class 
alliances seemed partly to borne out of an unwillingness to engage with nationalist 
aspirations. Problems and solutions were viewed in material terms only. In addition 
Spence addressed his UVF colleagues on the outside as if they had sworn to build a new 
Jerusalem in Northern Ireland, whereas the leadership, and indeed most of the 
membership, were primarily concerned with the defence of the status quo.
However, this isolated position also had its advantages. Debate and dialogue could 
carry on away from public hostility. Reaching out to nationalists was a dangerous 
business for any unionist politicians, as Craig found out when the suggestion of an 
expedient alliance with the SDLP crushed his Vanguard Party. The prisoners were also 
shielded from Paisley and the DUP. Though Paisley's political activities sometimes
n-j
Bruce, S 'Unionism amongst the Paramilitaries' from Hanna, R (Ed) The Union: Essays on Ireland 
and the British Connection (Newtownards) Colourpoint Books 2001, p73
04 Nelson, S 1984 Op cit.
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brought him onto the same platform as paramilitaries, he was also swift to condemn 
illegal activity. Paisley had harried Craig and taken advantage of Vanguard's demise. 
The prisoners were freer of these pressures. Being sidelined, even to an extent by their 
own organisation, gave them more space to explore potentially unsettling options.
This idyll of debate and self-analysis was severely curtailed by events of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. The withdrawal of special category status sparked protests that 
involved both loyalist and republican prisoners. However, the denouement of the 
protests, the death on hunger strike often Provisional IRA prisoners, made the issue an 
iconic moment for the republican movement which allowed them to capitalise on the 
unrest in a way that loyalists couldn't. The special category protests also narrowed the 
focus of prisoners' politicking from wider ideas of class and national identity to 
worsening conditions.
In addition the prison population was growing. The first UVF prisoners were now being 
joined by a new wave of their more militant and militaristic colleagues who were not 
enthused by the prospect of Spence's schooling in socialism and Irish history. Spence 
had stepped down as camp commandant due to ill health. Billy Hutchinson, his 
successor, was overthrown by a coup in 1979 and intra-group relations within the 
prison system became more turbulent.
It seemed that the initial process of re-evaluation in prison had been diminished by the 
intrusion of reality, both in the shape of increased discord with republicans and the 
arrival of new prisoners who represented the UVF as it really was, rather than an 
idealised version. However, key ideas that would recur again and again in PUP 
thinking, such as the idea of being Irish and British, and a critique of mainstream 
politicians for exploiting loyalist deference, took shape under these conditions.
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4.10 The UDA; In Search of a Mandate
4.10.1 The Next Strike
The UDA had built up a sense of power and legitimacy thanks to the UWC strike. 
However, this dissipated throughout the rest of the 1970s. Whilst the paramilitaries 
promoted themselves as defenders, they were not wholeheartedly accepted as such by 
the communities they claimed to represent. Their credibility was further dented by a 
feud between the UVF and UDA in 1975 that led to the UVF being proscribed once 
again. It seemed Ulster's defenders were more interested in fighting each other than the 
IRA.
Unionist concerns over the political future of Northern Ireland had been eased by the 
perception that the British government was prepared to tighten security and that another 
Sunningdale settlement was not about to be forced on the unionist electorate. This 
further eroded claims to legitimate activity by the paramilitaries. The UDA's link to 
more mainstream political activity was damaged by the attempt to recreate the success 
of the 1974 stoppage in co-operation with Paisley. The UDA had always had a difficult 
relationship with Paisley and they had had a public spat in 1975, when the UDA 
leadership gave its blessing to Craig's coalition plans. Paisley had denounced Andy 
Tyrie as the leader of an organisation "guilty of the most diabolical crimes" against 
Catholics and Protestants. 95 Paisley liked to combine rhetoric that suggested he felt 
Ulster should be defended by any means necessary with a condemnation of those who 
actually used illegal force.
Burying their differences for another strike in 1977 delivered little benefit for either 
Paisley or Tyrie. The 1977 strike committee did not win over sufficient numbers of 
power station workers. It lacked the focus of a scary constitutional proposal like the
95 'Paisley in slanging match with UDA' Guardian 29th September 1975
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Council of Ireland. In addition, the replacement of Merlyn Rees by Roy Mason marked 
an emphasis on more reassuring security-focused policies for Northern Ireland. As 
Douglas puts it:
Mason in his nine months in office before the strike began, had already done 
much to dispel the confusion and woolliness of Rees policies. He kept repeating 
that a British withdrawal was simply not a possibility, and with his more 
militaristic approach he was clearly offering more support to the security forces.96
Mason described his confusion over Paisley's commitment to the strike, saying that "he 
knew perfectly well that I had been harassing the IRA with as much vigour as was 
legally acceptable in a liberal democracy". 97 Learning the lessons of the UWC strike, 
Mason took the protest seriously and put the army on standby. He used intelligence to 
gauge potential support for the strike and to second guess the UDA's actions. It soon 
became clear that the strike was not going to have any serious impact.
What became apparent during the 1977 strike was that the UDA had lost two of the 
roles the organisation had claimed for itself. There was no need to guard Ulster against 
flawed politicians because there was no imminent prospect of another power-sharing 
arrangement. There was also less scope for the UDA to present themselves as an 
alternative branch of the security forces as they had done during the construction of
Q«
no-go areas in 1972 and through UDA 'police' patrols in 1975. However, at the same 
time another role was emerging for the UDA and a possible avenue for re-establishing 
legitimacy presented itself in the form of community action.
96 Douglas, J 'No Doomsday plans for Ulster's Defenders' Fortnight 9th September 1985
97 Mason. R Paying the Price (London) Robert Hale 1999, pi74
98 The UDA threatened to institute their own police patrols in reaction to the setting up of incident 
centres - a Sinn Fein measure that was seen as a means of policing their own community. The UDA 
called off this threat after leaders met with Merlyn Rees on 28th February 1975 and he reassured them 
that no illegal police forces would be tolerated in Northern Ireland (i.e. he made it clear he was not 
condoning republican actions). See 'UDA backs down on private policing plan' The Times 1st March
1975
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4.10.2 the Ulster Community Action Group
Weiner argues that the civil rights campaigns of the 1960s had demonstrated to 
Protestants that activism could lead to demands being met and this realisation spurred 
action on one of the most pressing issues facing working class Protestant people: the 
poor quality of housing stock. Weiner asserts that "housing was seen as women's work, 
the job of getting repairs done was largely left to the women which again cut out much 
mass support". 99 However the sense of political power generated by the strike and 
hostility to mainstream politicians meant that housing could act as the spur for public 
rather than private activism, especially as controversial redevelopment projects were 
proposed in urban areas.
The UDA entered these protests initially through the West Belfast Housing Association 
in 1972, managing the tactic of squatting. The UDA then branched out into providing 
advice on housing and jobs as well as supporting opportunities for local people to 
engage in handicrafts and music. The Sunday Times marvelled at this development:
Nursery groups and sewing classes sound unlikely subjects to hold the attention 
of the tough UDA. But under the shrewd guidance of bespectacled chairman 
Andy Tyrie, the men of Ulster's most militant loyalist paramilitary organisation 
are turning their hands to community work. 100
McCready asserts that "from the time that Andy Tyrie assumed command of the UDA, 
it became apparent that the organisation was searching for ways to adapt to its 
grassroots membership". 101 This led to various community initiatives that coalesced
99 Weiner, R The Rape and Plunder of the Shankill (Belfast) Farset Co-operative Press - Belfast 1980, 
p!28
100 'The UDA at work' Sunday Times 16th March 1975
101 McCready S Empowering People: Community Development and Conflict 1969-1999 (Belfast)
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into the Ulster Community Action Group (UCAG) in 1976. UCAG received funding 
from the Rowntree Trust and from the British Government. McCready says that the 
group "became a vehicle for social protest about housing conditions and recreational 
needs in working class communities". 102 However, by 1981 the group was virtually 
defunct. Poor leadership meant that few of the objectives set by UCAG were actually 
achieved. There was a lack of willingness to work with community groups from the 
other side, which limited lobbying power. Many of those involved with UCAG felt 
dissatisfied with its progress.
Nelson argues that social activism only appealed to one element within the UDA and 
"It was more of a step sideways for the organisation which added another role to the 
confining number it had already. It changed the lives of some individuals but the effect 
was often that they left the UDA". 103 Community work did not lead to a synthesis of 
roles within the UDA and therefore it did not provide a coherent political direction to 
complement or supplant the terrorist activities carried out under noms de guerre such as 
the Ulster Freedom Fighters.
For both the UDA and the UVF the title of defender of the community was tainted by 
gangsterism. Fund-raising for paramilitary action was often achieved through extortion 
and racketeering. Bruce argues that the UDA could only draw on the revenues of 
subscription during its initial phase of mass recruitment. 104 McAuley and McCormack 
state that the UDA's community work was overshadowed by accusations of 
gangsterism, which prompted allegations about "the exploitation of 'ordinary people' 
whom the UDA were supposedly protecting". 105
Stationery Office 2001, p49 
1 °2 McCready, S 2001, p49 
1 °3 Nelson, S 1984Opcit. pi95. 
104 Bruce, S 1992 Op. cit, pi89
105 McAuley, JW and McCormack, PJ The Protestant working class and the state in Northern Ireland 
since 1930: a problematic relationship' from Hutton, S and Stewart, P Ireland's Histories. Aspects of
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The criminal image also wounded the paramilitaries because they were in competition 
with legal security forces. Many unionists may have believed that the security forces 
were unfairly constrained in their battle to quell violent republicanism but the logical 
demand arising from this belief was more power for these forces (which Mason was 
supplying) not the freedom to rob banks, run illegal drinking dens or demand money 
with menaces.
Nelson argues that the self-image of many unionists reflected the belief that Protestants 
were a law-abiding people. 106 The UDA and UVF had come to prominence at a period 
when the laws and the permanence of Northern Ireland's constitutional status was 
uncertain. As fears about the future of the union eased in the mid-1970s, this widened 
the gap between this perception of law-abiding Protestants and law-breaking 
paramilitaries.
4.10.3 The New Ulster Political Research Group
The idea of a nation of Ulster continued to be championed by those such as Glenn Barr 
and after the failure of the 1977 strike the schism from politicians opened up an 
opportunity for further exploration. Along with Bill Snoddy, Thomas Lyttle and Harry 
Chicken, Barr formed the New Ulster Political Research Group in 1978. The group 
stressed that an independent Ulster was the only viable solution to the conflict in 
Northern Ireland:
It is the only proposal that does not have a victor and a loser. It will encourage the 
development of a common identity between all of our people regardless of 
religion. We offer through our proposal first class Ulster citizenship to all of our 
people because like it or not the Protestant of Northern Ireland is looked upon as a
State. Society and Ideology (London) Routledge 1991, pi23
106 Nelson, S 1984 Op. cit.
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second class British citizen in Britain and the Roman Catholic of Northern 
Ireland as a second class citizen in the south. 107
The blueprint for an independent Ulster took shape in the 1979 document Beyond the 
Religious Divide, consciously modelling the new state on the constitution of the United 
States of America. The bill of rights included ideas of positive as well as negative 
liberty proclaiming "the government is obliged to protect and promote employment and 
where necessary to provide the basic commodities and services". 108
The new Ulster would be a civic state with particular emphasis on the secularisation of 
education. It was imagined that this civic citizenship would encourage allegiance 
regardless of religious background. This civic nationalism and proportionality in 
government would suffice to attract nationalists into a constitutional set-up that was 
still largely based on mechanisms of majority rule.
4.10.4 Eire Nua
During the 1970s Sinn Fein and the IRA Army Council had pledged support to Eire 
Nua as the blueprint for the administrative arrangement of a future united Ireland. 
Moloney describes the programme as being "designed to create a political structures 
that, its architects believed, would calm Protestant fears that a United Ireland would 
mean their subjugation and eventual absorption by nationalist and Catholic Ireland". 109 
The programme rested on a federal Ireland, based on the four ancient provinces on the 
Island (meaning that the term Ulster pertained to the Counties of Monaghan, Donegal 
and Cavan as well as the six counties of Northern Ireland). It was designed to correct 
the economic imbalance between east and west, as well as to allay the fears of northern
107 NUPRG Constitutional Proposals 1979, p4
108 NUPRG Beyond the Religious Divide 1979
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Protestants.
O'Brien states that "Eire Nua was totally the brainchild of Ruairi O'Bradaigh and 
Daithi O'Connell as well as Maire Drumm". 110 It has already been highlighted that 
O'Bradaigh and Drumm publicly lauded the UVF and the UDA's consideration of new 
structures of government, believing this could be the beginning of a wider loyalist 
acceptance that they were children of the Irish nation.
However, whilst the NUPRG was concentrating on crystallising what a future 
independent Ulster would look like, the IRA and Sinn Fein were moving away from 
this position. Gerry Adams used Eire Nua in his battle to break the influence of the 
southern based leadership. Moloney says he persuaded the IRA Army Council that Eire 
Nua was "a sop to loyalism" 111 and pushed for a centralised Republic of Ireland to 
become the official constitutional goal of the republican movement, levering out 
O'Braidaigh and O'Connaill in the process of developing an avowedly socialist Sinn 
Fein.
Eire Nua took Northern Ireland out of the United Kingdom. The emphasis on Irish 
language and culture suggested that Ireland was still envisaged as the home of a Gaelic 
people. However, it had attempted to address the resistance unionists felt to a united 
Ireland and its architects had looked to developments within loyalist politics as a means 
of gauging the potential of winning support from Protestants in the north. The 
ascendancy of northerners within Sinn Fein and the IRA, marked by the absorption of 
An Phoblacht into Republican News and the rise of Adams to the position of President 
of Sinn Fein, curtailed these developments. For the UDA this was actually a potentially 
positive development. Although Beyond the Religious Divide sought to earn the
1flQ Moloney, E A Secret History of the IRA (London) Penguin 2002, pi 80
110 O'Brien, B The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein (Dublin) O'Brien Press 1999, pi 11 
11 Moloney, E 2002 Op. cit, p!82 Eire Nua ceased to be party policy in 1982. Bradaigh stepped down 
the following year, marking the shift of power away from him and O'Connaill. Maire Drumm was 
assassinated in Belfast in 1976.
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allegiance of Catholics in the province, the UDA's initial task was trying to establish 
legitimacy within a loyalist community that hated and feared the IRA. The 
abandonment of federalism meant that the UDA's constitutional solutions were 
distinctly different from those of the republican movements.
4.10.5 The Formation of the Ulster Loyal Democratic Party
However the NUPRG was not the only political activity within the UDA camp. The 
Ulster Loyal Democratic Party (ULDP) was launched on 2nd June 1981. The prime 
mover in this development was the UDA commander John McMichael. Early UDA 
political debaters had shied away from forming a party partly for fear of splitting the 
Protestant vote, but also from experience of the failure to get UDA men like Tommy 
Herron elected to the Assembly in 1973. Instead political activity had occurred at the 
grassroots community level or in policy documents that heralded a future independent 
Ulster.
McMichael and Andy Tyrie felt that this was no longer enough. The failed strike of 
1977 had ensured a much deeper estrangement from constitutional politicians. They 
were an easy target for the frustration many in the UDA felt about the dissipation of the 
power they had generated from the 1974 stoppage. Interviewed a few months after the 
launch of the party, Tyrie complained:
We produced the soldiers because we thought the politicians would have the 
courage of their convictions. In private they gave us their blessing but in public 
they would not come out and be the officers. 112
The positive reception to documents like Beyond the Religious Divide encouraged
1 ' 2 Marxism Today December 1981, p2
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McMichael to form a political party and fight elections on the platform of achieving 
greater independence for Ulster:
The aspiration of the ULDP is to achieve Ulster national sovereignty by the 
establishment of a democratic Ulster parliament, freely elected by the Ulster 
people, whose authority will be limited only by such agreements as may be freely 
entered into with other nation-states or international organizations for the purpose 
of furthering international co-operation and world peace. 113
However, Bruce notes the change from an independent Ulster to independence within 
the United Kingdom. He identifies a split within the UDA at this time. Barr and 
Chicken withdrew, leaving McMichael as the dominant political force. Bruce says that 
the new party was symbolic of this change:
As its name - not only 'Ulster' but 'Loyalist' made clear, the new party 
represented a step back from the NUPRG position. In response to criticisms that 
the UDA was a 'Prod Sinn Fein', the ULDP offered a more limited independence 
within the United Kingdom. 114
McMichael believed that his experience of betrayal by the unionist mainstream would 
resonate with enough of the Protestant electorate to gain representation in Westminster. 
He also felt he could sell the idea of an independent Ulster to Catholics arguing that 
"more and more of our people will realise that they've a separate identity from being 
Irish and from being British". 115 The party was formed against new political initiatives 
by the Conservative Government, who intimated that another assembly could be 
established.
113 ULDP Constitutional Proposals 1981
1 Id Bruce, S 1992 Op. cit, p233
' ' 5 Marxism Today December 1981,p28
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The chance to test McMichael's optimism came in February 1982 when John 
McMichael stood as the ULDP candidate in South Belfast. The election was won by the 
UUP whereas, as Bruce notes, "McMichael got just two per-cent of the unionist vote in 
a constituency that included several thousand working class loyalists in the Roden 
Street, Sandy Row and the Village areas. Many of them would have been members of 
theUDA". 116
McMichael had ignored the fact that whilst mainstream unionist politicians had not 
brought peace and stability to the province, the UDA's prestige and credibility had 
declined post-Sunningdale and it was not automatic that they would be embraced as an 
alternative. Standing on a straightforward social democratic programme would have 
been difficult enough, given that loyalist paramilitaries carrying that message had not 
had much electoral success and that the constitutional issue still had a stranglehold on 
political life. However, despite limiting the scale of secession what the ULDP had 
focused on was independence which was deeply unpopular with all sides in the conflict.
Despite clashes with Westminster and the imposition of direct rule, Protestants in 
Northern Ireland had not redefined themselves as belonging primarily to the nation of 
Ulster. On the contrary, a sense of British-ness actually increased, in 1968 a survey by 
Rose found that thirty-nine per-cent of Protestants surveyed viewed themselves as 
British, whilst thirty-two per-cent defined themselves as Ulster and twenty per-cent as 
Irish. 117 Ten years later Moxon-Browne found that sixty-seven per-cent of Protestant 
respondents identified themselves as British with twenty per-cent stating Ulster and 
eight per-cent Irish. 118 The intensity of conflict, and the lack of a Northern Irish 
parliament had encouraged polarisation of identity. An independent Ulster did not
116 Bruce, S 2001, p78
Rose, R Governing without Consensus: An Irish Perspective (London) Faber and Faber 1971
I ] p
Moxon-Browne, E Nation. Class and Creed in Northern Ireland (Aldershot) Gower 1983
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reflect the identity of the majority of Protestants in Northern Ireland.
As for persuading Catholics into such a constitutional change, the chances were slim. 
The UDA were unlikely persuaders, given that the main modus operandi of the 
organisation was to target Catholic civilians as a means of revenge and intimidation. 
Additionally though the blueprints for this new state deliberately echoed the civic 
American model, the independent Ulster debate also drew on sources such as The 
Cruthin, a pre-historical pictish tribe who had moved from the North-East of Ireland to 
Scotland, making the Ulster plantation a home-coming rather than a colonisation. 119 
This was evocative of a more ethnic and therefore exclusive Ulster nation. It was a 
nation to which the majority of Northern Ireland's residents did not feel they belonged.
After the party failed to secure seats for the new assembly, the ULDP's role became to 
absorb the political energies of some UDA members in the way community work did. 
While Sinn Fein had felt able to take the hunger strikes as a fresh starting point for 
electioneering, loyalist paramilitaries still lacked a political direction and indeed were 
torn about whether to search for one at all. In reaction to the Hunger Strikes, the 
political was once again supplanted by the military and the Ulster Army Council, a title 
claimed by both the UDA and the UVF, was used in conjunction with promises that 
paramilitaries would have "no hesitation in retaliation, even to the extent of taking the 
offensive". 120
119 Adamson, I The Cruthin (Bangor) Pretani Press 1974. See also The Ulster People (Bangor) Pretani 
Press 1991
120 Combat Vol 4 Issue 3 1981
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4.11 Conclusions: New Loyalism Mark One?
The IRA's border campaign of the late 1950s made little impact and garnered very little 
in the way of nationalist support. Therefore, it seemed possible to some politicians to 
encourage nationalists to abandon abstentionism for participation. One of these 
politicians was Terence O'Neill who believed that economic growth and gestures of 
reconciliation would be enough to create inclusion through the fostering of civic pride. 
Other politicians within the NILP, such as Charles Brett, felt that nationalist votes could 
now be actively courted without alienating unionists. The NILP stressed common 
interest in bringing down a patrician and incompetent unionist hierarchy in favour of 
increased welfare and worker's rights. Both of these projects had foundered as conflict 
re-emerged in the 1960s, due to the consequences of nationalists campaigning for the 
structural reforms they felt were necessary for genuine inclusion.
The UVF and the UDA constituted a reaction to the civil rights movements, and both 
groups were committed to defence of the constitutional status quo. Many members of 
these groups saw military defence as the only role for loyalist paramilitaries. However, 
by the end of the 1970s the UVF and the UDA had experimented with various political 
roles and some members came to believe that they could become the political 
representatives of a marginalized loyalist working class community. The UWC strike 
created a sense of empowerment and demonstrated the benefits of defying mainstream 
politicians. Meanwhile prison gave some paramilitaries the unexpected advantage of 
space and time to discuss and debate with their own side and with republicans.
Paramilitary leaders like Andy Tyrie saw politics as a means of augmenting legitimacy. 
After the violence and uncertainty of the early 1970s, Northern Ireland's place in the 
union seemed less insecure due to Mason's 'get-tough' approach and a moratorium on 
power-sharing initiatives. This meant that the UVF and UDA found it harder to present 
themselves as an alternative security force. Both organisations explored political 
options, whilst maintaining their self-appointed role of defenders. They produced
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political parties and the UDA branched out into both community politics and 
constitutional proposals.
These experiments produced several themes that would re-emerge in the agendas of the 
UDP and the PUP. These were the recognition of the diversity of identity within 
Northern Ireland; willingness to reach out to republicans; confidence that new political 
institutions could be created that would win the support of both communities; a belief 
that the needs of the Protestant working class were not being addressed; and finally, a 
willingness to criticise unionist politicians and to stand against them, even at the risk of 
splitting the unionist vote.
However, these first initiatives did not mark a significant political realignment. The 
UVF and UDA remained paramilitaries first and foremost and their reactive military 
strategy included the targeting of Catholic civilians. The VPP lacked a coherent 
political programme and the ULDP's main idea was independence within the United 
Kingdom, which was an unpopular platform. The UVF and the UDA also faltered 
because they were easily marginalized by other actors in Northern Ireland. After the 
shock of the strike, constitutional politicians managed to reassert their supremacy and 
they were never really troubled by the electoral performance of representatives 
connected to paramilitaries. The republican movement periodically expressed interest 
in the UVF and UDA's politics but Sinn Fein's endorsement was not the kind of thing 
to encourage support amongst unionists. The rapprochement that occurred during 
prison was cut short by the entry of more militant loyalist inmates, but it was also 
curtailed because it was the republican movement that managed to exploit the special 
category protests. The loyalists remained a reactive military force and by the end of the 
1970s there was less space for them to demonstrate innovation in the political sphere. 
This period produced some key ideas and experiences that would inform the 
development of the PUP and the UDP. However, the political actions of the 
paramilitaries lacked coherence and direction, and they failed to attract significant 
electoral support.
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CHAPTER FIVE - NEW LOYALISM AND THE PEACE PROCESS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter opens with the constitutional initiatives undertaken by the Thatcher 
Government and focuses on the effects of the Anglo-Irish Agreement on unionist 
politics. Unionists reviled the Agreement, and protest against it promoted a strong 
sense of unity amongst politicians and paramilitaries. However, this comradeship 
dissipated as protest failed to dislodge the Agreement. The UVF and the UDA 
displayed increasing frustration and dissatisfaction with mainstream politicians and 
began searching for their own alternatives and political programmes.
When talks between parties were resuscitated in the early 1990s the British and Irish 
Governments made approaches to loyalist paramilitaries and sought to include them in 
the developing peace process. The reaction of the paramilitaries to these overtures will 
be assessed along with the effect of the CLMC ceasefire on the stature of the 
paramilitaries and their representatives, the PUP and the UDP.
The focus of the chapter will then narrow to the UDP. The UDP developed from the 
UDA and it will be argued that it drew on the UDA's commitment to speak for the 
people of Ulster, rather than the development of a comprehensive social democratic 
manifesto. Divisions within the party reflected a wider ambivalence about the benefits 
of the peace process within the UDA. Having failed to get elected to the new assembly 
the party was overwhelmed by the actions of elements within the UDA grouping who 
had other, less constitutional ideas about representing 'the people'.
5.2 The Second Assembly
The first constitutional initiative undertaken by the new Conservative government was 
a conference between parties to consider possible options for devolved power, 
organised by the Northern Ireland secretary Humphrey Atkins. The talks were beset 
with problems. The DUP refused to discuss power-sharing. The SDLP met with the
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government in a parallel conference and so did not sit down with unionists. James 
Molyneaux, who had been elected leader of the UUP in 1979, was one of the strongest 
advocates of the integrationist stance the party now espoused. The UUP boycotted the 
talks on the grounds that they were only concerned with constitutional settlements that 
would maintain Northern Ireland's distance from Great Britain. James Prior replaced 
Atkins in September 1981 and proposed a scheme of'rolling devolution'. This entailed 
an assembly that would begin with a scrutinising role and which would have more 
powers devolved to it, if the parties managed a greater degree of consensus.
The assembly never received more powers than those of scrutiny. The SDLP boycotted 
the assembly. The UUP was unenthusiastic about devolution and also boycotted the 
assembly for a period in protest about security. 1 The assembly received no new powers, 
as the SDLP stayed away. However, O'Leary, Elliot and Wilford say that unionists 
became increasingly convinced that the assembly would endure and that "the SDLP 
could not continue their abstentionism without eventually suffering an electoral 
setback".2
The ULDP shared this belief. The party had fielded two candidates, in North Belfast. 
Between them they gained five per-cent of first preference votes, which was not enough 
to gain a seat. Despite their non-involvement, the UDLP and UDA were supportive of 
rolling devolution. John McMichael urged the IRA to call a ceasefire and nationalist 
representatives to take up their seats in the assembly. McMichael appealed; "stop this 
nonsense of trying to find a solution outside of Northern Ireland, because it can only be
found in Northern Ireland". 3
Like other unionists, McMichael was keen for the assembly to work because plans for 
devolution were occurring at the same time as Anglo-Irish summit meetings were being 
held. Elliot and Wilford note that "the ULDP called for a united unionist front against
1 The catalyst for this boycott was the murder of three worshippers at a Pentecostal church service in 
Darkley Co. Armagh in November 1983, for which the INLA claimed responsibility. The British 
Government was unmoved by the protest and the UUP rejoined the assembly after five months.
2 O'Leary, C Elliot, S & Wilford, R The Northern Ireland Assembly 1982-1986. A Constitutional 
Experiment (London) C.Hurst and Co 1988, pi86
3 'UDA explains reason for ceasefire' Ulster August 1983
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the Anglo-Irish Governmental conference and remarked ominously that 'marching 
days are over'".4 The party shared anxiety about the implementation of solutions with 
an all-Ireland aspect and saw the assembly as the best means of preventing this.
The Progressive Unionist Party at this time remained marginal to the UVF's operations. 
Party activity was based around Hugh Smyth and his advice surgery on the Shankill 
Road. Smyth had failed to get elected to the Assembly. The West Belfast constituency 
in which he stood returned only four members, as opposed to the six who had been 
elected for the 1975 Constitutional Convention. This raised the bar for a small party 
like the PUP, but Smyth's vote dropped and he lost nearly two-thirds of the support he 
had gained in 1975. 5
Any political energies within the wider UVF were absorbed in concern for prison 
conditions and prisoners' rights. This was intensified by the effect of'supergrass' trials. 
UVF members William 'Budgie' Allan and James Crockard gave evidence that led to 
scores of UVF members being brought before the courts.6
Neither the UVF nor the UDA had a stake in the assembly in terms of elected 
representatives. The fact that the assembly represented an internal settlement was 
reassuring compared to the Council of Ireland element of the previous attempt at 
devolving power to the province, although there was an awareness that the assembly 
would have to prove its effectiveness in order to stave off other constitutional initiatives. 
The paramilitaries were not in the assembly, but they did not oppose it either, so it did 
not provide focus for political action. This did not mean that activism was abandoned 
by either grouping but it was marginalised. The optimism and confidence engendered 
by the UWC strike had dissipated to a large degree and the role of community worker 
had not supplanted that of defender, however problematic a title defender itself may
4 Elliot, S & Wilford R The 1982 Assembly Election (Glasgow) University of Strathclyde 1983, p9 
www.ark.ac.uk/elections
Alien's evidence led to forty-seven people being tried for a total of two hundred and twenty six crimes 
ranging from UVF membership to murder. Twenty-nine people appeared in court in connection with 
Crockard's evidence although the judge dismissed charges against seventeen of them on the "balance of 
probabilities". See 'Forty seven sent for trial of word of'Budgie' Alien' Belfast Telegraph 18th August 
1984 and 'Crockard informer case thrown out' Belfast Telegraph 21st Feburary 1984
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have been.
5.3 The Anglo-Irish Agreement
5.3.1 The Signing of the Agreement
The signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement on 15th November 1985 publicly marked a 
shift in British policy towards Northern Ireland. The feasibility of a lasting internal 
settlement was undermined by continual disagreement between Northern Ireland's 
politicians. The assembly had not earned the support of nationalist representatives. 
Sinn Fein's share of support had grown to approximately one third of the Catholic vote, 
increasing the pressure on the Thatcher administration to bolster constitutional 
nationalism. Additionally ongoing concerns about security pointed to improving 
relations with the Republic of Ireland, which was seen as a weak point in defending 
against republican violence. Tonge asserts that the British government "was prepared 
to accept the Irish-ness of the minority in Northern Ireland in the hope that the Irish 
government would help ensure that expressions of minority interests were 
non-violent". 8
The agreement retained the principle of majority consent, that the constitutional status 
of Northern Ireland could not be changed unless the majority of the electorate 
expressed support for change. The Irish Government could offer its views on the 
governance of Northern Ireland through the mechanism of the inter-governmental 
conference, but "without prejudice either to British sovereignty or to the objective of 
establishing a devolved government in Northern Ireland acceptable to both 
communities".
7 Cunningham, M British Government Policy in Northern Ireland 1969-2000 (Manchester) Manchester 
University Press 2001
8 Tonge, J Northern Ireland. Conflict and Change (Harlow) Pearson Education Ltd 2002, pi27
9 Hadden, T and Boyle, K. The Anglo-Irish Agreement. Commentary. Text and Official Review (London) 
Sweet and Maxwell 1989, plO
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The agreement relied on co-operation between ministers of the two governments on 
matters relating to security, human rights, the administration of justice and cross-border 
co-operation. The agreement also recognised the legitimacy of both nationalist and 
unionist aspirations and identities.
5.3.2 Unionist Reaction
The signing of the Anglo-Irish agreement took unionists by surprise. Thatcher's 
attitude to the New Ireland Forum Report of 1984 had been one of derision. In addition 
the continuance of the assembly had not given them cause to believe the British were 
looking at anything other than an internal settlement. The overwhelming reaction was 
outrage followed by panic that this agreement was a pre-cursor to joint authority, which 
in itself would herald a united Ireland.
The strength of feeling made for a huge degree of unity against the imposition of the 
agreement, under the slogan 'Ulster Says No'. The first major demonstration of this 
unity was a rally to Belfast City Hall on 23rd November 1985, attended by twenty per 
cent of the Protestant population. 10 The two main unionist parties, the UUP and the 
DUP, joined in this spirit of unity and undertook an electoral pact which was first 
exercised in by-elections held across Northern Ireland on 24th January 1986, a 
necessity created by the resignation of unionist MPs in December. The parties also 
organised protest at local government level, refusing to set council rates or undertake 
council business.
Protest also emerged in other forms. One was the formation of Ulster clubs. The clubs 
had an explicit Protestant connection and the founder member, Alan Wright, was a 
Salvation Army officer. The clubs expressed anxiety about losing British citizenship, 
but also about the denigration of an Orange-Protestant identity, evidence for which was 
detected by events in Portadown. Loyalists fought with police in March and April 1986 
over the banning of an Apprentice Boys march. In the subsequent rioting a protestor, 
Keith White, was shot by plastic bullets. He died later of his injuries, becoming the first
10 Tonge, J 2002 Op. cit,p!33
172
Protestant to be killed by plastic ammunition.
Another protest organization, Ulster Resistance, launched on 11th November 1986 with 
Paisley and Peter Robinson chairing the inaugural rally. Ulster Resistance was in 
keeping with Paisley's idea of a 'Third Force' of citizens prepared to defend Ulster with 
legally held weaponry. Paisley's Third Force had first made an appearance as part of 
protests in the wake of the murder of the MP, Reverend Robert Bradford, at his 
constituency surgery on 14th November 1981. Bradford's murder focused protests 
about security leading to a day of action on the 23rd, with Paisley marching his force 
around Conway Square in Newtownards. The Anglo-Irish Agreement provided a new 
focus for Paisley, who utilised the same tactics he had when trying to rally support 
around his demands for harsher security measures.
Though both the Ulster clubs and Ulster Resistance carried a threat of force this could 
not be made too explicit. Alan Wright proclaimed that "obviously there is a dire need to 
meet force with force". 11 However, Aughey argues that the Ulster Clubs' popularity 
was based on ambiguity in "giving the impression of militancy while shrinking from 
violent acts". 12 As for Ulster Resistance, elected politicians disassociated themselves 
from it as it became clear the UDA and UVF had hit on the idea of using it as a front for 
gun-running from South Africa. 13 Though the Agreement had pitted unionists against 
Westminster, there was still a reluctance to use violence amongst the majority of 
Protestants.
As for constitutional protest, activism seemed to founder on the fact that the Agreement 
had been designed to withstand unionist protest. It was an agreement between the 
British and Irish government and whether Ulster said no or yes did not seem to matter. 
The electoral pact was continued through the general election of 1987 and the two 
parties formed a task force to explore alternatives to the agreement. However, divisions 
emerged about the way forward and there was strong disagreement on the issue of
Newsletter 'Loyalists must stand together - Wright' 7th February 1986
Aughey, A Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (London) C.Hurst and Co 
London 1989, p75
13 Taylor, P Loyalists (London) Bloomsbury 1999
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integrating Northern Ireland further into the United Kingdom. Court rulings and fines 
pushed councils into undertaking more and more business. It seemed that though 
opposition to the Agreement remained, boycotting and negative tactics had not brought 
any change. Additionally, protest that was potentially more militant survived by 
ambiguity rather than actual action. The unionist protest seemed to have hit an impasse.
5.3.3 The Reaction of the Paramilitaries
Reviewing events around the Anglo-Irish Agreement Gusty Spence reflected that "the 
UVF and the UDA were quite placid. They too had come of age. They too were reading 
the political runes". 14 Placidity was a relative concept for the paramilitaries. The UVF 
and UDA were active throughout this time and were responsible for shots fired at the 
RUC during rioting, for example after the 'Day of Action' on 3rd March 1986. In 
addition the UDA struck in the Republic of Ireland, with the UFF planting bombs in 
Dublin and Donegal in February 1987.
Spence himself was optimistic about the possibility of a peaceful settlement. He was 
released from prison in December 1984 and involved himself in community work. 
Garland says that he "told the loyalist paramilitaries to 'grease up your guns and put 
them away'". 15 He believed that negotiation and some form of accommodation of 
nationalist culture could be the basis of a democratic solution. He signalled that he 
would be prepared to talk to Sinn Fein on the grounds that "if people are democratically 
and constitutionally elected then you have to take account of them, that is if you are a 
democrat". 16 However, he was opposed to the political involvement of the Irish 
Government.
It was not the case that the paramilitaries astutely assessed the Agreement the day after 
it was signed and decided to 'hang fire'. The initial strength of opposition to the
14 Garland, R Gustv Soence (Belfast) Blackstaff 2001, p264
15 Garland, R 2001, Op. cit p263
16 'Gusty set for polities' Irish News 1st June 1985
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Agreement, suggested that it would be overwhelmed by the rage of the people without 
too much military assistance. When this did not happen a lot of loyalist angst was 
diverted into activities such as the Ulster Clubs rather than leading to the mass 
recruitment that would have turned the UVF or UDA into a citizens' army. The 
legitimacy of the paramilitaries was not substantially altered by events.
In the initial period after the Agreement was signed there was a strong degree of unity 
against the new political development. Loyalist paramilitaries and mainstream unionist 
politicians were determined the Agreement should be scrapped as soon as possible. At 
first these two groups complemented each other, though perhaps not consciously, by 
their statements and actions. Mainstream politicians preached apocalyptic visions of a 
Northern Ireland on the verge of a bloody fight for its survival. Paisley, inevitably, was 
one of the loudest doom-mongers. As the British Government demonstrated its refusal 
to listen to Unionist protest he continued with warnings such as:
We are on the verge of civil war... We are asking people to be ready for the worst 
and I will lead them. 17
These warnings also emanated from the UUP, with John Taylor stating:
The UVF and UDA must be rubbing their hands with joy as Mrs. Thatcher moves 
blindly towards creating a crisis situation in Northern Ireland. 18
For their part, the paramilitaries were happy for politicians to lead the protest whilst 
they acted as the embodiment of the potential violence that could engulf the province. 
Interviewed by the BBC, John McMichael said that the UDA were not waiting for 
violence. However "he added that it may be at the end of the day that the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement would bring about violence but every avenue would be explored without 
violence". 19 In other words the UDA would implement the people's wishes if more 
acceptable and legitimate political initiatives failed.
17 'Warning of a Civil War' Newsletter 25th June 1986
18 Taylor warns of violence from unionists' Irish Times 30th November 1985
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Immediately after the Agreement the paramilitaries seemed to be acting obligingly as 
the substance to the mainstream politicians' threats that bloodshed would follow if their 
protests were ignored. However, two problems with the strategy became apparent.
The first problem was that, although the spirit of Carson's covenant was again invoked, 
this was not enough to scare the British or Irish Government. Paisley addressed the first 
mass rally against the Agreement with the words:
I never thought I would see the day when 1912 was repeated. It's just the same as 
you see in those old brown pictures taken at the time. This is the voice of the 
Protestant people. 20
In the end Carson's army had not been put to the test. With no world wars breaking out 
unionist politicians would actually have to demonstrate that they could channel this 
massive discontent into a people's militia. The paramilitaries were recruiting new 
members who were prepared to undertake violence but this could not be said of the 
whole unionist community. A poll conducted by Mori for The Sunday Times in 
November 1985, during the initial wave of protest, found that only ten per-cent of 
Protestant respondents were supportive of armed revolt.21
The mass of the unionist community were not prepared to contemplate a war, 
supporting Aughey's thesis that the impression of militancy was the best that most 
unionist politicians could offer if they wished to maintain popularity. The paramilitaries 
began to realise that they would not be accorded the status of an army in waiting but 
they also began to question the tactics of the politicians. A few weeks after the mini 
general election caused by unionist MPs resigning their seats, Andy Tyrie told The 
Newsletter that there would be no need to get into violent confrontation with 
nationalists or the security forces. This was because "we do believe if the politicians 
here and particularly the unionists get their act together then they could present a good
19 'UDA in terror pledge' Irish News 7th February 1986
20 The Prods Chant from Never Never Land' Guardian 25th November 1985
21 'Protestants Three to One against Irish Deal' Sunday Times 24th November 1985. Armed revolt was 
one option in answer to the question "here is a list of ways in which opposition to the 
Anglo-Irish-Agreement could be expressed. Please tell me the ones you are in favour of
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case to all the people of Ulster".22 However, the politicians were apparently incapable 
of running either a war or a constitutional protest and criticism by paramilitaries of the 
protest became more vocal.
4.7.3 Common Sense and Sharing Responsibility
As the Agreement withstood the protest it became apparent that the DUP/UUP alliance 
was ineffective as a means of changing British policy and that continuing with the 
negative tactics of boycotting and refusing dialogue did not amount to a plan of action. 
From the UDA camp a critique of the campaign was developed and articulated:
It is not enough to simply say no! Any advertising agency or public relations 
consultant would tell you that it is impossible to sell a product in a negative 
fashion. People would want to see and hear something positive, something 
hopeful and something with which they want to identify. 23
This positive move was unveiled on 29th January 1987 as Common Sense24 a policy 
document complimented by Cochrane as "the first real sign of intelligent life within 
unionism for several years". 25 Common Sense once again drew on American 
constitutional principles and took its name from the writings of Thomas Paine. 
However, mindful of the previous reception to the campaign for an Independent Ulster 
this parliament, based on proportionality and a bill of rights, would be fixed within the 
United Kingdom. Common Sense was intended, like its predecessor Beyond the 
Religious Divide, to foster a sense of allegiance amongst all residents of Northern 
Ireland. However, this was to be allegiance to a region, not a new nation-state.
McMichael stated that "Common Sense was prepared over a long period of time and in
22 Tyrie opts out of deal conflict' Newsletter 26th February 1986
23 UPRG A Cohesive Co-ordinated Campaign 1986
24 NUPRG Common Sense 1987
25 Cochrane, F Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism since the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Cork) 
Cork University Press 2001, p217
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the absence of those whom we elected to represent us coming to terms with the 
agreement". 26 Those elected representatives seemed to find the UDA's politicking 
distinctly unwelcome. Molyneaux dismissed Common Sense as "irrelevant" because 
there were no signs the British Government was prepared to consider an alternative to 
the agreement. Paisley argued that "power-sharing was rejected by the Northern Ireland 
people at the time of Sunningdale and we still reject the idea that any party should have 
seats in government as of right."27 As with previous loyalist paramilitary constitutional 
experiments it was representatives on the nationalist side who seemed most positive 
about Common Sense, with John Hume pronouncing himself "pleasantly surprised" by 
the document.28
There were also signs within the UVF grouping of frustration with the anti-Agreement 
campaign. Another mass rally was held on the first anniversary of the signing of the 
Agreement. The main outcome of this protest was two days of rioting, which led to two 
deaths. An editorial in Combat despaired of the state of the campaign and proclaimed:
The days of marching to God-knows-where are over. There has to be a new 
approach. The great crowd of loyal Ulstermen and women who gathered yet 
again at the City Hall need a goal rather than a pitch to mill around on.29
The PUP also contributed to the debate by publicising the document it had formulated 
before the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Sharing Responsibility30 was based 
on the significant strengthening of local government in Northern Ireland, with powers 
to be transferred to it on a rolling basis.
26 'Before it's too late' Sunday Tribune 15th February 1987
27 'UDA blueprint hits Paisley snag' Newsletter 30th January 1987
28 'UDA plan for North is welcomed' Irish Press 30th January 1987
29 Combat Vol. 6 Issue 2 23rd November 1986
30 PUP Sharing Responsibility September 1985
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PUP documents during this period concentrate on Britishness rather than Ulster. The 
proclamation that "the PUP is the only socialist unionist party in this region"31 was 
different in tone to the ULDP whose emphasis was still on independence as the "the 
next logical step" 32 if the Agreement was maintained. The PUP concentrated on 
stressing the innate Britishness of the region and arguing for some measures of 
integration such as mainland parties organizing for Northern Irish elections.
The PUP built on the original VPP position that the border issue had served to 
marginalise the loyalist working class, and that socialist politics must be articulated, 
even at the risk of creating divisions within unionism. The PUP looked to the British 
Labour Party for a role model, which is most recognisable in the PUP constitution.33 
Sharing Responsibility was in truth not a sophisticated solution to the conflict, as it 
seemed to posit that the continual transferring of powers to Northern Ireland would 
create stability in itself. The most noteworthy aspect of these documents is that, in 
marked contrast to the formation of the Volunteer Political Party, there was no 
squeamishness about the use of the word socialism.
Common Sense, for all the plaudits it garnered, was not the solution either. There 
seemed to be an inability to recognise the importance the agreement placed on 
aspirations and identity. Common Sense sought to circumnavigate these difficult issues 
by faith in a neutral regional patriotism, rather than grappling with the concepts the 
Agreement was built on.
The UDA's profile, heightened by public wrangling with Paisley, had ensured that 
statements from its leaders and think tanks were represented as the definition of 
paramilitary political thinking. Hence, when feuding within the UDA led to the death 
of John McMichael34 and the organisation turned in on itself, the pressures placed on 
mainstream politicians from this quarter diminished rapidly.
31 PUP War or Peace? 1986
32 ULDP Peace Democracy Jobs 1988
33 PUP Constitution and Standing Orders
34 McMichael was killed in December 1987 by an IRA car bomb. However, Cusack and MacDonald, 
Garland, Bruce and Taylor (op. cit.) concur that the information required to target McMichael came from 
his own'side. McMichael had decided belatedly to tackle fraud and racketeering in the UDA.
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The Anglo-Irish Agreement had provided a target that constitutional politicians and 
paramilitaries could attack. It encouraged co-operation between the DUP and the UUP 
and the doomsday rhetoric of senior unionists encouraged paramilitaries to views 
themselves as a modern manifestation of Carson's Ulster Volunteer Force. However, 
the estrangement between paramilitaries and politicians was not just due to the 
realisation that mainstream unionists were not really prepared for war. It was also the 
product of a critique of the tactics of the 'no' campaign. The burying of the DUP and 
UUP's Task Force report increased frustration with the negativity of the mainstream 
campaign and once again paramilitary groups floated constitutional solutions that relied 
on the accommodation of nationalists. Though these proposals lacked sophistication 
they were a sign that political elements within the UVF and the UDA were open to the 
idea that a new constitutional settlement could be a positive move.
5.4 The Peace Process
Peter Brooke was appointed Northern Ireland Secretary on 24th July 1989. Until his 
removal35 he dedicated himself to drawing parties in Northern Ireland into talks that 
could generate concord about a settlement of conflict. This marked a new phase in the 
search for political agreement in Northern Ireland.
The activities of the paramilitaries in the following years seemed to imply they were 
totally committed to military action. Violent acts increased, usually taking the form of 
revenge attacks against ordinary Catholics for IRA acts. 36 In addition their official 
definition of a legitimate target widened in reaction to the perception of a 
pan-nationalist front, founded on dialogue between John Hume, the leader of the SDLP 
and the Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams. The GAA and bars that played Irish folk
35 Brooke's rendition of My Darling Clementine on an Irish chat show was judged to be an offensive 
show of frivolity in light of the Teebane massacre. Major initially seemed to back Brooke during the 
furore but in the cabinet reshuffle after the general election in April 1992 he was replaced by Sir Patrick 
Mayhew.
36 For example, the UVF murdered a Catholic taxi driver in County Tyrone the day after the IRA murder 
of a Protestant taxi driver in Belfast on 23rd October 1990. The UFF attacked a bookmakers shop on the 
Ormeau Road on 5th February 1992 and killed five Catholics, in revenge for the killings at Teebane.
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music were named as targets (though condemnation from other unionists led to the 
revision of these threats).
However, whilst the violence escalated the paramilitaries were also being drawn into 
negotiations with the British and Irish government and showed signs of optimism about 
the effectiveness of entering into dialogue. It is the gap between escalating violence and 
political negotiation that will now be examined.
5.4.1 Collusion
On 25th August 1989 a Catholic called Loughlin Maginn was murdered by the UFF. 
The IRA denied he was a member but the UFF/UDA were so keen to prove he was a 
legitimate target that they invited a BBC reporter, Chris Moore, to look over their cache 
of intelligence documents. In the following weeks excerpts from these files were 
pasted on walls across Belfast.
The resulting furore led to the first of three investigations undertaken by the deputy 
chief constable of Cambridgeshire, John Stevens. His first investigation showed 
evidence of collusion between the UDA and members of the security forces. 
Fingerprints on security documents leaked to the UDA turned out to be those of Brian 
Nelson, the UDA's director of intelligence. This led to the revelation that he was also a 
British army agent, listed as Agent 6137 by the Force Research Unit (FRU), making use
^7
of army information to aid the UDA/UFF in targeting republicans. Nelson pleaded 
guilty to five counts of conspiracy to murder in January 1992. He was sentenced to ten 
years, the judge accepting the mitigating evidence offered by the former head of FRU, 
Colonel Gordon Kerr. Kerr said that Nelson's courage had foiled assassination 
attempts and saved lives, a claim disputed by the Stevens Enquiry Team. 38
37 Taylor, P Loyalists (London) Bloomsbury 1999
38 The journalist John Ware interviewed several members of the Stevens Enquiry team for his two-part 
Panorama documentary, A Licence to Murder shown on BBC1 on 19th and 23rd June 2002. On the 
second programme, Detective Constable Sarah Bynum stated "I can't say that it was clear to us that the 
whole goal of the army having him [Nelson] in place was to save life".
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Further work by Stevens uncovered the revelation that the RUC and the army had 
deliberately obstructed his enquiry. Turning his attention to the murders of Patrick 
Finucane and Brian Lambert, he found evidence of another agent at work in the UDA, 
William Stobie. 39 The third Stevens Enquiry concluded that whilst Stobie had supplied 
the weapon which killed Finucane, "Nelson was aware and contributed materially to 
the intended attack on Finucane" at the very least by showing his photo to UDA 
members. 40
Stevens reported that he found evidence of collusion in the murders of Finucane and 
Lambert and he noted that "my enquiries have highlighted collusion, the wilful failure 
to keep records, the absence of accountability, the withholding of intelligence and 
evidence, and the extreme of agents being involved in murder. These serious acts and 
omissions have meant that people have been killed or seriously injured". 41
Although there was evidence of collusion involving the Ulster Volunteer Force, it was 
the UDA that bore the brunt of the arrests following the instigation of the Stevens 
Enquries. 42 However, Taylor notes that the resulting clear out delighted younger 
members of the UDA and he quotes an interview with one member who feels that 
events had worked out in the organisation's favour:
The Stevens Enquiry got rid of all the old guard within the UDA and fresher men 
took over, not people who had been in the organisation from the start. The people 
who had lived through the eighties, a very frustrating time, we were now in 
charge and were now bringing the war to the Provisional IRA. Whereas in the 
eighties the people in our area were calling us gangsters etc., in the nineties you
39 Brian Lambert was murdered whilst at work on a building site on 9th November 1987. He was a
Protestant and it is believed he was mistakenly identified as a Catholic and shot in revenge for the IRA 
bomb at a Remembrance Sunday service in Enniskillen. Patrick Finucane was a solicitor who represented 
many republican clients. He was murdered in front of his family on 12th February 1989.
40 Stevens Three: Overview and Recommendations 17th April 2003 point 2.12
41 Stevens Three 2003 Op. cit, point 1.3
For example on 17th July 1988 Nelson spotted a car outside a restaurant which belonged to the Sinn 
Fein member, Alex Maskey. He tried to summon a UDA team to assassinate Maskey but failed to get 
them together in time. He then passed on information about Maskey and other targets to the UVF.
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were proud to be a part of the UDA, you were proud to be a member. 43
The UDA seemed determined to increase the intensity of their campaign. Guelke says 
that "the new leadership saw the restraint that the UDA had exercised during the 1980s 
as a product of the corruption of the old guard and was determined to demonstrate its 
effectiveness by matching the violence of the Provisional IRA blow for blow".44 This 
determination was such that by the end of 1992 loyalists were responsible for more 
deaths than republicans.
Moloney says that the IRA was unnerved by this sudden loyalist rejuvenation. Not only 
were they getting sharper as regarded targeting republicans, the ferocity of their 
campaign threatened the credibility of the defensive role of republican paramilitaries:
The loyalist onslaught directly challenged the IRA's raison d'etre and the 
pressures on the organisation in Belfast to respond were enormous. After all the 
Provisionals had come into existence to defend the city's vulnerable Catholic 
communities, and any failure to hit back at those behind the attacks could 
provoke uncontrollable freelance operations by IRA units. In a worst-case 
scenario these could even precipitate a split in the organisation. 45
This panic led to the IRA's attempt to blow up the UDA leadership on 13th October 
1993. However, the UDA were already gone from the room above Frizzel's fish shop 
on the Shankill, and the bomb killed nine customers and one of the bombers. The 
UDA's reaction included the murder of eight customers on Halloween at a pub in 
Greysteel, Co. Deny.
The ferocity of the UDA's campaign under their new leaders had spurred the new 
Northern Ireland Secretary, Sir Patrick Mayhew, to announce that the UDA would be 
listed as a proscribed organisation from midnight on llth August 1992. This final
43 Interview with Billy "Twister" McQuistan Taylor, P 2000 Op. cit, p209-210
44 Guelke, A 'Political Violence and the Paramilitaries' from Mitchell, P and Wilford, R (eds) Politics in
Northern Ireland (Boulder) Westview Press 1999, p47
45 Moloney, E A Secret History of the IRA (London) Penguin 2002, p414
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public acknowledgement that the UDA were a paramilitary organisation responsible for 
aggression and murder seemed a little hollow in light of the revelations about collusion. 
It also seemed unusually timed in that loyalist paramilitaries were being sounded out 
about involvement in the peace process. It could be seen to accord with the 
development of communication channels with the IRA at the same time as Major was 
claiming it would turn his stomach to talk to the organisation.46
Bruce argues that pro-state terrorists find themselves in a difficult position:
If the state encourages and tolerates the pro-state group, then the latter has many 
advantages of the former. But if the government feels that its own agencies are 
capable of dealing with the threats to the state, then the pro-state terror group is in 
competition with the state and, except in the extreme circumstance where the 
state itself collapses is bound to lose in that context.47
Evidence of collusion could demonstrate that the UDA had enjoyed the benefits of 
being tolerated by the British State but it was when they distanced themselves from the 
security services that members felt they were finally achieving their goal of destroying 
violent republicanism. British government agencies had not only tried to direct the 
UDA in their war against the IRA, at other times they had funded and encouraged the 
community action side of the organisation. As has already been noted the UDA has 
always been an amorphous organisation. It has contained different factions who have 
been in conflict with each other, sometimes to the point of violence. As such it was a 
hard organisation to control and direct from the outside.
Proscription did not mark the end of attempts by the British government to make 
contact with UDA members for political purposes and in the next few years, their 
political connection, the UDP would be publicly involved in the peace process. 
However, the revitalisation of the UDA in the early nineties boosted members' 
self-image as an effective scourge of republicanism. As will be shown this created a 
sense of unease within the organisation about embracing constitutional politics as the
46 'Major's secret links with IRA revealed' the Observer 28th November 1993
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only way forward.
5.4.2 The First Ceasefire
Parallel to the increase in violent action, there was support for the ongoing dialogue. At 
the beginning of 1991, The UDA and UVF joined together in a Combined Loyalist 
Military Command (CLMC) to co-ordinate a loyalist response to political 
developments. The CLMC announced a ceasefire on 17th April 1991 to enable 
politicians to make progress in the Brooke talks. The ceasefire ended on 4th July 1991 
as the talks collapsed. David Ervine, felt that unionist politicians had ignored the 
ceasefire and failed to take advantage of it:
The world wasn't watching, the world wasn't listening. Some might feel the 
world wasn't even told. That then created another circumstance. In that not only 
did we have to think for ourselves, we were going to have to talk for ourselves. 48
The UVF began to open channels of communication with the Irish government. This 
was accompanied by threats against the Republic of Ireland if ideas of joint authority 
surfaced, topped off with a letter bomb to Dick Spring in October 1993, which one of 
the bloodiest months of the conflict.
Meanwhile, although the UDA had stepped up the violence, it had been part of the 
ceasefire and its political component had not been erased in this new phase of militancy. 
John McMichael's son, Gary, had pumped life back into the ULDP, which dropped the 
loyalist from its title in 1989 in order to "make the party more attractive to a broader 
public". 49 Gary McMichael was articulate and a non-combatant. During the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement protests he had joined the Ulster Clubs. However, he became 
disillusioned with the campaign after the dismissive reaction within unionism to 
Common Sense. He echoed Ervine's argument that loyalists must talk for themselves:
47 Bruce, SI 992 Op. cit, p270
48 Taylor, P Loyalists (London) Bloomsbury 1999, p217
49 UDP 'A Brief History' www.udp.org
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Never again would [loyalist paramilitaries] allow loyalism to be represented by 
proxy to the traditional unionist parties while legitimate loyalist political voices 
were excluded. 50
Together, the UDP and the PUP would become the explicit political link to the 
paramilitaries and, through the brokering of a loyalist ceasefire, would enter the 
resuscitated peace process. Both the British and Irish governments were keen to draw 
them into the process even before the ceasefire was declared. Sinnerton points out that 
the CLMCs six principles for a political settlement, relating to the rights and dignity of 
both communities and to the freedom to pursue change by peaceful and democratic 
means, can be seen in paragraph five of the Downing Street Declaration. 51
5.4.4 The Second Cease-fire and Negotiations
On 13th October 1994, six weeks after the IRA ceasefire, the CLMC announced its own 
cessation of violence at a press conference. Gusty Spence's speech pledged that the 
ceasefire was permanent (that is loyalists would not start any offensive) and offered 
'abject and true remorse' to innocent victims. 52
The CLMC ceasefire had the immediate effect of conferring a new credibility on the 
political wings of loyalist paramilitaries. The UVF and UDA had always strained to 
maintain sufficient legitimacy, even within their own proclaimed constituency, whilst 
they undertook acts of violence. Now putting that violence on hold gave them 
legitimacy beyond the community. They were no longer the people who perpetrated 
terrorism but they could appear as the group who had put a stop to it. Previously other 
unionist parties could claim that they must be listened to or the paramilitaries would 
win out. Now parties linked to the paramilitaries could claim they must be listened to
McMichael, G An Ulster Voice (in Search of Common Ground in Northern Ireland) (Dublin) Roberts 
Rhinehart 1999, p41
51 Sinnerton, H David Ervine. Uncharted Waters (Dingle) Brandon 2002
52 CLMC statement delivered by Gusty Spence 13th October 1994
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because it was they who had curbed the violence.
Secondly the UDP and PUP were now drawn into negotiations. Both parties exploited 
their new positions as guardians of peace through their link to loyalist paramilitaries. 
In submissions to exploratory dialogue with the British Government both parties 
underlined this role as the source of their authority:
The UDP claims credibility in assisting to broker the loyalist ceasefire. 53
We [the PUP] believe that notwithstanding our lack of electoral mandate, we 
have a significant contribution to make towards the development of peace in 
Northern Ireland. We helped to broker a ceasefire. We are encouraging the 
CLMC to maintain and consolidate that ceasefire. 54
Thirdly, as the above PUP statement makes clear, the role of peacemaker acted as a 
substitute for the role of popularly elected spokesperson. It provided a mandate the 
parties had lacked, as neither party had advanced from a small presence in local 
government. At a press conference in December 1994 Billy Hutchinson of the PUP 
asserted "our mandate comes from the silence of the guns". 55
Now they had been drawn into the process, the credibility of both parties was further 
boosted by the 1996 Forum elections. The PUP gained 3.4 per-cent of the vote and the 
UDP 2.22 per-cent. They gained two seats each via a 'top-up' list that provided them 
with negotiating teams equal to the larger unionist and nationalist parties. 56 Bew, 
Gibbon and Patterson argue that the electoral system was designed to gain 
representation for these parties:
The loyalist ceasefire had the temporary effect of enhancing the credibility and 
political acceptability of the PUP and the UDP amongst working class Protestants.
UDP Political Prisoners. Submission to Exploratory Dialogue 1995
54 PUP Submission from the PUP 23rd December 1994
55 Quoted in Sinnerton, H 2002 Op. cit, pi 75
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Concerned that politics should be seen to work for the loyalist paramilitaries, the 
Northern Ireland Office provided a mixed electoral system for the forum. 57
Both parties had, through a place in negotiations, a public platform for their views. 
They acknowledged that their electoral mandate was still small, but, although they 
claimed a place at the table had been earned through the ceasefire, they also sought to 
link this legitimacy to the need to represent the loyalist working class. They argued that, 
without the participation of the PUP and the UDP, this group would not have a real say 
in the negotiations.
Now that they were cast as the parties that kept the lid on loyalist violence, the UDP and 
the PUP also served as a means by which more pragmatic unionist negotiators could out 
manoeuvre negative tactics. Cochrane asserts that whilst the UUP were trying to find a 
way into negotiations with the British government they were hemmed in by the DUP:
Every attempt by Ulster Unionists to emerge from the trenches dug in 1985 was 
accompanied by shouts of betrayal from the DUP and a frantic scuttling back to 
their previous position by the UUP. 58
Cochrane's work tends to assume a clean, neat divide between the DUP and the UUP, 
which fits in with his hypothesis of a radical/pragmatic divide in unionism. However, 
Molyneaux and then Trimble were often under pressure from the pessimism and 
hostility to change from elements of their own party. That said, Cochrane is correct to 
assert that "The fear of being undercut by the loudest voice - which for the last thirty 
years has been owned by lan Paisley - has been an important dynamic within unionist 
parties". 59
56 Tonge, J 2002 Op. cit.
57 Bew, P Gibbon, P and Patterson, H Northern Ireland 1921-2001 Political Forces and Social Classes 
(London) Serif 2002, p230
58 Cochrane, F 2001 Op. cit p254
59 Cochrane, F 200 Op. cit p350
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Given this, the role of the PUP and the UDP in negotiations was to diminish the impact 
of accusations of treachery from the DUP camp. They greatly enjoyed ridiculing 
Paisley and undermining his negative position in the negotiations.60 Given their new 
position as those who had put a stop to violence, Paisley had very little scope for 
threatening violent retribution against those who threatened Northern Ireland's 
constitutional status. The parties also sought to undermine Paisley as they were looking 
to challenge the DUP's mastery of the urban loyalist vote, arguing that no party had 
addressed the real needs of this constituency.
Aughey quotes George Mitchell, who chaired the talks that led to the Good Friday 
Agreement as a means of highlighting the fact that the DUP's main tactic (and that of 
Robert McCarthy's UKUP) during the peace process was that of boycotting:
Their absence freed the UUP from daily attacks at the negotiating table, and gave 
the party room to negotiate that it might not otherwise have had. 61
Darby and MacGinty consider the implication of the DUP's withdrawal, as Sinn Fein 
were admitted, as being that "the DUP strategy was now to sit back, in the hope that the 
talks would come crashing down around David Trimble". 62
Given this the UDP and the PUP linked the flexibility they displayed in negotiations to 
confidence that the union was safe, as a means of repelling any accusations of 
Lundyism. Spence, who was now enjoying the position of patron saint of new loyalism 
summed up this confidence arguing that "the union is safe because a million people say 
it is safe. The union is safe because the British government, despite what people say 
about the British government's word, the British government, the Irish government and 
indeed the American government say that the union is safe". 63 Once again there was the
Probably the most famous instance of this is the UDP/PUP ambush of a press conference organised by 
Paisley on 9th April 1998 to damn signatories to the Good Friday Agreement as traitors.
Aughey, A 'The 1998 Agreement: unionist responses' Cox, M Guelke, A & Stephen, F A Farewell to 
Arms? From 'Long War' to Long Peace in Northern Ireland (Manchester) Manchester University Press 
2000, p65
62 Darby, J and MacGinty, R The Management of Peace Processes (Basingstoke) MacMillan 2000, p76
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opportunity to exploit the paramilitary link in that those who had been prepared to fight 
and die to defend the union now appeared convinced that the purpose of the 
negotiations was not to dismantle that union.
The parties also demonstrated a belief that involvement in the peace process would 
allow them to take on nationalists and put pressure on them to reappraise the position of 
unionists. For example Gary McMichael argued:
The government's declaration that it has no selfish strategic or economic interest 
in Northern Ireland was seen as many unionists as a sign of abandonment. I, 
however, see it as a strong message to nationalists that it is not the government 
with which they must resolve the conflict, it is with their cohabitants with which 
they must resolve the conflict.64
The PUP and UDP publicly aligned themselves with David Trimble and pragmatists 
within the UUP. Trimble was the surprise victor in the UUP leadership contest that 
followed the resignation of James Molyneaux in the 1995. The former law lecturer, had 
been involved in the Vanguard movement before joining the UUP in 1978. As the new 
leader of the party, Trimble seemed to establish his hardline credentials during the 
marching season. He walked hand-in-hand with lan Paisley at the front of a jubilant 
Orange Order parade in Portadown, after marchers had successfully faced down a 
protests by nationalists, who had sought to divert the parade from the Garvaghy Road.
However, during the peace process, Trimble emerged as a pragmatic leader who was 
ready to take risks, such as entering into talks with Sinn Fein, in order to reach a 
constitutional settlement. When he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize in 1998 (which he 
shared with the SDLP leader, John Hume) he said, "in Ulster what I have looked for is 
peace within the realms of the possible". 65
Gusty Spence quoted in Rowan, B The Stop/ of the IRA and Loyalist Ceasefires (Belfast) Blackstaff 
1995, pI47
64 McMichael, G 1999 Op. cit, p85
65 Acceptance speech for Nobel Peace Prize, 10th December 1998
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Hugh Smyth articulated the belief that his party "gave Trimble a backbone. I don't 
mean this to undermine Trimble but it is an inescapable fact that he would not have 
been able to sit down with Sinn Fein without the backing of the PUP. There wouldn't 
have been a peace process at all. We made him strong". 66 The PUP and UDP 
negotiating teams saw themselves as part of a pragmatic bloc within unionism, and 
Trimble made this alliance public, by arranging to walk into talks at Stormont, flanked 
by Ervine and McMichael.
In the hours before agreement was finally reached a Sinn Fein delegation approached 
the PUP and UDP on the subject of prisoner release. Sinn Fein wanted to cut the 
waiting period before all prisoners were released from three years to one. Explaining 
why the PUP and UDP did not back this amendment Gary McMichael said "we didn't 
want to push the boat out any further than it had to be, because we knew that would 
throw the UUP off board. So we declined". 67 Both parties believed that the alliance 
with the UUP was crucial to the success of negotiations, as this created a unified cohort 
of unionist politicians who were prepared to make compromises and concessions in 
order to secure the union.
From the reviews of literature relating to unionism in Northern Ireland and to 
citizenship in ethnically divided societies, an analysis of the components of a new 
loyalist politics has been established. This can be summarised as the securing of 
electoral support for a manifesto that asserts that the union is safe and life within that 
union can be improved both by social democratic politics and the recognition of and 
accommodation of varied political and national identities.
During negotiations the PUP and the UDP offered confidence, pragmatism and the 
stifling of violence. However, both parties saw themselves as offering more than this. 
They sought election to the Assembly created by the Good Friday Agreement on
66 Quoted in McAuley, J.W. & Hislop, S "Many roads forward: Politics and Ideology within the PUP" 
Etudes Irlandaises Spring 2000, pi82
67 Quoted in Mallie, E and McKittrick, D Endgame in Ireland (London) Hodder and Stoughton 2001, 
pi82 The timescale for prisoner release was reduced to two years.
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manifestos committed to putting socio-economic issues on the agenda of the new 
institutions. They had been accommodated within the peace process because of the 
ceasefire. They sought to be accommodated within the new assembly by gaining 
credence for their self-proclaimed representation of the working class. This required a 
successful electoral campaign. However, whilst the PUP gained two seats in the new 
Assembly, the UDP failed to get elected. The PUP's claim to new loyalism will be 
evaluated in the following chapter. However, the demise of the UDP is the final issue 
to be considered within this chapter and it is this failure to gain a seat in the new 
assembly that marks the beginning of this demise.
5.5 The End of the UDP
5.5.1 The Consequences of the First Assembly Elections
I know that the UDP shall grow from strength to strength and that we shall 
continue to give the loyalist people the decisive and vibrant leadership they so 
desperately want and deserve.68
The above comment from Gary McMichael proved to be less than prophetic. The PUP 
candidate Billy Hutchinson was elected to the Assembly in North Belfast. His first 
preference votes totalled 3,751. Gary McMichael performed best for the UDP. His first 
preference votes in the constituency of Lagan valley came to 3,725. He was eliminated 
in the last count, though he ended up with a slightly higher vote total on transfers than 
Hutchinson had in his constituency. The UDP could be therefore said to be unlucky in 
not securing representation in the new Assembly.
However, the PUP polled more than twice the votes obtained by the UDP and David 
Ervine's election in East Belfast was a more secure victory.69 Conversely in South 
Belfast (and calling to mind John McMichael's failure in 1981 to gain votes out of areas 
like the Village and Sandy Row) Davey Adams of the UDP polled poorly. McAuley
68 Gary McMichael UDP Conference Notes 1997
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argues that the failure to win seats "marked a turning point in UDP fortunes, with those 
involved directly in the UDP unable to convince the broader UDA of the merits of 
political involvement".70
Academic literature relating to new loyalism focuses in more depth on the PUP than on 
the UDP. In light of this Crawford's work on the disintegration of the UDP after the 
assembly elections is interesting. He argues that the alliance between politicians and 
paramilitaries was contingent on the UDA being rewarded for its acquiescence in the 
peace process by representation in post-Agreement Northern Ireland. Evidence for 
Crawford's thesis can be drawn from Mo Mowlam's visit to UDA/UFF prisoners to 
persuade them to back the UDP's place in negotiations. McMichael had lost a key 
member of the UDP in 1994, when Ray Smallwood was murdered by the IRA. He 
entered negotiations as the political connection to a large organisation, which contained 
many sceptics within it.
However, when Crawford seeks to explain why the UDP failed to make the grade he 
attributes far too much cunning to the British Government:
Quite frankly the exclusion of the UDP (and implicitly the UDA/UFF) in the 
political process, upon either a democratic or an executive basis, strikes one as 
such a glaringly obvious omission one questions the nature of governmental
intent. 71
This view is hard to support. As Goldsmith points out, the Northern Ireland Assembly 
has only twenty-one seats less than the Scottish Parliament, even though the Scottish 
population is three times the size of Northern Ireland's. 72 Furthermore, in the absence 
of assembly success, David Trimble appointed Gary McMichael to the Civic Forum. 
The evidence suggests that attempts were made to keep the UDP in, not push them out. 
As Chris Thornton argues that the UDP "provided a study of decaying political
69 Ervine polled 5,114 first preference votes and was elected fourth out of six candidates.
70 McAuley, JW 'Unionism's last stand? Contemporary unionist politics and identity in Northern Ireland 
Global Review of Ethnopolitics Vol.3 No.l 2003, p62
71 Crawford, C "A Reluctant Ceasefire" Fortnight Magazine February 2001, www.fortnight.org/polcols
72 Goldsmith, R "Democratic Audit" Fortnight Magazine June 2001, www.fortnight.org/polcols
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influence...although the other parties and the governments kept a place open for them in 
the process, the UDP's ability to persuade their paramilitary partners became obviously 
reduced. It became apparent who led who". 73
Davanna believes that "UDA prisoners seem to hold a unique position within their 
party's decision making process". 74 She suggests that when Mo Mowlam went to visit 
UDA/UFF prisoners, the UVF/RHC prisoners met her out of courtesy - they accepted 
that the political decisions were being made on the outside by the PUP. Mowlam's 
intervention did draw the prisoners back into a supportive position, but they remained 
ambivalent about the peace process.
Crawford is right to pin-point the UDP's failure in the Assembly elections as the 
starting-point for the party's collapse, though he blames the wrong people for that 
failure. There were elements within the UDA who did not support the new political 
developments as well as those who had never been enthusiastic about a political path. 
These elements were strengthened by the election result. This disenchantment with the 
Good Friday Agreement also emerged within the UDP with a third of the party 
resigning their membership. By the time of the local elections in May 2001, the party 
was in disarray, though two UDP councillors were elected, (despite the fact that late 
registration led to party candidates being classed as independents).
The UDA began releasing statements announcing "grave concerns about the 
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement and its viability if unionist concerns are 
not satisfactorily addressed and public confidence restored". 75 Statements were also 
released in the name of the UFF, an action that in itself implied a willingness to 
embrace violent action. Whilst the pro-Agreement parties met at Weston Park in July 
2001, a UFF statement announced withdrawal of support for the Good Friday 
Agreement. This was on the grounds that "we find it intolerable that Sinn Fein have 
gained concession after concession, yet there is still a growing erosion of our culture
73 'Loyalism Part V: The Rocky Path to Polities' belfasttelegraph.co.uk 4th October 2002
74 Davanna, T ' When Mo went to jail' Fortnight Dec 98/Jan 99, p!4
75 'UDA 'Concerned' About Peace Accord' www.news.bbc.co.uk 24th January 2001
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and heritage". 76
The UDP was now in a difficult position because it was still committed to the Good 
Friday Agreement. Party spokesman John White admitted:
The difficulty within the UDP at this moment in time is that we support the GFA 
and the UDA have said that they no longer support it so there is a conflict there 
and we can no longer say we fully represent that views of that organisation. 77
On 12th October 2001 the Northern Ireland Secretary, John Reid, declared that the 
ceasefires of the UDA and the LVF were over. 78 Events seemed to be pushing the UDA 
further away from the political path and this culminated in the disbandment of the UDP 
on the 28th November 2001. The announcement by the party explained:
During the past month's intensive discussions have taken place within the UDP 
regarding the future electoral and representative viability of the party. These 
discussions are now at an end and it has been decided that, from this date, the 
UDP should be dissolved and therefore cease to exist as a political party. 79
76 "Loyalist Anger over Political Process" www.news.bbc.co.uk 10th July 2001
77 Broadcasting House Radio 4 28th October 2001
78 The issue of whether a ceasefire has or has not been broken seems to have been within the power of 
the British Government to ascertain. Guelke argues that "the main paramilitaries never intended the 
ceasefires to apply to their use of violence for secondary purposes" such as punishment beatings (Guelke, 
A 1999 Op. cit, p49). The UDA and the UVF had been involved in a murderous feud over the summer of 
2001 and UDA members were deemed to play a large part in rioting taking place in Belfast. The final 
straw for the British Government as far as the UDA and LVF were concerned was the murder of the 
journalist Martin O'Hagan on 29th September 2001.
79 "UDA moves to Disband its Political Offshot" www.independent.co.uk 29th October 2001.
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5.5.2 The Feud
During the summer of 2000, tensions between the UVF and the UDA came to a head. 
The UVF suspected that the UDA had allied themselves with the breakaway LVF and 
that they were using this group as a cover to attack the UVF in Belfast. The extent of 
bad intent towards the UVF became apparent on the twentieth of August when, under 
the cover of a loyalist cultural day, UDA members provoked a confrontation and 
opened fire on the Rex Bar on the Shankill Road. This incident marked the beginning 
of an open feud beginning with tit-for-tat attacks on homes and party offices and 
culminating in four murders.
Cusack and McDonald state:
The first feud in 1974 took place just two months after the loyalist victory of the 
UWC strike. Loyalism was searching around for a political way forward 
following the collapse of the power-sharing executive at Stormont. Since the 
earliest days of the Troubles there has been a tradition that when one loyalist 
group tries to reach out the hand of friendship to their enemies across the 
peaceline, the other becomes more sectarian and belligerent in a bid to vie for
80supremacy.
The UDA's provocative behaviour kick-started the feud and foreshadowed the end of 
the political project pursued by the UDP. However, the UVF responded in kind and it 
was their attack on the Shankill UDP office that led the UDA to burn down the PUP 
office. The feud highlighted a fundamental problem for any party seeking to claim the 
epithet, new loyalist. The continuing existence of different loyalist paramilitary 
groupings and their separate political representation (and divergent political agendas) 
represents a serious obstacle for any party that claims to speak for the urban loyalist 
communities. Competition between the UDP and the PUP fragmented what was 
already a fragile electoral coalition of support. Competition between the UDA and 
UVF damaged the legitimacy of their political representatives as constitutional actors.
' Cusack, J & McDonald, H UVF (Dublin) Poolbeg Press 2000, p399
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5.5.3 Models of New Lovalism - Testing the UDP
The UDP's failure to secure seats in the assembly election started a chain of events that 
heralded its collapse. The optimism of Gary McMichael that his party would "grow 
from strength to strength" proved to be unfounded. As the purpose of this thesis is to 
establish what is new and different about the concept of new loyalism, the models of 
new loyalism constructed in accordance with the methodology governing this work 
need to be applied to the UDP. This application demonstrates that the agenda of the 
UDP was subject to internal tensions that prevented the party from contributing to 
normalised Northern Irish politics.
From the manifesto and statements of the UDP two things are apparent. Firstly, the 
emphasis on an exclusivist identity remained. The UDA publication, The New Ulster 
Defender supported the role of the UDP in the peace process. Articles within the 
journal rested on the idea of Ulster as a nation and the idea of independence was still 
given credence. One article in favour of negotiated independence proclaimed that:
The simple truth is that there are two nations on this island - Ulster and Eire. 81
The nation of Ulster was not characterised in evangelical term, but Protestantism was 
still an implicit badge of membership due to the ethnic blood connection drawn with the 
Scottish planters through prehistoric kinship. There was a noticeable tension between 
the civic and the ethnic in the depiction of Ulster as a nation.
Secondly UDP manifestos did not seem to have moved on from a populist style of 
politics and pronouncements from the party seemed to express a degree of anxiety 
about nationalists and about the institutions of British government. A motion at the 
1997 conference, when the UDP was riding high as a negotiation team, stated that "this 
party believes that the Northern Ireland office and the Northern Ireland Housing 
Executive have a hidden agenda of systematically moving Protestants out of the Greater
81 'Self-Determination - an Ulster Nationalist Viewpoint' New Ulster Defender Vol 1, No 9 March 1994
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Belfast Area." The forces ranged against loyalism remained nationalists and a 
two-faced British government and the UDP concentrated on negative responses.
It was this perception of loyalists being driven out of North Belfast and housing estates 
as the venue for the ongoing battle against the insatiable demands of nationalists that, in 
part, prompted a resurgence in UDA violence. Statements were issued in the summer of 
2000 warning that the ceasefire would end if Catholics didn't stop forcing Protestants 
out of their home. 83 Racioppi and O'Sullivan See argue that the UDA paper, the New 
Ulster Defender "emphasized the suffering of Protestants during the 'Troubles' and in 
the 1990s argued that Protestants became victims of ethnic cleansing. One article went 
so far to compare to the Irish Roman Catholic Church to the Croatian Ustashi". 84 As 
will be shown in the following chapter, this discourse of ethnic cleansing stunts the 
potential of a new loyalist politics because it links social and economic issues to the 
constitutional issues that they are meant to supersede. That the UDP were accepting of 
this idea suggests their populist political agenda had not resolved the tensions that have 
allowed socialist and sectarian values to co-exist within loyalist political action.
The UDA had always been a larger and more amorphous organisation compared to the 
UVF. The UVF actually became more centralised and urban as the peace process 
developed. Dissident members based mainly in the Mid-Ulster area broke away in 1996 
and formed the Loyalist Volunteer Force. As the anti-politics elements within the UDA 
gained prominence the UDP was left in a vulnerable position. In the absence of a strong 
electoral mandate the UDP's legitimacy was based on brokering the ceasefire. When 
the ceasefire ended that legitimacy was damaged and, having failed to increase their 
share of the vote in the meantime, the UDP did not seem to have a constituency to 
represent and could not stand alone from the UDA.
R? Motion proposed by Thomas English, North Belfast UDP Conference 1997
0-1
Cusack, J and McDonald, H Op cit. 2000. The authors note that all of the twenty-one people forced out 
of their homes in North Belfast in July 2000 were Catholics.
84 Racioppi, L and O'Sullivan See, K: 'This We will maintain': gender, ethno-nationalism and the 
politics of unionism in NI' Nations and Nationalism Vol 7 No.l p!02-103
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Crucially though the UDP had not developed a manifesto that differed radically from 
other political movements within the UDA. Populism rather than socialism governed 
the agenda of the party and the emphasis on an Ulster identity remained which tended 
towards an exclusivist idea of who 'the people' were. It could seem that the UDP were 
the victims of unfavourable circumstances but in fact the party had not developed the 
confidence and sophistication required to withstand this turbulence. For the larger 
UDA grouping the only role that remained open was representing the people of Ulster 
through extra-constitutional action.
The next chapter will explore loyalist perceptions of the effects of the Good Friday 
Agreement in Northern Ireland in depth. What has become apparent is that sectarian 
tension has been rising, especially in interface areas. Shirlow says of residents in these 
areas:
The whole peace process is basically a folly for these people. There have been 
benefits in the suburbs and rural areas - better jobs, the possibility of higher 
incomes, greater stability - but in other areas conflict is still being reproduced in 
the same way as for the last thirty years. If people can't even move within the city 
[Belfast] and accept work where they wish, where is the peace dividend?85
Shirlow argues that both communities see themselves as victims and refuse to 
acknowledge the suffering of the other side, which exacerbates division.
For the UDP to sell the Good Friday Agreement to this constituency would be a 
difficult task by any stretch of the imagination. The alternative could have been to 
become an anti-Agreement party but this position has been covered by the DUP, who 
have enjoyed two distinct advantages over the UDP. Firstly, the DUP have no 
paramilitary connections and are far more respectable as an electoral option. Secondly, 
the DUP's defence of Ulster does not connect with ideas of independence, making their 
agenda far more reassuring to anxious loyalists. With the DUP's electoral strength 
growing, there was never really a space for the UDP to be reconfigured as an 
anti-Agreement constitutional force and the party ended up being jettisoned, with
85 'Belfast more divided in 'peace' than strife' thetimes.co.uk 4th October 2002
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McMichael withdrawing from public life.
5.6 After the UDP
Although the government had declared their ceasefire was over, UDA members 
presented themselves as still maintaining that ceasefire. They attempted to exploit 
tension in interface areas in order to present themselves as a necessary form of 
protection against republican harassment, but also as an unofficial police force, 
preventing loyalist reprisals. In January 2002 the North Belfast brigade issued 
statements to the effect that they had launched patrols to prevent loyalists attacking 
Catholics and promised to punish those that did. One statement said
We are without doubt on the edge of an abyss. The fuse is getting shorter, and we 
are now faced with the reality of having to break our ceasefire in order that we can 
defend our community with the same means openly used by Sinn Fein/IRA to 
attack loyalists over recent months. 86
Meanwhile, under the cover name of the Red Hand Defenders the UDA murdered a 
Catholic postman in North Belfast called Daniel McColgan on 12th January 2002. In 
the following week the RHD issued threats against Catholic postal workers and 
teachers. McColgan's murder caused outcry and was the cause of a lunchtime stoppage 
on 18th January, organised by the trade union movement. The UDA acknowledged this 
adverse reaction by telling its alter ego to stand down and stated that "we condemn 
unreservedly the threat to school teachers and post office workers, along with any other 
members of their profession".87 Instead a brand new group, the Loyalist Reaction Force, 
emerged to issue more death threats, this time against Sinn Fein members such as Alex 
Maskey, Eoin O'Broin and Scan Kelly. 88
86 'We are on the edge of abyss, say UDA' www.times.co.uk 5th January 2002
87 'Loyalist terror group lifts threat' The Guardian 17th January 2002. The LVF also used the name Red 
Hand Defenders as a cover and were, by all accounts, irritated by the UDA 'disbandment' of the 
imaginary group.
88 'UDA accused of issuing death threats' www.utvinternet.news 25th January 2002
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It was against this background that the formation of the Ulster Political Research Group 
(UPRG) came to prominence. Containing former UDP members and represented 
publicly by John White the group was presented as a think-tank that the Belfast 
Telegraph noted "intended to explore methods of addressing the political alienation of 
loyalist communities". 89 This alienation was seen in part to stem from the Good Friday 
Agreement:
Support can only be given when changes are made to the Agreement. The UPRG 
sets as one of its main objectives the review of the Agreement.90
UPRG members also worked with the Loyalist Commission, a loose grouping of 
paramilitaries, community workers and church ministers. The Commission's primary 
task had been to ease tensions between the UDA and UVF after the last feud. However, 
the group had been instrumental in encouraging loyalists residents to negotiate during 
the Holy Cross protests and have since promoted themselves as spokesmen for 
Protestant working class communities.91
The British and Irish governments have shown willingness to talk with both the 
Loyalist Commission and the UPRG as part of a recognition, according to an Northern 
Ireland Office spokesman, that "dialogue with the political leadership of loyalism is a 
vital part of the peace process. Like many other groups, the UPRG has a contribution to 
make". 92
Neither of these groups can be said to fit under the label of new loyalist. They both 
have a limited agenda and their actions are mainly based on a straightforward reaction 
to events at grassroots level rather than planning and presenting a cohesive political
89
'Welcome for loyalist 'think-tank" belfasttelegraph.co.uk 14th January 2002
90
'Loyalist group urges review of agreement' www.thetimes.co.uk 26th January 2002
n I
'Loyalist think-tank working at peace' Sunday Tribune 20th January 2002
'The UDA dog day afternoon' belfasttelegraph.co.uk 22nd February 2003. See also 'Reid holds talks 
with loyalist paramilitaries' utvinternet.com/news 5th March 2002 and 'Government meets loyalist 
group' news.bbc.co.uk 14th August 2002
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programme. 93 The idea that the UPRG could in any way be a substitute for the UDP 
has been disproved by events subsequent to the release of the Johnny 'Mad Dog' Adair.
When Adair was released on 15th May 2002, John White announced "he wants to 
rekindle his relationship with his family before assessing his role as an influential figure 
within loyalism" and hinted at a revival of the UDP. 94 Given that Adair had been 
pivotal in the UDA/UVF feud, it would not be unfair to see his influence on loyalism as 
malign. Adair now seemed to see his main role as supreme commander of the UDA and 
he provoked a power struggle within the organisation, creating a murderous internal 
feud and involved the LVF. Adair and White were expelled from the Inner Council of 
the UDA in September 2002 and Adair was returned to jail on 10th January 2003. By 
the following month White had fled Northern Ireland along with other Adair supporters 
to escape the wrath of other senior UDA members. 95
After these events the UDA announced a twelve-month ceasefire, which they 
christened "the John Gregg initiative". % However, the likelihood of the UDA 
producing a new commitment to a political direction is small. The events surrounding 
the release and incarceration of 'Mad Dog' have revealed that the UDA is internally 
divided and beset by power struggles. Moloney has argued that the UDA's division 
means it is too weak to wreck the Agreement
Some elements are more hostile to the Good Friday Agreement than others while 
some districts are more or less totally absorbed in criminal activities such as drug 
peddling.97
93 UPRG member and Lisburn Councillor, Frank McCoubry did stand as an independent at the 2003 
Assembly election, but he only polled 469 votes.
94
'Released Adair will be a force for good' belfasttelegraph.co.uk 15th May 2002. Adair had been
returned to prison after the feud between the UVF and the UDA.
95
'Adair supporters flee homes' news.bbc.co.uk 5th February 2003
'The loyalist call for peace rings hollow' guardian.co.uk 26th February 2003. John "Grug" Gregg had 
been pivotal in getting Adair ostracized by the UDA and his murder on 1st February was attributed to 
Adair supporters. He seems an unlikely patron of a posthumous peace initiative, having been linked to 
the murder of Daniel McColgan.
97
'Secret loyalist think-tank may curb violence' Sunday Tribune 20th January 2002
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However, in its current state, the UDA seems unlikely to provide constructive 
constitutional solutions or to raise its involvement in local communities to a level where 
it is addressing the causes of tension rather than provoking hostility. In addition the 
media focus on Adair has once again underlined the popular image of the UDA as thugs 
and gangsters, something that has always hampered claims to legitimacy.
5.7 Conclusions
The ineffectiveness of protests after the Anglo-Irish Agreement presented loyalist 
paramilitaries with another opportunity to pursue a political role. The UVF and UDA 
both built on initiatives undertaken in the 1970s. The UDA published proposals for a 
new civic settlement within Ulster, although they played down ideas of independence. 
The UVF was more committed to a British identity and to socialist politics as a means 
of promoting change and peace.
The peace process of the 1990s drew in paramilitaries from both sides. The CLMC 
ceasefire conferred a new legitimacy on politicians connected to the UVF and UDA and 
they presented themselves as a distinct alternative to the 'No' unionism exemplified by 
the DUP. However, after failing to get elected to the new Northern Ireland Assembly, 
the UDP began to disintegrate. What became apparent was that the UDA's support for 
the Agreement was contingent on electoral success and when this was not forthcoming 
the UDP was overwhelmed by those opposed to the Agreement and those who did not 
see any value in engaging in constitutional politics. A new cadre had risen to the top of 
the UDA in the early nineties and their ferocious campaign against republicans and the 
wider nationalist community had rattled the IRA. Compared to this success, the 
benefits of participation in the peace process seemed pretty feeble.
Even without this uncertainty about the peace process within the wider UDA, the 
agenda of the UDP lacked the sophistication that would have seen it measured 
successfully against a positive model of new loyalism. The UDP's populist manifesto
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and Ulster identity politics did not represent a significant development from previous 
political developments within the UDA and, as members drifted away from support for 
the Agreement, they offered no viable alternative within loyalism to the resurgent DUP.
The fate of the UDP must be borne in mind during the next chapter, which focuses on 
the PUP. The public emergence of division between politicians and paramilitaries 
within the UDA grouping should be compared to the growing anxiety about the 
Agreement within the UVF. The areas where the PUP have carved out distinctiveness 
from the DUP also need to be considered, as the factors that marked the UDP out from 
Paisley's party, such as connection to paramilitaries and suggestions of independence, 
were not vote winners. In addition the way the PUP has reacted to loyalist 
disenchantment with the Good Friday Agreement is an issue to be addressed when 
considering the party's continued confidence in the political process.
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SIX - NEW LOYALISM AND THE PROGRESSIVE UNIONIST PARTY
6.1 Introduction
The collapse of the Ulster Democratic Party can be attributed in part to their failure to 
carve out a distinct brand of loyalism from the DUP. Their unique attribute was the 
championing of a distinctive Ulster identity, which has never been a successful 
electoral strategy because of its association with secession. Lack of success in the 
Assembly elections of 1999 hastened their demise, especially given the demonstrable 
ambivalence within the UDA regarding the Good Friday Agreement. This chapter is 
concerned with examining the agenda and actions of the Progressive Unionist Party in 
relationship to the models of new loyalism that have been outlined in the previous 
chapters.
The Democratic Unionist Party seems to have benefited from being stridently opposed 
to the Good Friday Agreement. Shortly before the suspension of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly lan Paisley took the opportunity to tell the Assembly that his prophesies of 
disaster were being fulfilled:
What we said would happen has happened. We said that the IRA would continue 
to plan and carry out its acts of terror at will. Since the Belfast Agreement was 
signed, the IRA has updated its weapons and bombing techniques in Colombia. It 
has rearmed from Russia and Florida. It has targeted leading political, judicial, 
security, forensic and loyalist figures, using updated intelligence files. The 
Police have identified the IRA as the only major line of enquiry into the break-in 
at Special Branch Headquarters at Castlereagh.'
Hansard 8th October 2002
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Increasing electoral support for the DUP and poll data suggesting unionist enthusiasm 
for the Agreement is on the wane2 has been taken in media and government circles as 
indicators of deep-seated unionist alienation from the peace process. In November 
2001 the then Northern Ireland Secretary, John Reid, stated that he did not want 
Northern Ireland to become a 'cold house' for unionists. He described unionists as a 
community:
which feels its traditions, culture and way of life are under threat from an alliance 
between the large and vibrant Catholic minority within its boundaries, its larger 
neighbour to the south, and a spineless, ungrateful or even perfidious parent 
across the Irish Sea. A community which feels that some elements of nationalism 
are intent on humiliating it under the legitimate guise of achieving parity of 
esteem. 3
This sense of despair is perceived to be especially intense amongst unionists at the 
bottom of the socio-economic scale. Richard Haas, the United States Envoy to 
Northern Ireland, surveyed protests at the Holy Cross School in North Belfast and 
stated:
The rage which spilled out in this inexcusable behaviour was rooted in economic 
distress, unease about demographic changes, lack of proper housing, and - most 
importantly - a fear that the new society being built in Northern Ireland offers 
little place for those doing the protesting.4
It is important to assess this prevailing view in relation to the agenda of the PUP for a 
number of reasons. Firstly party documents depict the PUP as an integral part of a
2 For example a poll conducted for the BBC programme Hearts and Minds after the suspension of the 
assembly on 14th October 2002 found that support for the Agreement had slipped from seventy per-cent 
at the time of the referendum to fifty-six per-cent. Only a third of unionists said they would vote for the 
agreement again, as compared to eight out often nationalists. 'Slump in Support for Agreement' 
news.bbc.co.uk 17th October 2002. This is a similar figure to the 2002 Northern Ireland Life and Times 
Survey which showed only thirty-five per-cent of Protestants would vote for the Agreement again. 
www.ark.ac.uk/nilt
3 Address to Institute of Irish Studies, University of Liverpool 21st November 2001
4 Quoted from 'The Protestant Factor' www.guardian.co.uk 12th January 2002
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Protestant working class community in Northern Ireland, and not just a political party 
offering political representation to this constituency.
When we want to know what the people want we ask ourselves. When we want 
to know the people's priorities we just look at our own hearts. When we want to 
know of hardship we just look at our own plight. Because whatever adversity 
faces us too since we live and move and have our being in the working class 
districts of Northern Ireland.5
The PUP seek to augment electoral support with the legitimacy that stems from being 
seen as an essential component of a community that cannot be fully understood from 
outside. Understanding the Progressive Unionists' depiction of this community and its 
needs is therefore crucial to examining their commitment to establishing normality in 
Northern Ireland through policies of redistributive social justice.
It is also important because the PUP leadership maintained support for the Good Friday 
Agreement after the UDP had moved to a 'no' position. How the PUP reconciles this 
with the increasing electoral threat from the DUP is an important indicator of the depth 
of PUP confidence in the peace process and the new institutional arrangements.
Finally it is important because the PUP belief that a normalised social democratic 
political process can be established is connected in part to a stated willingness to create 
a class cleavage across the two communities, where the promotion of common 
socio-economic interest could allow politics in Northern Ireland to develop beyond 
constitutional concerns. According to the party leader, David Ervine:
The reality is that if you want sectarianism to go away you've got to replace it 
with something and the only way you're going to replace it with something in a 
society as divided as ours is create common purpose and alliances. 
Therefore this chapter will provide an analysis of the new loyalist agenda of the PUP in
5 Breaking the Mould PUP 1998 Bold typeface in the original document.
6 The Fortnight Interview: Rudie Goldsmith talks to David Ervine' Fortnight January 2004, pi6
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relationship to their proclaimed constituency, the Protestant working class. This will 
involve examining statistical data on deprivation in Northern Ireland. Much of the data 
focuses on Belfast. Although the PUP have stood for elections outside Belfast, in Deny 
City and North Down for example, it is in Belfast where they have been successful. 
Hugh Smyth is a Councillor for Shankill Ward in West Belfast. Billy Hutchinson was 
elected as an MLA in North Belfast in 1999. He lost that seat in 2003 but remains a 
member of Belfast City Council. David Ervine is also a councillor and retained his 
MLA seat in East Belfast in the 2003 Assembly election. Tommy Sandford's seat on 
Castlereagh Borough Council is contained within the constituency of East Belfast. 
Therefore the focus of this data aids the development of a profile of the areas that have 
given a degree of support to the PUP.
The activities of the PUP will be examined at different levels of government allowing 
for an examination of their participation at the macro-level of the Assembly and of their 
involvement in grassroots politics. This will facilitate a discussion of PUP attitudes to 
the concept of citizenship and the impact of the Agreement on the agenda of the party.
6.2 Exclusion and Inequality
As outlined in the introduction, there is a widespread perception that the despair and 
alienation exhibited within contemporary unionism is most acutely expressed by those 
at the lower end of the socio-economic scale. Daily Telegraph editorials do not, as a 
rule, lament the decline of the labour movement. However an opinion piece entitled 
Belfast Ghettos did just this:
Consider for a moment the shrinking world of the urban Protestants over the past 
thirty years. All the institutions which upheld respectable working class life 
have been destroyed. The manufacturing industry has gone - and with it much of 
the trade union movement. The Orange Order has been demonised as a sort of a 
Ku Klux Klan. The RUC and the UDR were consigned to the scrap heap of 
history. Britishness has been downgraded from the official culture to one of two 
equal sectarian traditions. And BBC Northern Ireland is scarcely friendly to 
pro-British narratives. There's even talk about replacing the Northern Irish
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football team with an all-Ireland side. 7
Writing for the Irish Times Mary Holland argues that disillusion with the Good Friday 
Agreement is "symptomatic of a much deeper sense of exclusion and fears about the 
community's long term future" which will have to be addressed through educational 
achievement and increased investment to turn working class Protestants away from 
voting for Paisley and "into the pro-agreement tent". 8
There is a problematic element to this media discussion. As was discussed earlier in this 
thesis, the insecure worldview expressed by loyalists should not be treated as a disease 
of poverty that can be cured by social mobility. As well as surveying evidence of 
deprivation in Protestant working class areas, the significance of exclusion and 
inequality in relationship to constitutional politics needs to be considered.
6.2.1 Patterns of post-industrial development
Changes in the nature of central government funding, through the Barnett formula, 
mean that post-Agreement Northern Ireland is facing a relative decrease in public 
subsidy. The formula was devised in the 1970s, but there has been a move towards 
stricter application of the formula since the creation of devolved government within 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The formula is based on population rather than 
need, and stricter application has been undertaken to hasten convergence towards equal 
per capita spending in the UK. A report commissioned for the Northern Ireland 
Assembly notes that "potential high public service demands could cause particular 
concern, especially if combined with low disposable incomes as is the case in the 
devolved countries, particularly in Northern Ireland which is the lowest". 9 The report 
depicts convergence as a measure that will promote less rapid rise in expenditure
'Belfast Ghettos' www.opinion.telegraph.co.uk 12th January 2002
o
'Stormont Deal Won't Solve Problems of North Belfast' www. ireland .com/newspaper 8th November 
2001
9 'A background paper on the Barnett formula' Northern Ireland Assembly Research Paper 12/01 2001, 
point 76
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outside England, rather than an actual decline in funding for the devolved regions. 
However, the report notes that this could have implications for the new Scottish 
Parliament and Welsh and Northern Irish Assemblies, as they could be blamed for 
slower provision of service improvement in areas such as health.
Central government subsidy is not the only means by which post-Agreement Northern 
Ireland could sustain itself. Shirlow and Shuttleworth argue that one of the key 
elements in policy around the Good Friday Agreement is the promotion of economic 
reconstruction to supersede "the use of public expenditure to compensate for Northern 
Ireland's economic decline". 10 There is an implicit assumption that there will be an 
economic peace dividend, and that regeneration will ease social exclusion and in turn 
curb violence. However, Shirlow and Shuttleworth refute this:
The conventional notion that growths in jobs and wealth creation reduce both 
social marginalisation and poverty is somewhat erroneous given the pattern of 
accumulation, investment and social exclusion over the past two decades. 11
They depict economic regeneration as dependent on an increased service sector, which 
promotes job and wealth creation without easing inequality. Cebulla and Smyth also 
see economic development in Northern Ireland as widening the gap between different 
types of employment and present a study of patterns of employment in Belfast to 
support this claim:
The expansion of the private and the public service sectors in Belfast has 
increased the number and proportion of professional jobs in the city while the 
growth in consumer services had the opposite effect of expanding the lower 
occupational strata, thus leading to the polarisation of employment in the city.
10 Shirlow, P and Shuttleworth, I 'Who is going to Toss the Burgers? Social Class and the 
Reconstruction of the Northern Irish Economy' Capital and Class No.69 1999 p28
11 Shirlow, P and Shuttleworth, I 1999 Op. cit, p39
12 Cebulla, A and Smyth, J 'Disadvantage and New Prosperity in Restructured Belfast' Capital and Class 
No.60 1996, p39-40
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This polarisation in employment is mirrored in residential polarisation. Cebulla and 
Smyth's study shows affluent Protestants moving into the suburbs and their Catholic 
counterparts moving into South Belfast.
The increasing feminisation of the workforce stems from the decline of the unionised 
industrial sector and the growth of the service sector, which offers flexible part-time 
work that can be based around childcare responsibilities. Coulter argues that:
The poor rates of pay invariably associated with forms of employment classified 
as essentially 'female' has ensured that growing economic activity has often not 
afforded women financial autonomy. 13
Thus investment and job creation do not automatically increase the financial well being 
of the poorer workers in Northern Ireland's economy. By June 2001 unemployment in 
Northern Ireland had hit a 25 year low 14 but economic development has promoted 
polarisation that is evident not just in disparity of wealth and job security but in terms of 
residential separation. In the Belfast area the migration to the south of the city or to the 
suburbs has intensified the decline of other areas of the city. Belfast contains eight out 
of the ten worst wards in Northern Ireland in terms of quality of life. 15
The polarisation between different socio-economic strata is accentuated by the 
education system. Primary school children sit a transfer test, commonly known as the 
eleven-plus, that determines whether they receive a grammar school or secondary 
modern education. The Department of Education for Northern Ireland is aware of the
Coulter, C Contemporary Northern Irish Society. An Introduction (London) Pluto 1999, pi 17 
14 West Belfast and Greater Shankill Task Force Report February 2002
The wards are Crumlin, Woodvale and New Lodge in the constituency of North Belfast; Falls, 
Whiterock and Shankill in West Belfast; and The Mount and Ballymacarret in East Belfast. The 
measurement used is the Noble Index of Deprivation which considers income, employment, health, 
education, access to services, housing and the social environment. HAZ Database: A profile of North and 
West Belfast North and West Belfast Health Action Zone Report July 2002 The HAZ (Health Action 
Zone) project was an initiative launched by Frank Dobson when he became Health Minister. Deprived 
areas were declared Health Action Zones. Statutory and voluntary agencies could bid for money to be 
used in innovative projects aimed at improving the health of the population in these areas. The initiative 
was not renewed by Alan Milburn when he took over at the Department of Health
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effects of socio-economic status on the pass-rate for the test:
There is a marked relationship between social disadvantage and achievement in 
the Transfer Test. As the proportion of pupils entitled to free school meals 
increases, the proportion of pupils achieving grade A decreases. Of those who sat 
the test, pupils at schools in the lowest free school meal band were more than two 
and a half times as likely to achieve a grade A as those at schools in the highest 
free school meal band. Moreover, in general, as the proportion of pupils of pupils 
entitled to free schools rose, so too did the proportion of pupils not sitting the
test. 16
Coulter notes that "socio-economic origins, therefore, exercise an important influence 
upon the matter in which the Northern Irish educational system is accessed and 
experienced" 17 . Residential segregation in terms of social class is therefore largely 
complemented by educational segregation.
These urban working class areas have also experienced a disproportionate amount of 
violence during the years of conflict, and for inner city Belfast, the signing of the 
Agreement has not produced a dividend in terms of reduced violent incidents. For 
example, between July 2001 and March 2002, one-hundred-and-thirty-six houses in 
Belfast were vacated due to social unrest. All but five of these were in North Belfast. 18
The most cursory examination of Northern Irish society reveals poverty and inequality. 
However, it the impact of these indicators on loyalist political action and confidence 
that needs to be explored. The violence in these areas is not visited upon them from 
outside; it is the product of conflict between nationalist and loyalist communities, and 
conflict within those communities. The relative deprivation between the communities 
and the significance of any disparity therefore needs to be examined.
16 DENI Report - Transfer Procedure Test Results 2001/2002 23rd May 2002 
www.deni.gov.uk/facts_figures
17 Coulter (1999) Op. cit, p73
18 Report of the Project Team North Belfast Community Action Project May 2002.
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6.2.2 Catholic and Protestant Inequality 
Borooah et al point out that
there is much greater inequality within the Catholic and Protestant communities 
than there is between them and this statement holds true even for Catholic and 
Protestants belonging to specific categories. Therefore if one was serious about 
"doing something" for inequality in Northern Ireland then one should start by 
attempting to narrow income differences between the "rich" and "poor" 
(irrespective of religion). 19
They argue that there has been an assumption of a gap in wealth between the two 
communities that directly correlates to the differences in the rate of unemployment and 
that this has distorted debates on inequality and poverty.
There has been a persistent difference in rates of unemployment in the two 
communities with Catholic men being at least twice as likely to be unemployed as 
Protestant men. 20 Teague states that that there has been a general acceptance since the 
1970s of this disparity between the two communities. Along with the unemployment 
differential, Catholic males are over-represented in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs. 
However, Teague says that the debate over why this is the case often ignores the 
indirect forces that shape outcomes.21
Cebulla and Smyth state that the Northern Ireland's economy during the Stormont era 
was marked by a clientelist system and that Catholics were largely excluded from
19 Borooah, V Mckee, P Heaton, N Collins, G 'Catholic-Protestant Income Differences in Northern 
Ireland' Review of Income and Wealth Vol. 41, No.l Mar 1995, p55
20 The Labour Force Survey Religion Report 2001 National Statistics (2003) puts the unemployment 
differential between Catholics and Protestants at 2.1 for males and 1.6 for females
21 Teague, P 'Catholics and Protestants in the Northern Ireland Labour Market. Why Does One Group 
Perform Better than the Other?' Economy and Society Vol. 26 No.4 November 1997 pp560-578
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trades because of "residence, family tradition and local informal networks". 22 However, 
they believe that deliberate attempts to stimulate business development in nationalist 
areas such as West Belfast during the conflict were doomed to be unsuccessful due to 
the economic conditions of global recession. They cite the De Lorean plant, which 
produced fabulously expensive luxury cars for a virtually non-existent market, as a 
particularly ill-thought out plan. league agrees that reducing the unemployment 
differential is difficult because the Northern Irish economy can only develop so much. 
He estimates that to increase Catholic male employment by the time of the 2011 census 
without damaging Protestant male employment thirty-nine thousand new jobs would 
need to be created.23
Another factor to be taken into consideration is what Coulter refers to as "the 
geography of fear". 4 Teague points out that "Segregation in employment is only 
reflecting the growing residential segregation of the two communities".25 He argues 
that many firms recruit locally and informally, which results in extended internal labour 
markets. Booroah et al see these networks are made more impervious to entry from 
outside by a marked reluctance to seek jobs outside one's own informal labour market. 
They point out that
Northern Ireland should not be seen as an area over which workers and 
job-seekers regardless of religion, move freely but rather as a constellation of 
geographically segmented labour markets between which mobility is extremely 
limited.26
Coulter states that technical and white-collar workers feel freer to move across 
geographical boundaries in search of work. He says "the nature of territorial politics 
and the fear generated by thirty years of conflict impacts, in terms of locating places to
22 Cebulla and Smyth 1996 Op. cit. p46
23 Teague, PI 997 Op. cit
24 Coulter, C 'The Absence of Class Politics in Northern Ireland' Capital and Class 69 1999, p41
25 Teague, P 1997 Op. cit, p563
26 Borooah, V et al 1995 Op cit, p55
214
work, which are perceived as safe, most upon the deprived and socially excluded".27 
Working class areas are marked out through murals and symbols which as Hughes and 
Donnelly point out enhance a sense of isolation from the other community:
Segregation has been accompanied by an increase in "chill factors", referring to 
demarcation of sectarian boundaries with graffiti, flags, kerb painting and other 
manifestations of cultural/political identity and paramilitary association.28
The violence of the conflict has encouraged residential segregation, which has in turn 
ensured that informal networks of recruitment remain localised. Segregated housing 
plays a role in discouraging many people to apply for all possible available jobs due to 
an unwillingness to go into the "other" area, a sentiment felt most intensely in working 
class areas where streets and communities are clearly demarcated and there is still a 
high incidence of sectarian violence. In addition to this segmentation of the labour 
market, the underperformance of the Northern Irish economy means that easing the 
unemployment differential through simple job creation is not a viable option.
These social and economic developments have two important implications for the 
search for links between deprivation and unionist alienation, which will be discussed 
below. The first is the sense of deterioration of position felt by many working class 
Protestants and the second is the marked importance of defending one's territory 
against the "other side".
27 Coulter, C 1999 Op. cit, p41
28 Hughes, J and Donnelly, C 'Ten years of social attitudes to community relations in Northern Ireland'
from Gray, AM Lloyd, K Devine, P Robinson, G Keenan, D (Eds) Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland. 
The Eighth Report (London) Pluto Press 1999, p40
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6.2.3 Deprivation and Decline
McAuley argues that sectarianism is the main value which governs Protestant working 
class relationships but:
for many loyalists, however, their experience also needs to be seen in the context 
of dramatic economic decline, political disarticulation and ideological 
disintegration.29
The existence of a differential in unemployment rates does not mean that Protestant 
workers as a group are enjoying significantly higher levels of affluence and job security, 
league points out that during 1971 and 1991 the absolute number of jobs held by 
Catholic males declined by four per-cent but for Protestant males the decline was 
fourteen per-cent. 30 Firms such as Harland and Wolff in Belfast are no longer the major 
employers they once were. As manufacturing in Northern Ireland went into severe 
decline in the 1970s the gap was filled to some extent by the burgeoning security forces. 
However, this is another sector seeing marked change. Police reform has rested in part 
on the creation of a new police force that is meant to be more reflective of the 
community it serves. The fifty-fifty recruitment drive means that applications are split 
between Protestants as a group and nationalists and other communities. This further 
promotes a sense of estrangement from policing in Northern Ireland. As previously 
noted disaffection has been evident within the Protestant community since the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement.
An area where the Catholic working class is outperforming their Protestant 
counterparts is education. As previously stated DENI's own research shows that 
socio-economic status affects performance in the Transfer Test. Overall a lower 
proportion of Catholic managed pupils achieved a grade A in the academic year 
2001/2002. According to the DENI this "reflects the higher proportion of pupils
29 McAuley, JW 'A process of surrender? Loyalist perceptions of a settlement' from Anderson, J & 
Goodman, /Pis/Agreeing Ireland: Context. Obstacles. Hopes (London) Pluto 1999, p204
30 league, P 1997 Op. cit.
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entitled to free school meals in Catholic schools". 31 However the figures also show that 
"in contrast to the overall position, within each free school meal band a greater 
proportion of pupils at schools under Catholic management achieved a grade A than at 
schools under Other management". 32 In addition to this Catholic managed pupils are 
more likely than those at Other managed schools to go onto higher education. In the 
academic year 2000/2001 nearly twice as many Catholic secondary pupils went on to 
higher education than those in Other managed schools. 33
As was noted in the introduction to this thesis, many academic assessments of the 
Stormont era of direct rule describe dominant politicians within the Unionist Party 
fostering a populist ethos. 34 This style of politics eased tensions within unionism 
because it encouraged Protestant working class voters to feel that their loyalty was 
recognised and rewarded. Unionist politicians are no longer in a position to orchestrate 
a similar partnership and unionist political representation has become increasingly 
fragmented.
As noted by Nelson and Todd the supremacism and desire for domination evident 
within loyalism is the obverse of anxiety over the power of Irish nationalism to 
marginalize and submerge loyalist culture. 35 Coulter detects a strong belief in 
Protestant working class communities that fair employment measures are a simple 
means of taking jobs held by hard working Protestants. 36 The relative deterioration of 
economic well- being has occurred over the same period that the institutions and ethos
31 DENI Transfer Procedure Test Results 2001/2002 23rd May 2002, www.deni.gov.uk/facts_figures
32 DENI 2002 Op. cit.
The figures are 13.1% and 6.9% respectively DENI Qualifications and Destinations of Northern 
Ireland School Leaves 2000/2001 June 25th 2002 www.deni.gov.uk/facts_figures
34 See for example Bew, P Gibbon, P and Patterson, H The State in Northern Ireland 1921-1972: 
Political Forces and Social Classes (Manchester) Manchester University Press 1979, Northern Ireland 
1921-1996: Political Forces and Social Classes (London) Serif 1996 and McAuley, S and McCormack, C 
The Protestant working class and the state in Northern Ireland since 1930: a problematic relationship' 
from Hutton, S and Stewart, P Ireland's Histories: Aspects of State. Society and Ideology (London) 
Routledge 1991 pi 22
35 Todd, J 'Two traditions in Unionist political culture' Irish Political Studies Vol. 2 1987 ppl-26 Nelson, 
S Ulster's Uncertain Defenders (Belfast) Appletree Press 1984
36 Coulter, C 1994 Op. cit.
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of the Stormont era have been dismantled. Therefore it seems reasonable to assert that 
working class loyalists would make connections between the two. For example, 
support for the RUC became problematic when they were seen as quelling protest 
against the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Now the new PSNI is problematic for another 
reason, in that it is less open as a source of employment.
Political losses have occurred during the same period as economic losses reinforcing a 
sense of precariousness. Educational underachievement marginalizes loyalists, 
especially within the polarised and segmented job market of Northern Ireland. This 
insecurity is reinforced within Belfast by the sense that physical territory is being lost as 
well.
6.2.4 The Importance of Territory
Coulter asserts that for residents of working class areas a knowledge of 'sectarian' 
geography, that is the ethno-religious make up of different neighbourhoods, is 
necessary for simple self-preservation. He argues that:
The spatial distinctions that define contemporary Northern Irish society are 
particularly pronounced within working class districts. The experience of living 
within a divided society frequently impacts dramatically upon the disposition and
•17
conduct of the working classes.
There is a strong sense within working class areas of territoriality, that different 
districts belong to the loyalist or nationalist grouping living there and that these areas 
should not be breached by the other side. Within Belfast during the last few years there 
has been a notable decline in areas with a majority of Protestant residents. For example, 
between 1991 and 1999 the population of Shankill ward declined by just under five 
per-cent and the population of Glencairn by just under nine per-cent. 38 Wards with 
nationalist populations around these areas have been increasing in population density
37 Coulter, C 1999 Op. cit. p40
38 North and West Belfast HAZ 2002 Op. cit.
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and, as noted earlier in this thesis, the city itself now has a majority Catholic population. 
According to Jarman:
With a young and growing Catholic community and an aging and declining 
Protestant community the shift in territorial identity is seen as unidirectional...it is 
thus increasingly important to defend the boundaries of one's area and ensure that 
the land does not pass into the hands of the 'other'.39
This view is echoed by the North Belfast Community Project Team. Their report also 
states:
This aspect of territoriality is a highly emotive subject in North Belfast and it has 
damaged already fragile relations between the two communities in the area. 
Protestants/unionists feel strongly that there is a desire on the part of Catholics/ 
nationalists to move the Protestant working class out of the city. They see the 
Housing Executive as being compliant with this strategy. In particular, violence 
directed towards the Protestant community is often interpreted as active attempt 
to encourage this community to either move out or further back to provide space 
on which to house the 'other community'. The Catholic community on the other 
hand feel that their need for housing is not being taken seriously and they are 
trapped behind 'walls of fear' even though there may be space available within 
Protestant areas.40
In fact the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) is trying to avoid aggravating 
this tension by accommodating greater Catholic demand within their traditional areas. 
Their current strategy for North Belfast aims to meet need in the area by 2007 with 
more than four times the houses being built in Catholic areas than Protestant. 41 
However, if these demographic trends continue these areas cannot be maintained and
39 Jarman, N Managing disorder: responses to interface violence in North Belfast from Hargie, O 
Dickson, D (Eds) Researching the Troubles: Social Science Perspectives on the Northern Ireland 
Conflict (Edinburgh) Mainstream Publishing 2003, p230
40 North Belfast Community Action Project 2002 Op. cit, p36-37
41 'Walls of Hatred' The Guardian 21st November 2001 The projected figures are 1,450 and 350 homes 
respectively.
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current strategies do not seem to have mollified Protestants in North Belfast who 
believe that they are being deliberately squeezed out by nationalists. A community 
worker and former UDA member, Eddie McClean told the Guardian that "Sinn Fein is 
shipping these people in because they want North Belfast to be nationalist, the same as 
West Belfast".42 Given that it is the NIHE that controls housing transfers in public 
stock, it is unlikely that Sinn Fein could embark on such a deliberate strategy even if 
they wanted to. McClean's comments reveal a tacit acceptance that the republican 
enemy can easily manipulate the agencies of the state in order to get a step closer to 
pushing loyalists out of Northern Ireland altogether.
Shirlow's analysis of Ardoyne and Upper Ardoyne shows that Protestant Upper 
Ardoyne residents read the decline of their areas in terms of economic well-being, 
population and amenities "as a result of republican violence and erroneous policy 
making against the community". 43 He argues that local residents have developed a 
righteous attitude where they must hold on to "their" territory for the sake of it.
This sense of decline and of defences being overrun accords with a hypothesis that 
socio-economic patterns can echo fears about loss of constitutional control and cultural 
self-expression. Territoriality in housing also fits into a wider discourse of loss and 
betrayal due to the continuing conflict generated by Orange Order parades. Jarman 
sees that "there is no common understanding of the [parades] issue, no acceptance of 
the other's point of view, no desire to compromise and no willingness to give 
ground."44 He argues that part of the reason that parades are so inflammatory is that 
they often breach perceived territorial boundaries. Events at Drumcree have stirred 
tensions in Belfast and elsewhere in part because it seemed to many loyalists unjust that 
nationalists would prevent their areas being entered for a certain period of time whilst 
seemingly bent on overwhelming loyalist areas permanently. Thus an issue like 
housing can fit into a larger tale of unionist loss.
42
'Walls of Hatred' The Guardian 21 st November 2001
43 Shirlow, P 'Who fears to speak. Fear, mobility and ethno-sectarianism in the two 'Ardoynes". Global 
Review of Ethno-Politics Vol.3 No.l September 2003, p83
44 Jarman, N 2003 Op. cit, p229
220
6.2.5 Making Connections
The above passages have suggested ways in which socio-economic factors can accord 
with constitutional uncertainty and political alienation. However, two qualifications 
need to be noted. The first is that the amelioration of inequality and deprivation would 
not necessarily infuse working class loyalists with faith in the peace process.
Murtagh's research into interface areas shows a high level of social deprivation. These 
areas have three times the unemployment than Northern Ireland as a whole and twice as 
many households on income support. Whilst forty-five per-cent of the Northern Irish 
population has an annual income of five thousand pounds or less. The proportion at 
interface areas is sixty-nine per-cent.45 However, one cannot establish a continuum 
within unionism where those furthest away from deprivation and violence are 
uniformly confident about their ability to extract benefits from political engagement 
with nationalists and the British and Irish governments.
The second thing to note is that when it comes to seeking electoral support the DUP 
does not rely solely on the kind of rhetoric and politics that has placed it in the 
anti-Agreement camp. David Rose, the deputy leader of the PUP, criticises Paisley's 
constitutional stance but says that in the past "I voted for Paisley because his party 
actually did do behind the scenes work on the ground for ordinary people, which the 
Official and Ulster Unionists never do".46 This is also an observation made by Billy 
Hutchinson:
It was Mr. Paisley, to his credit, who pointed out the need to do something for the 
working class people. He was one of the first to raise the issue about the 'big 
house' unionists.
45 Murtagh, B Territoriality, research and policy making in Northern Ireland' from Hargie, 0 and 
Dickson, D (eds) 2003 Op. cit, pp209-225
46 Interview with David Rose, Deputy Leader, 17th September 2002
47 'Progressive Polities' Combat March 1999
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As noted by McAuley and McCormack48 , the DUP has never been able to take support 
in areas like East Belfast for granted, they need to have something to offer in terms of 
non-constitutional issues.
McAuley argues that:
The current period has witnessed a growing recognition from within key sections 
of loyalism that unionist politicians have largely absolved themselves of many 
social and economic responsibilities by giving primacy to the constitutional
49issues.
When constitutional crises assert themselves unionists can overcome their differences 
and band together, as was shown in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement. However, this does not mean that sharing a sense of 
despondency over these matters encourages working class loyalists to overlook their 
socio-economic needs. Neither does it mean that a robust rhetorical defence of the 
union is enough to guarantee loyalist working class support. A 'common-sense' 
narrative can be constructed that links issues such as housing to a wider fear of 
destruction of the unionist community but this does not mean that loyalists simply 
believe that a different constitutional settlement would be the key to overcoming all the 
challenges they face. Politicians seeking votes in this area have not been able to avoid 
addressing social and economic issues, no matter how firm their stand on the 
constitution.
48 McAuley, JW and McCormack, P 1991 Op. cit.
49 McAuley, JW 'The emergence of new loyalism' from Coakley, J (ed) Changing Shades of Orange and 
Green: Redefining the Union and Nation in Contemporary Ireland (Dublin) UCD Press 2003[a], p!07
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6.3 The PUP; Class and Community
PUP literature depicts the party as representatives of the Protestant working class and as 
part of that class. In interviews the concept of class seems linked to locality rather than 
to a shared socio-economic position. David Ervine describes himself as working class 
but adds "I have to say to you that I have a number of neighbours who are not even 
working. A number of neighbours who, maybe I insult them, I do so surely for the right 
reasons, are underclass".50
The idea of being underclass is linked to not being in employment. Robin Stewart states
I am part of the underclass. I won't say working class because I don't work. I am 
part of the underclass because I live in these streets, I live around here 
[Netownards Road]. I don't drive a fancy car. I don't have a boat. I don't have a 
nice pension. So underclass. 51
The references to neighbours, and to living in a certain area, underline a theme 
prevalent in PUP politics that class status is linked to the idea of community and 
geographical location. Billy Mitchell sums up his sense of the divisions within 
Northern Irish society:
There's still these distinctions, the class divisions in Northern Ireland are about 
postcodes...there are still distinctions whether you would call them working class, 
middle class, upper class, you know the people you belong to, those in the inner 
city or the urban areas and those from the leafy suburbs. 52
It is this concept of community that links the PUP to those they seek to represent. They 
see themselves as living within an organic grouping with its own specific needs. Even 
though their own life-chances may have been altered by the education they've had, the 
jobs they do now, and their experience of political decision making, they are still
50 Interview with David Ervine, PUP leader, 30th April 2003
51 Interview with Robin Stewart, East Belfast constituency office worker, 17th January 2003
52 Interview with Billy Mitchell, PUP Executive Member, 12th March 2001
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authentically part of the community. William Smith states:
A lot of our policies would be based on working class issues, because we emanate 
from hardline, well not hardline, but tough deprived areas in Belfast. We have 
two MLAs, we have four councillors in Belfast, the four councillors come from 
areas that are deprived, are on the frontline of the conflict, interface areas et cetera, 
et cetera. So you need to be fully accustomed to the issues of the 
people in those areas, you know5353
This sentiment is echoed by the former leader of the party, Hugh Smyth:
The one main thing that makes us distinctive is that we are involved in our local 
communities. Our roots are in local communities... The difference between us is 
that we concentrate on working class issues, the things that affect the people out 
there. And I believe that those are housing, health, unemployment. I don't think 
that you divorce those three things. They are enshrined together. They are 
married together. You can't divorce them. And those are things that we 
concentrate on. That is the difference between us even to this day from the 
Unionist Party, while there's great changes that have taken place in it. But I still 
don't believe that they emphasise enough the needs of the people in deprived 
areas. 54
This concept of community reflects social and economic change. Instead of placing the 
PUP's natural constituency within the workplace it depicts a grouping that takes in 
those who do not work or those whose work is in the home. The emphasis on 
community reflects a recognition that the shipyards and the factories are not the centre 
of political and economic life in these areas. This has the potential to embrace a more 
modern politics dealing with identities such as gender because it does not rely on an 
image of a full-time male unionised workforce.
53 Interview with William 'Plum' Smith, Party Chairman, 18th January 2002
54 Interview with Cllr. Hugh Smyth, 13th January 2002
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6.3.1 Women and the PUP's Community
Cochrane argues that "the very nature of politics in Northern Ireland has produced a 
male-dominated environment" because of the violence associated with politics and 
because Northern Irish society retains more commitment to traditional gender roles and 
sexual morality than the UK as a whole.55 Instead women have often channelled their 
activism into voluntary organisations both in the secular and church spheres. Sales 
argues that women's activism could actually increase tension within communities. For 
example, the skills women developed during their organisation of support to prisoners 
and their families created a desire to transcend this supportive background role. This 
brought them into conflict with the idea that their place was firmly in the domestic 
sphere. 56 Some of this activism allowed for the creation of the Northern Ireland 
Women's Rights Movement in the 1970s. However, this organisation was divided over 
conflict related issues such as women prisoners and it finally split over the need for a 
response to the hunger strike. Racioppi and O'Sullivan See argue that since this period 
feminism became associated with republicanism and "many unionists saw feminism as 
a cloak for Irish nationalism".57
Weiner's analysis of housing protests in the 1970s concluded that issues such as 
housing had often been seen as women's work before other groups, such as the UDA, 
attempted to use them as a means of bolstering legitimacy. 58 Grassroots politics has 
long been associated with female activism. Therefore, the PUP has been in the position 
to develop out of a style of politics where women are already involved.
55 Cochrane, C Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism Since the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Cork) 
Cork University Press 2001, p48
56 Sales, R 'Gender and Protestantism in Northern Ireland' from Shirlow, P & McGovern, M Who are 
the People? Unionism. Protestantism and Lovalism in Northern Ireland (London) Pluto 1997, pp 140-157
57 Racioppi, L and O'Sullivan See, K 'This we will maintain: gender, ethno-nationalism and the politics 
of unionism'in Northern Ireland' Nations and Nationalism Vol. 7 No.l 2001, p99
58 Weiner, R The Rape and Pl-nder of the Shankill (Belfast) Farset Co-operative Press 1980
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Wilford and Galligan characterised the PUP's 1997 manifesto as gender-neutral 
because it talked of women's rights in broad neutral terms rather than proposing 
specific measures 59 . However, Racioppi and O'Sullivan See argue that the 1999 
Assembly manifesto "promulgated a more extensive women's agenda than any other 
party". 60 The 2001 PUP manifesto built on this programme. Indeed the section on equal 
rights is one of the most practical and detailed sections in terms of defined policies and 
demands. The manifesto centred on reproductive rights, improved legal protection and 
pay for part-time workers and increased provision of benefits and childcare to allow 
women to choose between employment and full-time motherhood.
The UDP actually had a very similar approach to women's rights in their last manifesto, 
including the same commitment to the extension of the 1967 Abortion Act to Northern 
Ireland. 61 However, Ward believes the PUP's approach has been more comprehensive 
because of the party's establishment of a Women's Commission in 1995, which "has 
been active in developing the party's policy on women". 62 In addition the PUP tries to 
provide a high profile for women within the party as spokeswomen, members of the 
executive and electoral candidates.
Given that the party is linked to such an overwhelmingly masculine organisation as the 
UVF, the promotion of women within the party serves to underline their commitment to 
be more reflective of this community they seek to serve. However, it must be noted that 
the proportion of female candidates remains low, something which has been a feature 
of elections in Northern Ireland in general and in unionist parties in particular. Given 
that the constitution still dominates much of mainstream Northern Irish politics, the 
PUP have been hindered in any attempts to strengthen the grassroots women's politics 
they have in part developed from. Racioppi and O'Sullivan See conclude:
59 Galligan, Y & Wilford, R 'Gender and Party Polities' from Galligan, Y Ward, E & Wilford R (Eds) 
Contesting Politics: Women in Ireland. North and South (Boulder) Westview Press 1999, pp 169-184
60 Racioppi, L and O'Sullivan See, K 2001Op. cit, p!04
61 UDP Manifesto 1998 www.udp.org
62 Ward, R 'Invisible women: the political roles of unionist and loyalist women in contemporary 
Northern Ireland' Parliamentary Affairs No.55 2002, p!76
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The PUP stands out for its extensive policy statements and quota commitments to 
women, but it has also failed to make women visible in politics.63
6.3.2 The community and socialism
The concept of community enables the PUP to create for itself a base that does not 
centre on outdated ideas of who is employed and where. However, while this idea of 
community is inclusive in this sense it is exclusive in another. Communities are divided 
from each other by ethno-religious identity and the PUP see themselves as embedded 
within the loyalist side of that divide.
A sense of this division is evident in discussion of the term socialism. David Ervine 
describes the PUP as "the only socialist unionist party in the region". 64 However there 
is also an awareness that the term socialist is problematic within loyalist politics. 
Wilson Me Arthur notes:
I would probably call myself a social democrat, but in this community, to call 
somebody a socialist, just due to the past the lines are sort of pretty hazy. If you're 
going to name something socialist - the republican movement gained its dynamic 
in 1969 very much through the international support of the socialist movement in 
different countries. And that connotation has sort of, the Marxist side of the 
republican movement and the socialism of their leaders and things, has left a sort 
of bad taste to socialism within the loyalist community. That's where people may 
have difficulty, where this, I suppose in any other industrialised city in the United 
Kingdom would be a prime constituency for the Labour Party, and the Labour 
Party is of socialist descent.
The emphasis on community within the PUP seems to offer a defence against this
63 Racioppi, L and O'Sullivan See, K 2001 Op. cit, p!04
64 Ervine, D Redefining Lovalism - a Political Perspective Institute for British-Irish Studies Working 
Paper No.4 2001
65 Interview with Wilson McArthur, Stormont office worker, 13th March 2001
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mistrust of terms such as socialism. Michael Acheson sums up a sense of the difference 
between socialism and community politics:
I am very upset and annoyed when I see media journalists putting us as a left of 
centre party and the whole stigma of what left means, comes into it... I would 
never say I am a socialist. But then again if someone said to me, if I have that 
interest in social problems then I am a socialist. I see myself as from my 
community and certainly I want to give something back to that community... So if 
socialism means that I work within my own community I take all the abuse that 
that gives us. 66
The PUP sees itself as speaking for a distinct grouping with Northern Ireland. Its 
self-proclaimed constituency is loyalist communities who are struggling both with 
social deprivation and with the continuing effects of sectarianism and violence. The 
questions to be considered about this view of community politics relate to how the PUP 
seek to represent this grouping, both at the elite levels of government which 
accommodated them during the peace process and at the grassroots level.
6.4 The Peace Process
The 1996 Forum elections brought the PUP and the UDP into the negotiations that led 
to the Good Friday Agreement, with negotiating teams of equal strength to larger 
parties. Contact with the British and Irish Governments had developed before the 
CLMC ceasefire of 1994, although the ceasefire statement with its expressions of 
remorse marked the beginning of a new higher public profile. Rowan argues that the 
speech was a signal "that loyalism was emerging from the backroom closet and wanted 
a place at the political talks table". 67 Unlike the UDP, the PUP was elected to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly. As discussed in the previous chapter, the accommodation 
of the UDP within the Civic Forum was not enough to keep the UDA within the elite
Interview with Michael Acheson, member of Duncairn Branch, 12th March 2001




For the moment the PUP remains officially a pro-Agreement unionist party. However, 
as will be discussed, there has been change within the PUP-UVF grouping as regards 
this issue.
6.4.1 Devolution and Integration
One aspect of the agreement that seems welcomed by the PUP is that of devolution. 
From the inception of the party, PUP documents have alternated between emphasising 
the benefits of integration and of devolution. In the UVF publication, Combat there has 
been a lack of consensus on constitutional structures. Some articles have expressed 
hostility to the idea of a devolved assembly. For example, a Combat editorial in 1988 
questioned the worth of Paisley's championing of a new assembly as the most effective 
replacement for the Anglo-Irish Agreement:
A Northern Ireland Assembly is not new. The last one didn't work, it was made 
unworkable by elected representatives. So what makes Paisley think that another 
would be any different?68
During the 1980s PUP documents often expressed anxiety about devolution as 
something that estranged Northern Ireland from the rest of the United Kingdom. The 
1986 document, War or Peace? argued that "power should not be available to any 
political structure designed to meet the needs of a region in the UK". 69 The PUP 
championed their constitutional proposals as an alternative to Anglo-Irish 
governmental structures. The document Sharing Responsibility, which was subtitled 
"an alternative to foreign involvement in the internal affairs of a region of the United 
Kingdom"70 focused on strengthened local government. It was not that devolution was 
rejected out of hand in PUP policy documents, rather that there was a noticeable
68 Editorial Combat Vol.7 Issue 7 September 1988
69 War or Peace? Conflict or Compromise PUP 1986
70 Sharing Responsibility PUP September 1985
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anxiety about isolating or estranging Northern Ireland.
When interviewed for this thesis Hugh Smyth concentrated on the benefits of 
devolution, arguing:
Devolution worked properly will be the salvation of Northern Ireland. Forgetting 
about what we had in the Unionist Stormont, those people are gone, their day is 
gone, that era is gone. It's essential that we give people from Northern Ireland 
charge of their own affairs where they will be saying how the money is spent.71
However, at the first PUP conference after the signing of the Agreement he seemed less 
enthusiastic and more pragmatic about the introduction of devolution:
On the matter of the Assembly Mr Smyth stated that he was not particularly 
happy with that and would have preferred total integration. But now having seen 
that devolved government had been given to Scotland and Wales it was inevitable 
that it would happen here. 72
The devolution projects in Scotland and Wales have served to normalise devolution for 
the PUP and have made constitutional arrangements for Northern Ireland seem less 
asymmetric. The Northern Ireland Assembly grew out of a different process to the 
Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. Each institution possesses a different set 
of powers and the Scottish Parliament exceeds the assemblies in terms of power and 
autonomy. However, it is the simple fact that Northern Ireland is now one of three 
regions with devolved power that makes its position within the UK seem less 
asymmetric. Devolution is seen to have similar effects and benefits for all regions and 
therefore the outcome of the process, rather than the specific powers and institutions 
involved, is promoted. David Ervine argues that "devolution does bring politics closer 
to people and it doesn't really matter whether it's Wales or Scotland or the regions of 
England - and they will come along". 73 Billy Mitchell echoes this idea:
71 Interview with Hugh Smyth, 13th January 2002
72 Report of PUP Annual Conference Combat December 1999
73 Interview with David Ervine, 30th April 2003
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I believe that local people have local problems. Local people should be able to 
address them. So, I mean, devolution, we need local administration. The same as 
Scotland, Wales. I also believe there's a good argument for decentralisation in 
England too, where you have local assemblies. I think that's the way forward. 74
Devolution is also seen as a means of normalising politics because of the potential for 
bringing non-constitutional issue means to the fore. According to Eileen Ward:
For far too long our politicians have got away with doing damn all on socialist 
issues. Now it's like they're going to have to be seen to be doing stuff, you know 
what I mean? They'll not be able to get away with it any more. People just won't 
vote for them. Hopefully. 75
For the PUP, attitudes towards devolution seem to have become more positive and 
certain compared to the 1980s. This can partly be accounted for by the devolving of 
powers to Scotland and Wales, which mean that devolution in Northern Ireland actually 
makes the province seem less of a satellite. However, the development of PUP 
certainty on this area can be linked to the parallel development of optimism about the 
ability to engage in negotiation with nationalists and with both the British and Irish 
governments. Anxiety about the possibilities of measures such as joint authority meant 
that constitutional change, especially if it enhanced distinctiveness from Great Britain, 
meant that that issue was fraught with uncertainty and difficulty.
6.4.2 Conflict Transformation
After interviewing Billy Hutchinson for his research about the republican and loyalist 
ceasefires of 1994, Rowan noted:
74 Interview with Billy Mitchell, 12th March 2001
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Billy Hutchinson speaks in terms of conflict transformation rather than conflict 
resolution - basically because he believes the diverse positions of nationalism and 
unionism cannot be reconciled. The best hope for Northern Ireland, he believes, 
is that its violent battle can be transformed into a political battle. 76
The concept of conflict transformation is part of the Progressive Unionist manifesto:
The Progressive Unionist Party is committed to facilitating a conflict 
transformation process to allow politics in Northern Ireland to progress to the 
stage where Central Government would restore power. Progressive Unionists 
will play their part to the full in order to achieve a way that will take the gun out 
of unionist politics. We talk about transformation rather than resolution because 
the party would claim that resolution is not possible between unionism and 
nationalism as they are diametrically opposed. However we do believe that the 
conflict can be transformed from one of violence to one of constructive dialogue 
and that out of this transformation can come a respect for diversity. 77
This idea of conflict transformation seems suited to a consociational settlement. It 
suggests that political structures can accommodate divergent aspirations, that conflict 
can be turned inwards towards peaceful negotiations over differing demands. There are 
two issues to be considered when applying the practical use of this concept in the 
following passages. The first is that unionist political representation is extremely 
fragmented and the PUP is not in a position to direct unionist discourse from above. 
The second is that ideas of compromise and dialogue require two partners and the 
actions of nationalists and Progressive Unionist perceptions of those actions is 
therefore vitally important.
These ideas will be discussed at length in relation to relationships with both nationalists 
and other unionists. An example of what the PUP considers to be the use of conflict 
transformation is the debate on the display of lilies at Stormont. The proposal to display
75 Interview with Eileen Ward, Executive Committee Member, 14th March 2001
76 Rowan, B 1995 Op. cit, pi42
77 PUP Manifesto 2001
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lilies in the grounds of Stormont during Easter 2001 provoked a debate in Stormont 
because the symbolism of the lilies (that is their association with the Easter Rising of 
1916) was seen by many unionists as deliberately confrontational. Jim Wells from the 
DUP argued that "this is not simply about a floral display representing the Irishness felt 
by some members of the Assembly. If they wanted that Irishness represented, they 
could have used shamrock".78
Ervine was the only designated unionist not to vote against the planting of the lilies. 
His contribution to the debate upset both sides:
As a unionist, I have no particular desire to appreciate or venerate the republican 
dead - some of my colleagues and I would like to have added to their ranks. As 
members of the DUP slid about the 'Armagh Desert' with rolled-up manifestos 
determined to destroy the republican movement, there were those of us who tried 
to do exactly that, more efficiently. I am sorry that we did not have as much 
success as I would like to have been able to report...The motion that was put 
forward was an attempt to reach a compromise wherein some people would 
accept that that was an appreciation for them and a veneration of the dead. For 
others it was a way to make politics work, and to take us on to the next 
undoubtedly problematic item on the agenda. 79
Ervine's speech suggested that this nationalist demand could be met on grounds of 
pragmatism and that accepting something so painful to unionists was a means of 
moving away from conflict. However, his comments about not finishing off a few more 
republicans reinforced his belief in the legitimacy of loyalist paramilitary actions - 
because they had brought out this situation wherein republicans were willing to 
compromise. Therefore he felt he could afford to be provocative because the conflict 
had been transformed rather than resolved.
78 Hansard. 10th April 2001
79 Hansard. 10th April 2001
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6.4.3. Support for the Agreement
Although the PUP remains officially a "Yes" party as regards the Good Friday 
Agreement, this has not meant that change has not taken place within the party, and 
within the UVF. On the 16th January 2003 the UVF announced that it was withdrawing 
its contacts with the International Decommissioning Body headed by General De 
Chastelain, thus bringing to an end its half-hearted engagement with the 
decommissioning process. This came just over a week after the PUP had walked out of 
peace talks alluding to secret deals and government duplicity. Ervine argued that the 
party was being excluded from the real negotiations:
It is clear that there are things going on in the undergrowth - both political and 
paramilitary. Unless we have a clear understanding, a clear sight of what those 
are it would be foolish for the PUP to take its place in the upcoming talks and be 
used for simply a pat on the head and to rubberstamp something we have not been 
party to. We are not prepared to play that game. 80
This leadership criticism of the current negotiations to end the suspension of the 
institutions reflects unease within the party. On llth March 2002 the Castlereagh 
Central branch of the PUP posted an open letter on the party website:
We are dismayed at the Westminster Government's political strategy with 
Republicans of concessions without sanctions... Our concern presently lies with 
the views expressed in Castlereagh. As such it is the view of Castlereagh Central 
PUP, that we can no longer endorse the continuing flawed implementation of the
o I
Good Friday Agreement.
Anxiety about the Agreement is also apparent within the UVF. Interviewed the day 
after the break with the decommissioning body, Robin Stewart observed:
I would gauge the fact that maybe ninety per-cent, ninety-five per-cent of 
80 TUP walks out of talks' news.bbc.co.uk 7th January 2003
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members of the UVF and Red Hand Commando are not for this agreement which 
makes it hard then for the five per-cent who would be in the leadership who are 
for the agreement to keep it going and keep everyone on board. I think 
yesterday's statement is voicing a genuine concern. This is happening in the 
community and both the UVF and the RHC are from the community so therefore 
their views would be reflected well within the community. 82
The key word in the Castlereagh statement is implementation. The PUP have remained 
supportive of signing the agreement, but critical of the implementation of it. It is the 
significance of PUP criticisms as regards the implementation of the Agreement that 
must now be addressed.
Peter Robinson, the DUP MP for East Belfast, has criticised the manner of the CLMC 
ceasefire because of the assertion that the union was safe:
I think they are in the worst of all worlds because they are now in a position where 
they either go along with whatever a British government does or they have to 
stand up and say, we got it wrong. 83
The emphasis on implementation seems to be the way out of this for the PUP. David 
Ervine says he still supports the Agreement but:
Where the Good Friday Agreement went wrong was the fact that it was 
unfinished business: unfinished business on police, on weapons, on criminal 
justice, and a few other areas that where we, instead of taking the decisions 
ourselves, hived them off to commissions and then gutted the shit out of the 
commissioners when they made their judgement...We couldn't have achieved 
better. That doesn't mean to say it [the Agreement] is perfect. Far from it. Then 
the implementation was a bloody disaster. We are in uncharted water here. 84
81 'Open letter from Castlereagh Central PUP' www.pup-ni.org.uk
82 Interview with Robin Stewart, 17th January 2003
83 Rowan, B 1995 Op. cit, pi50
84 Interview with David Ervine, 30th April 2003
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David Rose also criticises the implementation of the Agreement:
I advocated it. I support it on paper but I think that there's been an unholy mess 
made of it. I think that whenever Mo Mowlam left and Mandelson arrived, he 
changed the dynamic of it. He changed it from an agreement with all the parties 
involved, to a save David Trimble agreement. Well I don't follow David Trimble. 
I never supported him and I never will so once I was excluded from that, then I 
owed the Good Friday Agreement nothing. So I don't feel I owe it anything. If I 
was asked to go out and campaign for it now, I wouldn't. But that's not because I 
am particularly against the Good Friday Agreement, it's because we were put out 
of it. And thus we owe it nothing. 85
This critique of implementation rather than of the Agreement itself includes a lot of ire 
directed at Sinn Fein for using the Agreement as a starting point for demanding more. 
Anger is also directed at the British and Irish governments for meeting these demands 
and therefore encouraging Sinn Fein to carry on adding to their wish list. At talks 
between Tony Blair and Northern Irish political parties at Downing Street in December 
2002 there were accusations from unionists that a secret deal was being struck with 
Sinn Fein over amnesty for prisoners on-the-run. The Belfast Telegraph reported:
PUP leader David Ervine accused Sinn Fein of using blackmail to try to get its 
way on issues such as policing and on-the-run prisoners during behind the scenes 
talks since the assembly was suspended. "My community would be furious if 
republicans on the run were granted an amnesty. I am not prepared to
Ofi
countenance blackmail; maybe the best option is not to be in the process".
These themes don't seem to differ much from the 'no' unionist camp: the obsession 
with finality and with a permanent unchanging settlement; the insatiable demands of 
republicanism; the duplicity of the British government making concession after 
concession. This viewpoint also tends to ignore areas Sinn Fein have been frustrated or
85 Interview with David Rose, 17th September 2002
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have had to make compromises. Mandelson's departure from the Northern Ireland 
Office was commemorated by a mural on the nationalist Ormeau Road. The mural 
depicted him as Pinocchio, which demonstrates that his appointment was no more 
popular with many republicans than it was with David Rose.
Also, given that policing, and the replacement of the RUC with the PSNI, is one of the 
most contentious issues for unionists it must be remembered that Sinn Fein were very 
dissatisfied with the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000. Republicans were already 
critical of Chris Patten's proposed reform programme and believed it was not 
sufficiently far-ranging. Mitchell, O'Leary and Evans point out that "neither the act nor 
the published implementation plans delivered the full Patten, only Patten lite".87 Sinn 
Fein's demand then became focused on the need to implement Patten in full; their 
ambitions for police reform had been limited by the way the Agreement had been 
implemented. The idea that Sinn Fein have consistently reaped benefits without paying 
any price or making any compromises is simplistic.
However, where the PUP critique of post-Agreement politics is different is the 
emphasis on the role of unionists in wrecking a process that was meant to benefit them. 
Unionists often criticise each other, but the PUP analysis does not rest on accusations of 
lundyism and going too far. Rather, it is that other unionists have not had the courage to 
go far enough. 88
In particular unionists are criticised for the emphasis that has been placed on 
decommissioning. When asked about the Good Friday Agreement Wilson McArthur 
stated:
86 'Prime Minister pressed on Sinn Fein deal' www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk 5 th December 2002
87 Mitchell, P O'Leary, B and Evans, G The 2001 elections in Northern Ireland: moderating 'extremists' 
and the squeezing of the moderates' Representation Vol. 39 No.l 2002 p27
88 Robert Lundy was a Governor of the City of Derry. He was ousted in 1688 because he was believed to 
be a covert supporter of James II whose army was laying siege to the city. He is burned in effigy during 
the marching season and his name has become synonymous with treachery within unionist ranks.
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I think one of the biggest difficulties I have at the moment is that the Ulster 
Unionist Party have been forced by dissident unionists over ground that they 
cannot walk. They have been pushed consistently by no unionists or by dissidents 
within the UUP who have forced Trimble to take a no guns, no government 
position, which I think is nonsense. Decommissioning is a red herring. Anybody 
who gives up guns one day still has the knowledge to use them, they still have the 
supply routes, they still have the targets, they still have everything. 89
Billy Mitchell echoes this sentiment
The republican movement appear to be using the issue of decommissioning as a 
bargaining chip in order to prise concessions out of Her Majesty's Government. It 
is a very cynical approach to decommissioning and shows a lack of good faith in 
the process. However it must be said that unionists handed the Shinners this 
bargaining chip on a plate by making decommissioning such a big issue. 90
McAuley identifies decommissioning as an important issue because:
The growing belief across unionism that the republican movement has not moved 
as far, or as fast, down the road they have charted, has led directly to a turning 
away of support from the Good Friday Agreement by unionists. 91
Although they may not have done enough to ease unionist anxiety, the IRA has made 
moves in this area. Wilson Me Arthur's comments about targets and supply routes are 
interesting. It is unlikely that republican patrons such as Colonel Gadaffi will be 
supplying arms to the IRA in the future. In fact the only group to make a commitment to 
decommissioning were the LVF, who are currently re-armed and active. PUP members 
are right to argue that many unionists have focused on decommissioning to the
89 Interview with Wilson McArthur 13th March 2001
90 Billy Mitchell posting on 'Progressive Forum' (PUP chatroom) www.pup-ni.virtualave.net 9th
August 2001
91 McAuley, JW 'Unionism's last stand? Contemporary unionist politics and identity in Northern
Ireland' Global Review of Ethno Politics Vol.3 No.l 2003[b], p61
238
exclusion any benefits that the Agreement may have brought. It is also sensible to point 
out that it is impossible to verify that the entire cache of republican arms have been 
decommissioned and that all republicans are sincere in their intent to use only peaceful 
political means. However, the PUP cannot reason away the emotional impact of the 
decommissioning issue. Continued movement by the IRA will increase the pressure on 
loyalists to prove their own peaceful intent.
The PUP has managed to maintain a pro-Agreement stance by criticising 
implementation. This allows the party leadership to be critical of unionists as well as 
republicans and the British government. This stance needs to be evaluated in two ways. 
It needs to be asked both whether this emphasis on implementation is a genuinely 
different attitude within loyalism. It also needs to be questioned whether the nuances of 
this stance are understood and supported by potential voters. However, before 
conclusions can be drawn an overview of the way in which the PUP have operated 
within the parameters of post-Agreement political life in Northern Ireland needs to be 
developed to aid understanding of the party's commitment to the peace process.
6.4 Working with Nationalists
In creating the models for testing new loyalism three aspects have been identified that 
relate directly to the nationalist community and these will now be considered in term. 
The first is the development of a critique of the unionist period of hegemony before the 
suspension of Stormont. The second is openness to less exclusive ideas of belonging 
and national identity. The third is a willingness to work with nationalist political 
representatives.
6.4.1 The Stormont Era
PUP members seem to find it easy to be critical of the Stormont Era and a common 
theme is that the benefits that Protestants accrued in this era were minimal. A few 
months after the loyalist ceasefire Billy Hutchinson addressed a nationalist audience in 
terms that resonated with the speeches of Gusty Spence:
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The alienation you feel, I feel, since I too was born and reared in a slum, mine 
being in the heart of the Shankill Road. We did not call them slums since that 
would have implied condemnation of those set in charge of us. 92
Considering the period before direct rule was introduced, David Ervine says
I think the only thing we had a bit different from the Catholic population was one, 
that degree of patronage, which did of course help in day-to-day life, the wages 
weren't great but at least they were wages. The other part I think was a sense of 
belonging, that we belonged. 93
McAuley sees this critique of the past as crucial to the PUP's ideology and as a means 
of establishing legitimacy for the party by identifying a lack of real leadership as a long 
term weakness in loyalist politics:
One central feature of the PUP project has been its attempt to reconstruct and 
reinterpret loyalism's past. From the beginning the PUP has sought to locate its 
politics directly in the claim that this group was not being properly represented by 
the traditional unionist leadership and to provide a different understanding of the
... . . 94past within unionism.
This reconstruction seeks to expose the supposed benefits of discrimination as largely 
illusory. Hugh Smyth's view of the period suggests that loyalists were hoodwinked 
because the benefits between Catholics and Protestants were based on perception rather 
than reality.
I would be one of those, as a unionist and a Protestant, who would be more
92 'Address by Billy Hutchinson at Pilots View Community Centre, Londonderry on Prospects for 
Peace' Combat April 1995
93 Interview with David Ervine 30th April 2003
94 McAuley, J.W. 2003[a] Op. cit, pi09
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critical than the Catholics. I believe that Stormont failed all of us miserably... 
They were all so comfortable in their wee way of going that Protestants were 
made to believe because they were Protestants that they were first class citizens 
and Catholics were made to believe that because they were Catholics they were 
second class citizens but the truth of the matter is, when you analyse it, we were 
all third class citizens and we allowed ourselves to be third class citizens. So I 
would be very, very critical. 95
This view suggests a large degree of passivity on behalf of the Protestant working class, 
something that also emerges in an interview with William Smith.
The only thing that I would say about that is that the Stormont Government was 
an elite cream within unionism - upper class, it discriminated not just against 
Catholics but against Protestants.
In response to the comment, "but Protestants voted for it" Smith replied.
I'll give you an example of a family, a marriage - a man beats his wife up but she 
still stays with him. That doesn't mean she likes getting beat up. People had no 
choice. For instance working class people had neither the money nor the time to 
formulate the political parties. The whole country was based around sectarianism 
right from the start... The housing on the Shankill Road and the housing on the 
Falls isn't any different. It's not like we were living in luxury which it was 
sometimes portrayed. We were living in the same state as nationalists... We were 
no better. We thought we were better, we were told we were better but we weren't 
any better. 96
The PUP critique of unionist hegemony concentrates primarily on economic factors 
and the limited nature of the benefits of discrimination. The Protestant working class is 
presented as a passive group, easily manipulated and fearful of the consequences of 
biting the hand that fed them.
95 Interview with Hugh Smyth, 13th January 2002
96 Interview with William Smith, 18 th January 2002
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David Ervine argues that any redefinition of loyalism must recognise:
The way in which we had a one party state; the way in which we did discriminate; 
the way in the circumstances were created. Circumstances where there were 
"them" and "us" these were the circumstances that undoubtedly created the 
conditions for bitterness and hatred, because "them" and "us" translated into 
another language is zero-sum. 97
This process of re-examination suggests a possibility of finding common cause with 
nationalists. According to Paul Morrow:
The Stormont Government created and reacted against people who wanted a right, 
and that was the right to have a say. They also reacted against the Protestants who 
also wanted to have a say. They created enough fear and created sectarianism to 
pull that Protestant community to its side... I have always said that when 
nationalists stood up and demanded rights, unionists betrayed them. We should 
have stood up and demanded the same rights for ourselves. 98
However, another more traditional view of pre-conflict Northern Ireland was contained 
in literature placed on the PUP website during the time of the Holy Cross dispute. In 
September 2001 The Ardoyne Interface : A History of Glenbryn was placed on the 
website as a means of providing a historical context for contemporary events. The 
document presented a continuous history of unprovoked nationalist aggression:
Each year at the "Twelfth" celebrations, when the streets were decorated and 
children's parties organised, no distinction was made on the ground of creed all 
the children joined together in the fun. Disharmony began to be created when in 
1966 rumours went the rounds that there would be no "twelfth" celebrations 
where the Roman Catholic ten per-cent were concerned. Republic [sic] pressures
97 Ervine, D Redefining Lovalism - a Political Perspective Institute for British-Irish Studies Working 
Paper No.4 2001, pi
98 Interview with Paul Morrow, PUP website manager, 20th August 2001
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prevented Roman Catholic children from joining in the "Twelfth" revelry of 1969. 
Later in the month verbal abuse, window breaking, and the destruction of gardens 
at night were the evidence of the republican intimidation of Protestants which 
was to cause older residents to flee their homes. The vacated houses were 
immediately occupied by Roman Catholics, many of them militant republicans."
This is another representation of loyalists as passive and powerless. This history of 
Ardoyne jars with the PUP project of ^ interpretation as it taps into a more traditional 
past where loyalists have been at the mercy of devious and demanding republicanism. 
Under the heading "Ardoyne: The story of Belfast in Miniature" the author Hugh 
Stockman, a former resident of Glenbryn argues that "the events which took place in 
Ardoyne from 1969 have been repeated in many places throughout the city of 
Belfast". 100 Catholics are shown as taking over Protestant areas using a combination of 
stealth and violence.
The PUP re-examination of Northern Ireland's history is not fully thought through. 
The emphasis on the elite of unionism and the discrimination undertaken by state 
institutions connects to a presentation of the Protestant working class as passive and 
helpless. This makes this re-interpretation problematic. It means the potential for a 
new view of the past to impact on the present is limited by emphasising the role of 
victim.
In fact, as was outlined in the introductory chapter to this thesis, the history of labourist 
politics in the North-East of Ireland provides evidence of activism rather than passivity. 
If, as William Smith stated in his interview the existence of Northern Ireland centred on 
sectarianism, its continued existence would be hard to justify. It would be more 
positive for the PUP to concentrate on the independent unionists and NILP politicians 
who harried the elite for their laziness and isolation, rather than present the Protestant 
working class as powerless and apathetic.
99 Stockman, H The Ardoyne Interface of Glenbryn www.pup-ni.org.uk September 2001
1 °° Stockman, H 2001 Op. cit.
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6.4.2 Who are the People?
One of the most recognisable slogans used by the Progressive Unionist Party is the 
proclamation of being Irish but peculiarly British. Interviews with party members 
show that they hold and prioritise a number of identities from Paul Ferguson's 
description, "British with an Irish/Ulster shine" 101 to Joan Totten's assertion that she is 
"British, Protestant and Proud". 102 There is a clear awareness of the difference between 
political and cultural identity as can be seen by Billy Mitchell's statement that "I regard 
myself as an Irish unionist. In terms of political identity, British. I would say I'm an 
Irish man or Northern Irish anyway." 103
As with attitudes to devolution, discussions of national identity often show a concern 
with stressing normality, that loyalists are not estranged from the wider British 
community by holding a sub-national identity. This can be seen in an interview with 
Robin Stewart:
Irish, Northern Irish. I have no problems with that. I have also British in the same 
way as someone in Scotland is Scottish first and foremost, but they are British 
because they belong to part of the British Isles, the same as a Welshman or an 
Englishman. I'm no different. I live in Northern Ireland so at the very least I must 
be Northern Irish and then British. 104
It would seem that Irishness is viewed as an element of identity that must be 
consciously acknowledged and embraced in order to provide a logical and credible 
reason for belonging to Britain. Billy Hutchinson and Dawn Purvis give similar 
descriptions of their national identities.
British-Irish, definitely. I'm British, everything about my culture. Belfast has 
more in common with Leeds and Liverpool than what it does with any town in the
101 Interview with Paul Ferguson, Secretary and Treasurer of PUP Shankill Branch, 13th March 2001
102 Interview with Joan Totten, Secretary of PUP Oldpark Branch, 12th March 2001
103 Interview with Billy Mitchell, 12 th March 2001
104 Interview with Robin Stewart, 18th January 2003
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Republic... I think those strong industrial links, like Newcastle, Sunderland, the 
shipbuilding and all that sort of thing. That's where my main links are. I would 
have more in common with people in Leeds, than people in Dublin. But because I 
was born on the island of Ireland, there's an Irishness about my culture as well, 
that would be distinct to me here as opposed to somebody in Leeds. 105
Politically I'm British and culturally I'm Irish. I don't have a problem with that. I 
mean it would be nonsense for everyone to say if they grew up in Northern 
Ireland since 1921 that don't have both whether you're a republican or a 
loyalist...I've grown up in a society a very working class one, where people race 
greyhounds and gamble on horses and do all those things and work on the 
shipyard. Same as people in Leeds, Manchester and Birmingham... I don't have a 
problem saying that there are good things about the Irish culture as well. The 
difficulty with that is, in terms of our society is people trying to force Irish culture 
down people's throats and in many ways, there seems to be I suppose a reluctance 
to actually accept or to acknowledge that there's any of it in you. But there is, it's 
impossible not to. 106
These discussions make deliberate links between Irish-ness and British-ness. The 
British-ness outlined here makes no reference to the Crown or other traditional loyalist 
symbols of British-ness, although the working class lifestyles referred to also seem 
slightly outdated due to the emphasis on heavy industry. Irish-ness is something to be 
dealt with, acknowledged. This is notably different from the concept of Northern 
Irish-ness, which is expressed as an identity stemming prosaically and pragmatically 
from the experience of living in Northern Ireland:
I would say British. However, if you sort of move back, I have a personal identity 
-I'm Northern Irish. 107
105 Interview with Dawn Purvis, Assembly Co-ordinator, 16th September 2002
106 Interview with Billy Hutchinson, MLA for North Belfast, 13th January 2002
107 Interview with Wilson McArthur, 13th March 2001
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I've never known an all-Ireland context. So I perceive myself as being Northern 
Irish. 108
The 2002 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey shows that whilst British and Irish 
are still the most popular identities 'Northern Irish' is an identity held by merely a fifth 
of respondents (nineteen per-cent). Catholics (twenty-five per-cent) are more likely to 
describe themselves as Northern Irish than Protestant (fourteen per-cent). The identity 
is much more likely to be chosen than the label of'Ulster' (one per-cent of Catholics 
and six-percent of Protestants described themselves thus). 109 As has already been 
discussed the term Ulster suggests an exclusive identity to Catholics and has an 
unwelcome connection to independence for many Protestants.
The emphasis on British-ness and Irish-ness is a deliberate and conscious attempt to 
address the divisiveness of national identity in Northern Ireland. However, the 
attitudes to Northern Irish-ness seem to be different to Irish-ness, which is linked to a 
process of exploration and discussion. It has to be said that this process seems rather 
forced and conscious and Reynolds argues that it is a process that has not had greater 
resonance outside the PUP, meaning that "its attempts to get loyalists to embrace 
Irishness failed". 110
What is more significant is the apparent sense of ease about identity: that is possible to 
explore and discuss without straying from what fundamentally defines national identity. 
As Ervine states:
I don't need to plant a Union Jack on my baldy head to identify who I am, I live 
comfortably with who I am. I don't know that there's a single symbol that you 
could say is British because I don't think that there's a British purity. 111
This openness on the issue of identity could be seen to stem from attitudes within the
108 Interview with Michael Acheson, 12th March 2001
109 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 2002 www.ark.ac.uk/nilt The question asked was do you
think of yourself as British/Irish/Ulster/Northern Irish?
1 '° Reynolds, L 'Scrabbling for Answers' Fortnight September 2003, p5
1 '' 'The Fortnight Interview: Rudie Goldsmith talks to David Ervine' Fortnight January 2004, p!6
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PUP towards religion. Joan Totten's response is anomalous in making a direct link 
between Protestantism and Britishness. The only PUP member interviewed who 
described himself as a churchgoer was Billy Mitchell who sees himself "as part of the 
evangelical wing of Protestantism". 112 However, as both Michael Acheson and William 
Smith point out, going to church is not always seen as a necessary condition of 
describing oneself as adhering to Protestant faith:
I am not a practising Protestant because I don't go to church on a regular basis, 
but certainly I would believe in all the teaching that I grew up with. 113
Protestantism is an ethos of individuality. You don't have to belong to a church to 
be a Protestant. You don't have to go to church to be a Protestant. 114
David Rose describes himself as being "from the atheist wing of Protestantism" 115 and 
Eddie Kinner as "a prod agnostic or a prod atheist". 116 Although both of these replies 
were delivered in a humorous tone they demonstrate clearly that Protestantism as an 
identity goes beyond either practise or faith. However, on the whole the PUP do not 
make connections between crown, faith and belonging. The descriptions of identity do 
not centre on an exclusivist concept of Britishness that must automatically repel 
nationalists. The British/Irish project can seem forced and self-conscious. However, it 
is an attempt to show that Protestantism and Britishness are not intrinsically linked and 
that one is not a condition of the other.
112 Interview with Billy Mitchell, 12th March 2001
113 Interview with Michael Acheson, 12th March 2001
114 Interview with William Smith 18th January 2002
115 Interview with David Rose, 17th September 2002
116 Interview with Eddie Kinner, 14th March 2002
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6.4.3 Protestantism and Catholicism
The relationship between Protestantism and unionism has already been discussed and it 
has been argued that Protestant institutions often have a secular significance because 
they are associated with ideas of unionist culture and belonging. This is not the same as 
agreeing with Bruce's argument that Protestantism is the defining essence of unionist 
identity. 117 One example of this is the endurance of the Orange Order, which is a 
valued institution to many of those from a Protestant background who would not 
consider themselves to be active members of a faith. Given how controversial the 
parades issue has become, it seems inevitable that PUP members would express 
frustration and annoyance. Although the consensus in interviews was that the Orange 
Order had to recognise nationalist concerns and enter negotiations there was a palpable 
sense that parades had become with which to beat loyalists. According to Michael 
Acheson:
It's not about us not accepting people's Irish-ness, they're not accepting us for 
anything... you get to the stage where you negotiate your flags away and then you
118
go on to negotiate something else away and what are you left to negotiate with?
Dawn Purvis argues that "Unionism, Britishness, Orangeism has been demonised." 119 
Although the PUP agenda may wish for the separation of unionism and Protestantism, 
there is a sense that attacks on Orangeism are attacks on the union and attacks on the 
culture of those who regard themselves as British. The need to rally to the defence of 
Orangeism suggests that the link between Protestantism and loyalism remains relevant 
and that secular political action is still subject to the influence of cultural Protestantism.
However, it is important not to conflate Protestantism and anti-Catholicism when 
reviewing secular loyalist political action. Evidence of suspicion and of influence of
117 See Bruce, S God Save Ulster (Oxford) Oxford University Press 1986 & The Edge of the Union 
(Oxford) Oxford University Press 1994
118 Interview with Michael Acheson, 12th March 2001
119 Interview with Dawn Purvis, 16th September 2002
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Catholicism is evident in PUP literature. For example the 1998 document Breaking the 
Mould states that Catholic nationalism and socialism are inimical because "the Catholic 
working class are caught in the rhetoric of anti-imperialism which bends itself more 
comfortably to the nationalist agenda. Class politics have always operated better within 
the UK than in the Irish Republic". 120
The reference to the Irish Republic is significant because it seems there is still a view of 
the south as a confessional state, militating against individualism and civil liberties. 
Billy Mitchell acknowledges in Principles of Loyalism that "in recent years the Irish 
Republic has become more liberal and pluralist but it remains our belief that the United 
Kingdom is better suited to the development of a multi-faith pluralist society than the 
Irish Republic." 121 He cites the strict adherence to the papal decree of Ne Temere 
(which demanded children of mixed marriages be raised as Catholics) and the influence 
of senior Catholic clergy on public policy and in the area of artistic censorship. He links 
these historical events to the contemporary furore over President McAleese taking 
communion in a Protestant church and Bertie Ahern's public conduct of a relationship 
with another woman after separating from his wife.
Comments such as these accord with David Trimble's denunciation of the Republic as a 
"pathetic, sectarian, mono-ethnic, mono-cultural state" compared to the United 
Kingdom which "respects the identity of all and threatens none. It seeks to 
accommodate and not repress. It offers stability and flexibility. It guarantees a higher 
standard of living." 122
Acknowledgement that the Republic has become more liberal and pluralist contains an 
implicit critique that it has started from a much more illiberal position than the United 
Kingdom. Mitchell's view of the Republic, for example, overlooks the powerful 
censorship of artistic expression legitimated by the British State during the same 
historical period. Instead he seeks to demonstrate that the Republic has not yet freed
120 Breaking the Mould PUP 1998
121 Mitchell, B Principles of Lovalism unpublished 2002. This document has been serialised in the UVF 
publication Combat beginning in Issue 12 Spring 2003
Speech by David Trimble to Ulster Unionist Council Annual Conference. 9th March 2002
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representative of working class loyalism. 124
The PUP's commitment to engagement with Sinn Fein relates to more than the 
constitutional negotiations that other unionists within the UUP have undertaken. It 
occurs within their framework of conflict transformation. As noted the PUP blame 
other unionists for allowing republicans to wrest concessions from the British 
Government due to their disunity over all issues except an obsession with 
decommissioning. Billy Hutchinson has argued that Sinn Fein cannot be ignored or 
wished away but they can be contained if unionists face up to them:
No amount of feigned anger, empty rhetoric or grandstanding to the media will 
defeat or dissolve Sinn Fein. The only way is to confront them in everything they 
say or do. 125
The PUP leadership argues that Sinn Fein can and should be confronted about whether 
the IRA's war is over. They are also concerned with issues such as parade protests, in 
which the hand of Sinn Fein is detected, stoking up tension. David Rose observes:
Gerry Kelly is a parades junkie. I don't know anyone else who would out of his 
bed at half past eight in the morning, phone round 400 close friends to get them to 
watch a march he doesn't like. I myself would lie in bed for an extra half- hour 
and enjoy the lie in.
Willingness to engage with traditional enemies such as Sinn Fein does not preclude 
distrust and antagonism. However, the PUP present themselves as prepared to deal with 
Sinn Fein in another guise, as representatives of an equally deprived constituency as the 
PUP's proclaimed community. It is the tension between these two positions that will 
now be addressed.
124 McAuley, J.W 2003 Op. cit, p 112
125 'Hutchinson calls on unionism to face down Sinn Fein' www.irelandclick.com 28th April 2003
126 Interview with David Rose. 17th September 2002
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6.5.1 Are Sinn Fein a Socialist Party?
A common theme that has emerged in interviews is a distrust of Sinn Fein's socialist 
credentials. When asked if they are a socialist party, David Rose offers the following 
response:
Sinn Fein are a right-wing single identity nationalistic party who have adopted 
some social polices. But at the core Sinn Fein to me would come out of the same 
tradition as say the Spanish Falangists in the thirties, that basically you're either 
Irish or you're out. One thing they're certainly not is Irish Republicans 
irrespective of what they say. 127
Eddie Kinner goes so far as to say, "I see Sinn Fein as mainly being purely fascist". 128 
This accords with the comments of Paul Ferguson:
They're a fascist party...their view of a united Ireland is of a united Ireland for 
Irish people going on their definition of an Irish Gael with a Celtic history. Now 
to me that's not an inclusive Ireland, that's an exclusive, xenophobic racist 
Ireland, which if you look at fascism that's what they are: racist and 
xenophobic. 129
Both Billy Hutchinson and William Smith refer to the abandonment of the ideal of a 
socialist thirty-two county republic, with Smith dismissing claims to socialism as "total 
hypocrisy. In prison I'd listen to SF and their 32 county socialist republic ideals and all 
that. Basically they have played that card but in fact they aren't socialists. Some people 
think that they are a right-wing Catholic party." 130 They both question how socialists 
could take money from what they see as right-wing Irish-American organisations.
127 Interview with David Rose, 17th September 22
128 Interview with Eddie Kinner, 14th March 2001
129 Interview with Paul Ferguson, 13th March 2001
130 Interview with William Smith, 18th January 2001
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justice, conflict transformation could in theory allow them to confront Sinn Fein about 
this and draw them into partnership despite ongoing profound differences on national 
identity. The PUP is committed to supplanting constitutional wrangling with political 
issues that could push entrenched interests into realignment. It has already been noted 
in this thesis that socialist politics and sectarianism are not separate entities, but that 
sectarianism can entwine itself around socio-economic issues. It is here that the PUP's 
faith in establishing normality in Northern Irish politics is tested.
6.5.2 'Bread and Butter' Politics
An issue that has allowed Sinn Fein and the PUP to work together is education. As 
education minister, Martin McGuinness dedicated himself to ending the current 
selective system of secondary education in Northern Ireland. In a debate at Stormont on 
proposals for changes in Northern Ireland (commonly known as the Burns Report133} 
McGuinness refuted the idea that selection benefited poorer children and he cited PUP 
arguments in so doing.
The poorest eleven-plus results are achieved in controlled schools with high 
levels of free school meals that serve working class Protestant areas. David 
Ervine and Billy Hutchinson of the PUP told me that in many working class 
Protestant areas, a grammar school place is beyond the reach of almost all pupils. 
In the Shankill less than two per-cent of pupils gain a grammar school place. If 
that is not a damning indictment, I do not know what is. 134
Hutchinson and Ervine have backed McGuinness in assembly debates on the subject. 
When McGuinness restated his determination to abolish the eleven plus, Billy 
Hutchinson responded:
I welcome the minister's statement, which because it concerns future generations 
of working class-children, may address the most important decision to be made
132 Interview with Hugh Smyth, 23rd January 2002
133 Education for the Twenty-First Century: Post-Primary Review Body DENI2001
134 Hansard 23rd April 2002
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by the assembly. 135
Education is also an area where the PUP have carved out a distinct position from the 
DUP. Sammy Wilson's contribution to the Burns Report debate criticised Martin 
McGuinness for pursuing a "narrow socialist agenda". Wilson said
The most bizarre argument that I have heard from the Minister is that he now 
wishes to become the champion of working-class Protestant children. It is a pity 
he did not think about that thirty years ago when he was blowing them up, 
shooting them and making them orphans. Anyone who believes that Martin 
McGuinness is concerned about the well-being of Protestant children from 
working class backgrounds needs their heads felt. 136
The above comments were clearly aimed at the PUP given McGuinness's approving 
quotation of their figures and Hutchinson's supportive comments.
Education seems to be a good example of how the PUP has used the institutions of the 
Good Friday Agreement to establish agreement with those they fought against. 
However, as a resource, education is far less problematic than housing. The haves and 
the have-nots can be clearly characterised as those with or without material goods. The 
proposed education reforms have created controversy and debate but no riot can so far 
be attributed to frustration over access to education.
As noted above, housing is one of the things that has stoked tensions in the areas the 
PUP claim to represent. In particular small enclaves of housing within bigger areas 
belonging to what is seen as the other side and the interfaces between different areas 
have been the flashpoints for inter-communal violence. It was in such an area, 
Glenbryn, that one of the biggest crises occurred for the PUP: the protests at Holy Cross 
School.
135 Hansard 8th October 2002
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The PUP have often been involved in trying to defuse conflict at interface areass. 
Jarman notes that:
Following the violence in north and west Belfast in 1996, Billy Hutchinson and 
other members of the PUP argued against people rioting and destroying their own 
areas in response to events at Drumcree and since that time the PUP and the 
Ulster Volunteer Force have been prominent in trying to prevent local disorder. 137
It was inevitable, therefore, that party representatives would be drawn into trying to 
find a solution to the protests around a North Belfast school. During September 2001 
tensions in the area came to a head as residents from loyalist Glenbryn stepped up 
protests on a route that led towards the Catholic Holy Cross primary school. They 
claimed that the pupils' parents, and republicans with no cause to be in the area, were 
using the school run to infiltrate Glenbryn for the purposes of aggression and 
intimidation. They sought to force the pupils to use another entrance to the school and, 
in addition, demanded increased security measures such as gates and higher fences. In 
a mirror image of republican strategy, they formed a group to articulate these demanded, 
the Concerned Residents of Upper Ardoyne. The protests ended in November, after the 
First Minister and Deputy First Minister met with the residents and confirmed in 
writing that CCTV and gating would be installed and that there would be increased 
police patrols in the area.
McAuley has argued that the PUP must secure support from the constituency it claims 
to represent if it is to pursue its agenda:
The importance for the future direction of unionism of the ability of the PUP to 
gain and maintain popular support cannot be overstated. Although it is of no little 
significance that the PUP has successfully presented its arguments to an 
extremely wide audience. It is its ability to convince its more immediate
i -30constituency that will ultimately prove of most importance.
136 Hansard 23rd April 2002
137 Jarman, N 2003 Op. cit, plOO
138 McAuley, J.W. 2003 Op. cit. pi 10
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The Holy Cross protests revealed how the PUP were led by their constituency rather 
than providing the leadership by which they hoped to gain votes. Billy Hutchinson was 
the main PUP contact for the residents and the media. He seemed to accept at face value 
the complaints of the residents, citing the continued efforts of parents to beat the 
blockade as evidence that they were seeking to score political points.
Children are not the problem. Their parents are. Now, you know, lets be honest. 
People who bring their children up this road, through all of this, you know, need 
to actually rethink what they're doing. And if this is about making their children 
political pawns in some sort of political game, then I think that's disgraceful. 139
Hutchinson saw the hand of the republican movement guiding the parents' action 
asking "are they trying to create a situation where the IRA are made to hold onto their 
guns?" 140 However, when considering the overall problem of conflict at interface areas 
Hutchinson has made comments that show he sees these enclaves as a set of last stands 
to be taken against republicans. For example, observing increasing tension in Torrens 
he argued:
Torrens is a classic case of ethnic cleansing. You have to live there to understand 
the problems faced by this Protestant community. 141
Holy Cross turned out to be a major incident and an example of direct community 
action. It was one that the PUP were forced to react to and the responses of their main 
spokesman in relation to this and incidents in other interface areas showed an 
acceptance of this discourse of ethnic cleansing. Given that the location and provision 
of social housing is already a sensitive issue, these incidents have reinforced for many 
loyalists a sense that they will be imminently swallowed up or pushed out of an Irish 
Catholic Belfast. In reacting to the events of Holy Cross, the PUP did nothing to 
challenge these fears, but added to their articulation.
139 Interview with Billy Hutchinson broadcast by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 
www.abc.net 6th September 2001
140 'No let up in violent clashes' irishnews.com 22nd June 2001
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The provision of social resources such as housing can provoke sentiments that lend 
themselves to traditional ethnic bloc politics. The PUP's attempt to provide a way out 
of this by encouraging cross-community consensus on deprivation and inequality 
seems to have been effective to some extent in terms of education. At the elite level of 
the assembly the PUP felt able to give full backing to Martin McGuinness. This was 
because education could be presented as an resource from which loyalists in particular 
but the working class in general was excluded. However, the anxiety that many 
loyalists feel about the future of their neighbourhoods is something that the party seems 
to been led by. The notion of ethnic cleansing remains unchallenged by the party, 
which suggests they are yet to question how sectarianism and socialist ideas interact 
with their own agenda.
Holy Cross also demonstrated the extent to which the PUP were in competition with 
other forces within loyalism, who wished to control or represent people like the 
Concerned Residents of Upper Ardoyne. In particular the UDA were seen to be the 
dominant force in Glenbryn. Jarman lists paramilitary rivalry as a factor in interface 
violence
Within the unionist community the increasing fragmentation of political 
representation is compounded by the presence of rival paramilitary groups who 
are claiming the right to defend existing interests, while at the same time aiming 
to extend their power and authority over other-working class territories. In such a 
context launching attacks upon the 'other' (whether rhetorical or otherwise) is a 
well-established political strategy that continues to be pursued across the area. 142
Interviewed by the Christian Science Monitor, both Shirlow and Jarman attributed the 
decline in violence at interface areas during the marching season of 2003 in part to 
pressure placed on the UDA. Shirlow argued that "The ARA (Assets Recovery Agency) 
has concentrated minds" and that the UDA was keen to avoid provoking police 
investigation. Jarman stated that "The UDA wants to gain some electoral credibility
141 'Hutchinson to discuss escalating violence' www.icnorthernireland.icnetwork.co.uk 4th June 2003
142 Jarman, N 2003 2002, Op. cit. p230
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within its own community and moved to keep its more militant elements under 
control". 143 The actions of the UDA in Glenbryn demonstrates that their influence has 
an important effect on events in interface areas. This presents a challenge to any 
attempts by the PUP to direct the anxieties felt by loyalists residents into constitutional
action.
Also, although the PUP is linked to the UVF, it cannot be said to be the sole director of 
its actions. The UVF's ceasefire has continued to be recognised by the British 
Government, but their involvement in paramilitary activity has not ceased, particularly 
in relation to competition with the UDA. A murderous feud between the two groups in 
the summer of 2000 was only one in a series of violent incidents stretching back to the 
early 1970s. By the time of the Holy Cross protest the UDA was only a matter of weeks 
away from being declared as having broken their ceasefire by the British Government. 
Paramilitary competition and aggression in these areas has demonstrated another 
means of articulating and exploiting anxieties within loyalist communities such as 
Glenbryn, one that does not rely on constitutional politics. This ongoing paramilitary 
activity thus allows another form of representation that does not require a political party. 
However, as will be shown later, this is not the only problem that paramilitary violence 
creates for the PUP.
Holy Cross also showed how the PUP were not the only constitutional representatives 
of this constituency. Another North Belfast MLA, Nigel Dodds, had extensive contact 
with the media. He sought to show that his party, the DUP, also understood the plight of 
areas such as Glenbryn. He avoided the pitfalls inherent in supporting a protest that 
had involved media coverage of terrified schoolgirls subjected to intimidation and more 
concrete threats such as a pipe bomb. Hutchinson on the other hand seemed to get 
caught trying to please too many audiences at once when the bomb incident provoked 
him to state he was ashamed to be a loyalist. As the Irish News noted:
Earlier Mr. Hutchinson said "no protest can be justified now. This is no longer 
about children going to school. It is about people out to cause trouble and I don't
143 'Northern Ireland's Summer of Content' Christian Science Monitor www.cs.monitor.com 29th 
August 2003
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want to be part of it." Later he said "after the blast I said I was ashamed to be a 
loyalist. But at the end of the day I am a political representative and have to 
defend the human rights of the residents". 144
It was not just a question of media savvy. The more established DUP was expressing 
the exact same message as the PUP. Nigel Dodds welcomed the resolution of the 
protests in the Shankill Mirror. His analysis of the situation did not differ significantly 
from Hutchinson's:
The situation in Ardoyne came about as a result of the government continually 
ignoring the plight of isolated communities who have been the subject of an 
organised campaign of intimidation for over thirty years. 145
The PUP and the DUP were chasing the same votes. Dodds and Hutchinson represented 
the same area and were claiming to speak on behalf of the same people. The Holy 
Cross protests seemed to demonstrate very little difference between the parties. This is 
something to be taken into account when considering how the PUP seeks to make itself 
distinctive.
6.6 The Republican Perspective
Prevalent in loyalism is a narrative that equates republican violence with city planning 
because they have both attacked loyalist communities where they are vulnerable. A 
recent edition of Combat provided this analysis of planning in South Belfast:
Prior to redevelopment, South Belfast was a safe and happy place to live, made up 
of the close-knit communities of Sandy Row, Donegall Pass and Donegall Road. 
In the mid-1970s the powers that be decided to rip away the old Victorian kitchen 
houses and replace them with modern homes, incorporating gardens and inside 
toilets.
144 'Hutchinson defends U-turn' www.irishnews.com 6th September 2001
145 'Dodds welcomes Protest move' Shankill Mirror Christmas 2001/January 2002
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Although these changes were necessary as the living conditions in the old houses 
were nothing short of Dickensian (akin to all over Ulster during that era) a vast 
majority of the people within the houses felt the need to pack up and leave. 
Therefore, a mass exodus occurred and left the areas concerned greatly depleted 
populous wise.
Since the building of the new developments, republicans have seized the 
opportunity to take advantage of the smaller communities. Night after night the 
houses in Vernon Street came under attack from the republican McClure Street in 
the Lower Ormeau Road. 146
Redevelopment and republican aggression are presented as two interlinked forces that 
have depopulated and destroyed loyalist communities. However, whilst loyalist areas 
are seen to be in decline, republican areas are expanding. Shirlow's figures show that 
whilst the population of Protestant Upper Ardoyne declined between 1971 and 1991, 
Catholic Ardoyne has increased in population size during the same period. Shirlow 
detects frustration in Ardoyne that housing has not kept pace with this expansion and he 
also argues that this creates resentment towards Protestants because of a belief that 
Ardoyne cannot be expanded because of their feelings. Therefore their quality if life is 
directly affected by what they see as the unfair demands of Upper Ardoyne residents. 147
Republican politicians have sought to establish that violence at interface areas is the 
result of loyalist aggression and that the British media has a vested interest in 
presenting it as the product of two equally blameworthy parties. 148 Reaction to the 
suspension of Stormont in An Phoblacht demonstrated these beliefs:
Haven't we been here before? It has been another week of loyalist attacks on
146 'South Belfast: the stronghold tightens' Combat Issue 17 September 2003
147 Shirlow, P 2003 Op. cit Upper Ardoyne has declined from 3,000 to 1,500 and Ardoyne has increased 
from 4,500 to 6,400 (these figures are approximate).
148 'Reported with prejudice: maintaining the tit-for-tat myth' An Phoblacht 19th July 2001 See also 
'Forced out' 18th September 2003 & 'From the cradle to the grave' 2nd October 2003
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nationalist and republican areas and squandered opportunities in the political 
process. This has become a recurrent theme. Families in vulnerable areas live in 
fear of loyalist bombings, yet are bombarded with media commentary about IRA
149arms.
Just as loyalists believe that republicans have used decommissioning to lever more 
concessions out of the British government, republicans see loyalist violence as a way of 
ensuring that they retain their hold on territory and resources. The announcement of a 
regeneration scheme for North Belfast in September 2001 was presented by the Sinn 
Fein MLA, Gerry Kelly, as a reward for Holy Cross:
The fact that three out of four areas in North Belfast approved by DUP minister, 
Maurice Morrow, for the Urban Renewal scheme are loyalist, challenges the 
minister's announcement that this will send a 'positive message to everyone in 
North Belfast'. 150
In addition to this frustration with the distribution of resources, republican politicians 
have also made reference that loyalist violence against their communities is part of a 
process of ethnic cleansing. For example, Alex Maskey, MLA and former Mayor of 
Belfast has stated that "the increase in loyalist attacks on Catholics right across the 
north can only be described as a sectarian pogrom". 151
The sense of despair and threat that loyalists feel is mirrored by republican frustration 
and injustice. Jarman observes that republican politicians have been accused by 
unionists of stirring up conflict over the issue of Orange Order parades. The residents 
groups that have increased in number since the IRA ceasefire of 1994 are seen as a front 
for Sinn Fein. The cynicism of the PUP as regards nationalist and republican objections 
to parades in their areas has already been noted - it is almost taken as a given that 
parades protests are in fact a new form of republican aggression. However, Jarman 
argues that
149 'Anger at British suspension' An Phoblacht 27th September 2001
150 'Glenbryn rewarded for bigotry' An Phoblacht 20th September 2001
151 'Unionist silence on sectarian attacks appalling' An Phoblacht 26th July 2001
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While there was undoubted support for the protests among republicans, the 
objections to parades were more widespread within the Catholic and nationalist 
population. They had in fact predated the ceasefires. 152
Sinn Fein have exploited rather than created the antipathy to the Orange Order and they 
have sought to bolster their own legitimacy at the grassroots level. The concept of 
conflict transformation was based on the transmutation of violent advocacy of 
respective constitutional positions into peaceful pursuit and on the creation of a new 
politics based on need. However, both loyalists and republicans seem overwhelmingly 
to accept a narrative where they are frustrated and threatened by the other side who can 
employ higher forces (from the media to the NIHE) to achieve their ends.
This ongoing hostility and mutual incomprehension has overshadowed positive 
developments, such as the support given by the PUP to Martin McGuinness in the 
Assembly. Issues such as housing are being linked by both sides to an ongoing story of 
threat and betrayal, which reinforces the tension about territory that has been stoked up 
by Orange Order parades and the protests against them. The actual nature of the 
antagonisms between the PUP and Sinn Fein that were revealed during the Holy Cross 
protests are different to the nature of debate envisaged when conflict transformation 
was proposed as the way forward for the party. This has limited the PUP's ability to 
break away from the traditional loyalist discourse of despondency and vulnerability. 
The PUP are also harmed, though, because they are not an equal electoral force to Sinn 
Fein. Sinn Fein have outstripped the SDLP whilst the PUP have lost ground.
152 Jarman, N 'From outrage to apathy? the disputes over parades 1995-2003' Global Review of Ethno 
Politics Vol.3 No.l 2003, p94-95
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6.7 The PUP and Unionist Party Competition
The PUP entered the peace process publicly after the CLMC ceasefire of 1994. They 
claimed a place in negotiations as one of the parties that had put a stop to loyalist 
paramilitary violence. They secured this place in the 1996 Forum elections, albeit on a 
mandate of 3.5 per-cent, which was enough for the electoral system utilised to return 
them from a top-up list.
Hugh Smyth became an elected representative before the PUP was established. He has 
said of the party, "we knew we were never going to be a major large party. We'd always 
be a ginger group, one that would be kicking at the heels of those in power". 153 
However, the PUP has sought to increase its share of the vote and candidates have stood 
for European, Assembly, Westminster and local government elections.
During the peace process the PUP's vote did increase but elections in 2001 showed it 
had slipped back. The party's vote in the 2001 general election was more than halved 
compared to its 1997 showing. Although there was little difference in votes between 
local elections in 1997 and 2001, the PUP had fielded more candidates for the latter. 154 
It is interesting to note the fluctuation in Hugh SmytfYs first preference votes. In 1993 
the figure was just over sixteen hundred. This rose to over three thousand in 1997 and 
then slipped to just over thirteen hundred in 2001 - similar to the level of support he has 
received in elections stretching back to 1974. 155
The 2003 Assembly elections confirmed this decline in the PUP's popular support. 
David Ervine retained his seat in East Belfast but lost more than two thousand first 
preference votes. Billy Hutchinson faced a similar decline. Given his smaller support 
base this was enough for him to lose his North Belfast seat. 156
153 Interview with Hugh Smyth, 13th January 2002
154 The CAIN election pages show that the PUP gained 1.4% of the vote in the 1997 general election and 
0.6% in the 2001 election. They gained 2% of the vote in the local government elections of 1997 and 
2001. www.ark.ac.uk
155 The exact figures are 1,609 3,070 and 1,336 Belfast City Council Elections Archive 1993-2001 
www.belfast.gov.uk
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Given a decline in support for the Good Friday Agreement, it would seem credible to 
suggest that a pro-Agreement unionist party would find their support slipping. 
However, the PUP also acknowledge that the paramilitary link is a long-term barrier to 
building electoral popularity. William Smith says:
Within the nationalist community, ex-prisoners are seen as heroes or ex-prisoners 
are accepted within their community. Ex-loyalist prisoners are only accepted 
within their immediate community. They're not accepted within Belfast, they're 
not accepted within upper class communities. 157
Finlayson believes that PUP literature echoes the DUP's obsession with truth and 
falsehood but that this discourse has been remodelled around the experience of loyalist 
paramilitaries:
It is the narrative of the ex-paramilitary drawn into conflict by the blood and the 
thunder of the demagogue only to be betrayed by him. It is the narrative of the 
working class unionist strung along by the middle class and business interests,
I co
made to fight a war on their behalf and then disowned. 
An example from Breaking the Mould bears this out:
The days of putting a union jack on a donkey in order to whip the working class 
electorate into shape at the polls are long gone. If the 'troubles' have done 
nothing else they have 'wised up' the ordinary man and woman in the street and, 
equally important, those men who were prepared to fight what they believed. 
Long years in Crumlin Road Jail and Long Kesh prison camp certainly provided 
the solitude for deep contemplation of things political and otherwise. 159
156 In 1998 Hutchinson gained 3,571 first preference votes which dropped to 1,358 in 2003. This 
represented a drop in support for the PUP from 9% to 4%. Ervine's vote dropped from 5,114 to 2,990 
(14% to 10%) www.ark.ac.uk/elections
157 Interview with William Smith. 18th January 2002
158 Finlayson, A 'Loyalist political identity after peace' Capital and Class No.69 Autumn 1999
159 BreaklngJheMou!dPUP 1998
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The PUP has linked the experience of their paramilitary members to a wider experience 
of working class Protestants. 'The truth' emerges despite the attempts at manipulation 
and dissembling by politicians. This puts the PUP at the end of a continuum of 
suffering and betrayal that makes them the embodiment of a community that is 
dissatisfied with the unionist representatives traditionally foisted upon them. This 
creates a link between the paramilitary actions of the past and both the political strategy 
of the present and the PUP's imagined community of the urban Protestant working 
class. As such it represents an attempt to turn a paramilitary association into an asset.
6.7.1 The PUP and the Ulster Unionist Party
The PUP, along with the UDP, was drawn into the peace process due to their 
connection with loyalist paramilitary groups. As previously discussed they both drew 
on the CLMC ceasefire to show their political legitimacy came from the end of loyalist 
violence. Billy Mitchell's assertion that "we've sheathed the sabre, now they can't 
rattle it any more" 160 is particularly apposite. The ceasefire didn't just mean that 
political representatives of the paramilitaries could claim they were committed to 
constitutional means with credibility. The silence of loyalist guns was also seen as a 
means by which other unionist politicians would be pushed into positive negotiations 
because they could not hide behind threats that engagement with this process would 
result in an increase in violence.
Whilst the DUP's attitude to the process remained antagonistic, the UUP did engage 
and Trimble aligned himself publicly with the UDP and the PUP. Since the end of the 
UDA ceasefire and the increase in incidents linked to the UVF, Trimble has stood by 
the PUP. Their relationship has been made more difficult because of a major difference 
over decommissioning and, as already been shown, individual party members are 
critical of his leadership. However, within the Northern Ireland Assembly they joined 
forced when debating a motion on the exclusion of Sinn Fein. Trimble stated:
160 McKay, S Northern Protestants (Belfast) Blackstaff2002, p61
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I wish to express my appreciation to the PUP for its support of the motion. Some 
people have expressed surprise that we have accepted that support but we are glad 
of it...I have no doubt about the PUP's commitment to exclusively peaceful and 
democratic means. 161
Aughey argues that Trimble has fought against the innate fatalism in unionist political 
culture and instead has adopted a pragmatic and flexible attitude in recognition of the 
fact that "to preserve the old, it is necessary to support the new order". 1162
Trimble's acceptance speech at the Nobel Prize ceremony, acknowledged problems in 
the past, although he encouraged nationalists to do so as well:
As Namier says, the irrational is not necessarily unreasonable. Ulster Unionists, 
fearful of being isolated on the island, built a solid house, but it was a cold house 
for Catholics. And northern nationalists, although they had a roof over their heads, 
seemed to us as if they meant to burn the house down. 163
Aughey identifies a pragmatic new unionism that he links to Trimble. He argues:
Here was Ulster Unionist thinking which implied abandoning majoritarianism 
and embracing pluralism. Interestingly it coincided with a similar reassessment 
taking place within loyalist parties like the PUP. 164
Trimble's criticisms of the past do seem to accord with the PUP critique. Trimble has 
also tried to emphasise that the Good Friday Agreement has delivered tangible benefits 
for unionism. During a debate on the status of the IRA ceasefire in the Assembly he
161 Hansard 8th October 2001. The motion debated was That this Assembly resolves that the political 
party Sinn Fein does not enjoy the confidence of the Assembly because it is not committed to 
non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means'. The motion was recorded as negative - it 
received no nationalist support.
162 Aughey, A 'Learning from The Leopard from Wilford, R (ed) Aspects of the Belfast Agreement 
(Oxford) Oxford University Press 2001, pi89
163 Trimble, D Acceptance Speech For Nobel Peace Prize, 10th December 1998 www.ark.ac.uk
164 Aughey, A 2003 Op. cit, pi90
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stated:
At the outset it is worth recalling our present situation. We should never forget 
that Northern Ireland is clearly a better place to live in today, and we do not 
debate the motion at a time of heightened fear...It is the UUP that has delivered 
this situation. 165
Although the PUP's agenda seems to share many of the positive and pragmatic 
elements of Trimble's defence of involvement in the peace process (and the negative, 
such as attitudes to the Republic of Ireland) there are two problems. Firstly, Trimble's 
brand of unionism is currently in danger of being marginalized. The DUP eclipsed the 
UUP at the 2003 election and UUP MLAs, such as Peter Weir and Jeffrey Donaldson, 
have defected to Paisley's Party. Trimble still faces challenges from within his own 
party, which has never demonstrated unity about the Agreement. Secondly, the 
loosening of the UVF's ceasefire, brings with it the danger of more established 
constitutional unionists feeling the need to distance themselves from the PUP.
The Northern Ireland Minister, Paul Murphy, has argued that loyalist politicians have a 
choice:
They can either choose gangsterism that we have seen in the last number of days, 
or they can choose political loyalism - the loyalism I have been associated with in 
terms of meeting with people over the last number of years - and I think the 
choice is pretty obvious. People have to go down the political road. Gangsterism 
masquerading as loyalism is something we cannot tolerate in Northern Ireland - 
we won't tolerate it. 166
The PUP have reacted angrily to any association with the gangster element of loyalism 
as can be demonstrated in Hutchinson's justification of the UVF decision to break off 
contact with the decommissioning process:
165 Hansard 29th April 2002
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Mr Hutchinson said the vilification and demonization of loyalism continued at 
the same time as the 'politicisation' of republicans, despite the Colombia 
"eco-terrorists", Castlereagh break-in and Stormont spy-ring allegations. The 
articulate voice of loyalism he said, and included former UDP/UDA linked Gary 
McMichael and David Adams along with his own party leader, David Ervine had 
been replaced - with more than a little help in the media by men with dogs in 
t-shirts, a clear reference to now imprisoned Johnny Adair. "We are perceived as 
Neanderthals whose knuckles are trailing the ground. That is not the reality", he 
said. 167
However, the PUP must recognise that they were accommodated within negotiations 
because they, along with the UDP had declared that loyalist political violence was at an 
end. Members are no longer in a position to depict the party as the political force that 
presents the return of physical force. Ervine has argued that "The UVF don't pose a 
specific threat to the peace process and aren't wanting to seek political advantage 
through military action". 168 However, editions of Combat have admitted to attacks in 
North and East Belfast with one article declaring "we are a stronger and more 
disciplined force that will defend the people of Ulster". 1169
The PUP argued that the ceasefire provided sufficient legitimacy to enter Northern Irish 
political life and then sought to develop long-term authority from representing "their" 
community, the loyalist working class. However, without a break-through in electoral 
terms and with the frailty of the UVF's commitment the Agreement the two potential 
sources of legitimacy for the PUP are endangered. The PUP once again put an 
emphasis on passivity, presenting themselves as victims of the media, politicians and 
unseen dark forces. An alliance with Trimble and the UUP negotiation team suggested 
that the PUP could integrate their pragmatic positive stance within the wider agenda of 
a bigger unionist grouping. However, this is also problematic, given the current state of 
the Ulster Unionists.
166 'Loyalists should take political road' www.utv.newsroom 6th February 2003
167 'Hutchinson spells out reason for UVF move' www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk 17th January 2003
168 'US omits terror groups from list' 23rd July 2003 news.bbc.co.uk
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6.7.2 Competition with the Democratic Unionists
Whilst unionists associated with the signing of the Agreement have come up against a 
number of problems, the DUP seem to be increasingly confident that they have been 
proved right. When the PUP launched their 'Yes' campaign at the unfortunately named 
Adair Arms Hotel, their campaign director, Dawn Purvis, expressed confidence that 
opposition to the Agreement could be overcome:
Various people have contacted our offices to complain that they all seem to be 
hearing is negative blustering but that they have been assured that the 'No's will 
burn themselves out very soon. 170
However, the DUP have not burnt out. Instead they have increased their electoral 
support and they became the largest unionist party in the 2003 Assembly elections. In 
the areas where they have fought most fiercely for the same seats as the PUP they have 
cemented their dominance. 171 In the hiatus caused by the suspension of the elections, 
the DUP have presented themselves as the representatives of popular unionist feeling, 
without having to deal with the responsibilities of holding political power. Their 
'common sense' rhetoric centres on the need for fundamental re-negotiation of the 
Agreement. This critique is from Nigel Dodds.
We are almost one year on from the first anniversary of the fourth suspension of 
devolution here. If you bought a new car and it broke down four times in its first 
few years, you would ask for your money back. The unionist people are asking 
for their money back. They want a new agreement. They don't want the old one 
patched up and put on the road again with another inevitable breakdown
172
somewhere on the horizon.
169 'Ulster loyalists admit breach of ceasefire' timesonline.co.uk 1st August 2002
170 PUP Press Statement 5th May 1998 www.pup-ni.org.uk
171 The 1998 Assembly elections gave the DUP 21% of the vote in North Belfast and 31% in East Belfast. 
In 2003 this changed to 34% and 39% respectively www.ark.ac.uk/elections
172 'Dodds calls for 'refund' on Good Friday Agreement' www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk 23rd September 
2003
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DUP politicians have never let up in attacks on the PUP, not just for the support for the 
Agreement but for their paramilitary connections. During the debate on the exclusion of 
Sinn Fein, Peter Robinson, MLA and MP for East Belfast, noted:
There are also those who consider a joint Ulster Unionist/PUP motion to be 
hypocritical. How, they argue, can the UUP table a motion to exclude IRA/Sinn 
Fein while in harness with the PUP... Is the PUP's support for an exclusion 
motion to be taken as a signal that the loyalist paramilitaries who are associated 
with that party are, at last prepared to commence actual decommissioning? If so 
the PUP's support for the motion, in one sense, can be taken as a welcome signal. 
If not, the sincerity of its support for the motion is seriously open to question. 173
Decommissioning as been used by the DUP to demonstrate the hypocrisy of the PUP 
and to underline their lack of constitutional legitimacy. This feeds into the 'gangster' 
image that Bruce argues has always limited the appeal of paramilitary political
174
representatives.
In February 2003 Tony Blair announced a regeneration package for Northern Ireland 
worth three million pounds that he expected "to especially benefit loyalist 
communities". He also said it was important that loyalism found a "proper true and 
political voice" and that he hoped the government would be able to help. 175 Nigel 
Dodds welcomed the package, but he demanded that the money be monitored very 
closely:
What it has to be used for is ensuring that there are people within the community 
who are taking on leadership, who have the skills to advocate for their local 
communities a way forward and don't have to rely on paramilitaries or gangsters 
or local mobsters to do it for them.
173 Hansard 8th October 2001
174 Bruce, S The Red Hand (Oxford) Oxford University Press 1992
175 'Cautious welcome for loyalist initiative' news.bbc.co.uk 6th February 2003
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Once again Dodds was staking his claim to represent the same community as the PUP 
but with greater legitimacy. The lack of a monopoly on loyalist force has allowed the 
gangster allegations to persist and hinders attempts by the PUP to use their paramilitary 
past as a means of enhancing credibility. Added to the PUP's continued support, albeit 
increasingly critical, for the Good Friday Agreement the DUP have been able to assert 
their popular support and legitimacy compared to the gangsters and traitors that have 
competed for their loyalist constituency.
As was noted in the introductory chapters of this thesis both Finlayson and McAuley 
have noted the space created within unionism by the peace process. 177 They have 
argued that new loyalist politicians have had a certain amount of freedom to engage in 
negotiations and political action that challenge the traditional pessimism and 
uncertainty of unionism. The revitalised DUP is looking to end this freedom and curtail 
the challenge of rivals such as the PUP. Wider unionist anxiety about the lack of 
benefits delivered by the Good Friday Agreement has also damned the PUP who are 
associated with strident support of the Agreement and with Trimble, no matter how 
critical they have been with them.
McAuley believes that the DUP has managed to reflect and make use of the most 
problematic outcomes of the Good Friday Agreement:
Any concessions within the political process are seen as a weakening of a core 
identity, a lessening of what it is to be 'British', Protestant and a unionist. This 
reading of contemporary events suggests that their very British identity, 
expressed as either unionism or Protestantism, is under attack. The heart of the 
DUP project continues to frame the conflict in this way and to construct 
discourses that re-emphasize and reinforce the central anxieties of many 
unionists. 178
176 news.bbc.co.uk 6th February 2003 Op. cit.
177 McAuley, J.W. 2003[a] Op. cit, Finlayson, A 1999 Op. cit.
178 McAuley, J.W. 2003 [b] Op. cit, p68
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McGinty and Darby point out that unionists have had to make compromises on current 
and visible issues, whilst nationalists had compromised on more abstract ideas:
Unionists had compromised on prisoner releases, the prospect of major police 
reform, and the entry of republicans into government. Nationalist and 
particularly republican concessions seemed to be of a different order. The 
recognition of the consent principle was somewhat academic given the 
remoteness of a United Ireland in the realm of practical politics. 179
This has meant that DUP politicians can point to a number of betrayals and attacks on 
unionism that are happening now, rather than the issues of sovereignty that more 
positive unionists have tried to present as copper-fastened by the acceptance of the 
consent principle. It is these key issues - prisoners, police and Sinn Fein in government 
- that the DUP has used to constrict the potential space for a rival such as the PUP. 
Given that the PUP also wanted prisoner releases and accepted the logic behind 
demands for police reform, the DUP can point the finger at them directly when looking 
for someone to blame. However, it could also be said that the actions of the PUP and 
the UUP have created space for the DUP in another way.
Both before and after the 2003 Assembly election, pronouncements from the DUP 
suggested that their hour was at hand. Peter Robinson, MLA and MP for East Belfast, 
and deputy leader stated during the campaign:
All and sundry said that negotiations would not follow Assembly elections. 
Nobody who inhabits the real world would now dare argue against the 
proposition that immediately and inevitably after the November 26th poll new 
negotiations will take place. 180
This emphasis on re-negotiation suggested that the DUP was confident that it could 
create a new Agreement that wrote Sinn Fein out of the process. Paisley maintained his
179 McGinty, R & Darby, R Guns and Government: The Management of the Northern Ireland Peace 
Process (Basingstoke) Palgrave 2003, p47
180 'DUP setting the pace in election race - Robinson' www.icnorthernireland.icnetwork.co.uk 3rd 
November 2003
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righteous stance towards republicans, stating bluntly that "the idea that some of the 
party would be part of government with Sinn Fein is a lie. That is a slur on the decency, 
honesty and integrity of my colleagues." 181
However, Peter Robinson's comments are more ambiguous and interesting. After the 
election he said:
I accept that Sinn Finn Fein are likely to be the dominant nationalist party and that 
the system we have in Northern Ireland must recognise that that is the case...If 
[Sinn Fein] become democrats then that's a new set of circumstances. I don't see 
it. There's nothing in their behaviour that suggests they are going to reach that 
stage. 182
Whilst not offering any straightforward measures by which Sinn Fein could become 
sufficiently democratic, Robinson's comments suggest that something could happen to 
cause the DUP to reappraise their assessment of the party. There is an element of 
flexibility. Indeed, when interviewed for Newsnight, Sammy Wilson of the DUP 
stressed that the party did not simply say no to everything, but to crucial issues such as 
being in government with terrorists, prisoner releases and the destruction of the 
RUC. 183 Whatever happens in negotiations about restoring devolution, it is highly 
unlikely that the DUP could ever bring back the RUC or round up all the released 
prisoners. They can say no to the release of prisoners, without having to actually do 
anything about it.
David Ervine has said "I was on my hands and knees with a little two pound club 
hammer breaking the ground that David Trimble could walk on and now I find that 
Peter Robinson is walking on it as well". 184 It was the UUP, UDP and PUP who 
entered the negotiations, made the concessions and signed the Agreement that brought 
about so many painful reforms. Restoring devolution may involve some hard choices
181 The future is orange, Paisley insists' The Guardian 15th November 2003
'We will recognise Sinn Fein's vote: Robinson' www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk 4th December 2003 
Newsnight broadcast on BBC2 15th December 2003
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184 Fortnight Op. cit. 2003, p!6
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for the DUP, but many of the most controversial issues have already been dealt with.
As previously discussed, consociational settlements are argued to encourage ethnic 
outbidding. The DUP has presented itself as the most trenchant defender of the 
unionist community and has exploited the loss and anxiety created by issues such as 
police reform. However, because other unionists made those compromises and 
hammered out a deal with nationalists based on them, the DUP does not have to deal 
with them and does not have to promise to re-open the Maze or disband the PSNI. It 
was the pragmatism and risk-taking of other unionist parties that has given the DUP the 
space to challenge for prominence and, in turn, stifle the greater impulse for change 
within a party like the PUP.
As such it would seem that the PUP's agenda has been hampered by circumstances and
by the actions of other unionists that are beyond their control. However, it is not
enough to say that constitutional uncertainty has restricted the impact of their social
democratic agenda. Whilst the PUP aimed to challenge more established forces within
unionism on issues such as deprivation, it is here where they have revealed themselves
to be closest to the DUP. They have failed to question the assumptions of ethnic
cleansing and nationalist manipulation of socio-economic issues. The DUP utilises
their language of community and seeks to represent the same people, but without the
baggage of paramilitary association. It is this lack of rigour in the PUP's critique of
politics of Northern Ireland and their place within it that also reaffirms the discourse of
betrayal that McAuley has detected within loyalism. 185
The PUP's slogan for the Assembly election was, how long are you prepared to wait for 
benefits for our community? When the results were announced, the PUP website was 
wiped of all information except for contact details and a statement that read:
How long are you prepared to wait? There can be no question that the electorate 
have issued their answer to this question...we can only respect the mandate the 
electorate have delivered but we doubt the outcome will result in any meaningful
1 DC
McAuley, JW What's New about New Lovalism? Conference paper for the University of Salford 
20th November 2000
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change that enhances the prospects of working class unionists. 186
The tone was one of injured pride and a certain wry sadness on behalf of the electorate. 
Throughout the election campaign the PUP had acted with this sense of noble sacrifice, 
Ervine arguing "we have set our stall out. We shall be respected for our honesty". 187 
After the election he argued, "when a prime minister treats you with irrelevance and the 
media treats you with irrelevance you can hardly blame the electorate for treating you 
any other way. 188
However, that election slogan reveals a problem with the PUP's presentation of its 
agenda. It is unclear what community is being referred to - the unionist community as a 
whole, specific loyalist communities or just the local community within the 
constituency being contested. The PUP has failed to package its notion of community 
in an attractive way, much as it failed with its exploration of Irish-ness. The 
ascendancy of the DUP has curtailed the freedom of the PUP to champion the salience 
of political issues that don't relate to the constitution or the Agreement. However, 
acceptance of notions such as ethnic cleansing have meant that the PUP has itself not 
moved far enough from the DUP's pessimistic world view.
6.8 Conclusion
McAuley believes that the PUP have embarked on a project of reassessment, which 
requires rethinking of traditional unionist discourses. He argues that "central to this has 
been the challenge offered by new loyalism to the authority of the established unionist 
political leadership and to some of the core ongoing discourses within unionism". 189 In 
many ways the PUP were responding to similar changes within the established 
leadership of the UUP. Now both parties seemed to have been marginalized by the 
DUP's victory. The DUP have been able to criticise the PUP both for maintaining a
186 www.pup-ni.org.uk 28th November 2003
187 'Election 2003: East Belfast - Unionists square up for battle' www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk 8th 
November 2003
188 Fortnight January 2004 Op. cit, pi6
189 McAuley, J.W. 2003, p!04
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link with violence through the UVF and for making common cause with the established 
UUP.
Little argues that:
The realm of formal politics in Northern Ireland has been dominated by middle 
class representatives who have been somewhat distanced from the communities 
that have experienced the brunt of political violence, antagonism and conflict. 
This is important because many in these deprived communities question the 
legitimacy of the political institutions and agreements that have been forged by 
the political elites. 190
The PUP have sought to speak for these deprived communities whilst playing a part in 
the forging of the very institutions that Little perceives as alienating. Inequality and 
deprivation persist in Northern Ireland and are accompanied by increasing polarisation 
and segregation. The PUP believed that they could gain a place within the new 
institutions as representatives of the loyalist working class, which they pictured as an 
identifiable community.
The party has been hampered by the fact that the DUP have refused to fade away but 
instead have gained in popularity. They are also at a disadvantage because their 
republican sparring partners have massively outstripped them in terms of electoral 
success. Some of the 'bread and butter' issues which both Sinn Fein and the PUP could 
group around, such as housing, have proved to be the most contentious and divisive, 
which has serious implications for the PUP's concept of conflict transformation.
The final problem for the PUP is the fact that without an increased electoral mandate 
their place in government becomes more dependent on the UVF ceasefire. This is 
becoming increasingly frail and, in addition to this, the activities of the LVF and UDA 
show that no one organisation has a monopoly on loyalist violence. Given the emphasis 
on passivity and victimhood that occurs within PUP critiques of Northern Ireland, past
190 Little A 'The problems of antagonism: applying liberal political theory to conflict in Northern 
Ireland' British Journal of Politics and International Relations Vol.5 No.3 August 2003, p378-9
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and present, there is a danger that party members will now fail to challenge the 
limitations of their own project and will instead blame neglectful or nefarious forces 




CONCLUSION; HOW NEW IS NEW LOYALISM?
7.1 Introduction
New loyalism, as defined in this work, is taken to mean a style of politics that is 
designed to secure the union by enhancing the quality of life of all those who live within 
it. Therefore it is envisaged that new loyalist politicians would demonstrate optimism 
about the future of the union and confidence about dealing with the key actors in any 
round of negotiations on the subject; the nationalist community and the British and 
Irish governments. It is also a style of politics that is committed to eroding the binary 
split between loyal and disloyal and to encouraging a commitment to forging 
cross-community alliances based on social and economic issues. This definition fits 
with the positive model of new loyalism, which, along with a corresponding negative 
model was used to test the so-called new loyalist parties, the UDP and the PUP.
This chapter will begin with a summary of the hypothesis and the methodology 
governing this thesis. Conclusions will then be drawn as to the novelty of the "new" 
loyalist projects of both the UDP and the PUP. It will be argued that, whilst the PUP do 
not fully correspond to the positive model of new loyalism, their programme is closer 
than the UDP and that this can be attributed to "the people" that both parties imagined 
themselves as speaking for.]
7.2 Hypothesis
It has been suggested by McAuley and Finalyson that the peace process created space 
for a loyalist alternative to the DUP to emerge. For example, McAuley argues:
Perhaps one of the most striking developments surrounding the PUP is not what 
they are saying (this has been reasonably consistent since the mid-1980s), but, 
rather, the ideological space which has been created within unionism and
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loyalism to allow the PUP to openly express and find support for such notions. 1
There are many factors that have combined to curtail this space for an exploration of 
ideas. In particular the ongoing anxiety over the intentions and actions of the republican 
movement has reinforced the fear of many unionists that they have made all the 
concessions without any tangible and significant reward.
However, the hypothesis that governs this work centres on internal factors. It was 
posited that there were a number of internal tensions or contradictory impulses within 
new loyalism. These tensions would have to be resolved in order for a new loyalist 
party to contribute to the creation of a civic unionism that would aid the development of 
a normalised politics within Northern Ireland.
What this hypothesis meant in terms of the UDP and PUP was that new loyalism 
needed to mark a progression from populist resistance to the unionist hierarchy, which 
did not combated sectarianism. New loyalist politicians also needed to develop a 
sophisticated analysis of how sectarianism could be marginalised rather than assume 
that exploring other political identities or focusing on material need would 
automatically provide a substitute for sectarianism.
7.3 Methodology
In order to test the hypothesis, two models of new loyalism were constructed against 
which the UDP and the PUP could be assessed. One was a positive model in which new 
loyalism represented a significant progression from previous attempts to sideline 
sectarianism in loyalist politics. It would be more accepting of diversity within 
Northern Ireland and open to debate that could undermine binary ideas of identity, 
where Protestant and Catholic equalled loyal and disloyal. This progression would be 
encapsulated in the belief that the best way to secure the future of the union would be to 
improve the quality of life within it through co-operation with nationalists at both the
1 McAuley, JW The emergence of new loyalism' from Coakley, J ed Changing Shades of Orange and 
Green: Redefining the Union and Nation in Contemporary Ireland (Dublin) UCD 2003. pi 10 See also 
Finlayson, A 'Loyalist political identity after peace' Capital and Class No.69 1999, p47-76
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elite and grassroots level. This would entail the development of a manifesto that 
addressed social and economic needs. For this new loyalist model to be genuinely new 
it would have to attract more electoral support than politicians with paramilitary 
connections did in the 1970s. This positive model amounts to a definition of new 
loyalism.
The negative model presented the novelty of new loyalism as a surface deep series of 
changes that masked negativity about the future of unionism, concerns over the 
precarious existence of loyalists in Northern Ireland and hostility and mistrust towards 
nationalists and outside political forces such as the British government.
The positive and negative models of new loyalism were developed through two 
separate literature reviews. The first sought definitions of unionism and loyalism, and 
areas of novelty within new loyalism. The areas identified were a re-interpretation of 
the Stormont era; confidence about the future of the union; a break with the binary 
representation of Protestant and Catholic as loyal and disloyal; and a new approach to 
social and economic issues that could promote common cause with nationalists. The 
potential in this positive style of politics came in part from the opportunities it 
presented for pushing the 'no' unionism of the DUP to the margins.
A strong indicator of the success of this project would be electoral support. Securing an 
increasing share of the vote would enhance the claim of these parties to speak for their 
communities, as well as showing a practical improvement on previous attempts by 
paramilitaries to become elected representatives. It could also serve as an indicator that 
the message of these parties, that negotiation and compromise with nationalists could 
have positive outcomes for unionism, had been accepted by those who did not 
undertake the personal rethink that PUP and UDP leaders did, necessitated by being 
imprisoned by the state they had broken the law to defend.
The second literature review highlighted debates relating to communal and individual 
rights. The Good Friday Agreement, to which the PUP and UDP were signatories, was 
drawn up from consociational principles. Critiques of consociationalism centre on
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arguments that such settlements encourage division and intransigence. More positive 
interpretations, such as those found in the work of McGarry and O'Leary, identity a 
"consociational paradox" whereby the political recognition of cultural differences 
within a state is the first step to defusing their salience. 2
What became apparent from this literature review was that it was impossible to judge 
the merits of any attempts to mediate division and/or conflict through constitutional 
change without considering the actions of politicians working within that framework. 
Porter's work suggested one way in which unionists could respond to the challenges of 
the concept of parity esteem as embodied in the Good Friday Agreement and as 
accepted by Northern Irish nationalists and the British and Irish governments. This was 
through the development of a civic unionism that "anticipates a way of life in which the 
British-ness and Irish-ness of Northern Ireland are recognised and structures of 
democracy and justice are established". 3
Considering Porter's work it is apparent that his own models of unionism are very 
prescriptive and that his discussion of civil society seems to separate it entirely from the 
division between nationalists and unionists. In addition, he acknowledges that his 
project of reconciliation rests on a classical republican theory of citizenship, whereas 
other literature on citizenship and civil society suggests that it is hard to quantify the 
benefits of a high level of political participation.4 However, three aspects of Porter's 
model of civic unionism were identified as relevant to the positive model of new 
loyalism: a concern with social justice; a willingness to engage in debate with 
challengers; and an acceptance that holding an Irish national identity is not tantamount 
to disloyalty. These complemented the tenets of a genuine new loyalism generated from 
the first literature review and allowed for the construction of the models by which the 
new loyalist parties and their political forebears could be tested.
McGarry, J 'Northern Ireland, civic nationalism and the Good Friday Agreement' from McGarry, J (ed) 
Northern Ireland and the Divided World (Oxford) Oxford University Press 2001, pi24
3 Porter, N Rethinking Unionism (Belfast) Blackstaff 1996, pi 1
See for example: Walzer, M 'Citizenship' from Ball, T Farr, J & Hanson, R Political Innovation and 
Conceptual Change (Cambridge) Cambridge University Press 1989 pp211-219 Kymlicka, 
W & Norman, W 'Return of the citizen: a survey of recent work on citizenship theory' Ethics Vol 104. 
no.2pp352-381
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The third element of the methodology, after these literature reviews, was the collection 
of primary data on the parties themselves. This data collection ended up being 
weighted towards the PUP. This was partly because PUP members agreed to take part 
in qualitative semi-structured interviews, but also because, with two members sitting in 
the Northern Ireland Assembly, the party's contribution to debate was recorded in 
minutes of Assembly proceedings.
7.4 Testing New Loyalism
The first three chapters of the thesis were dedicated to constructing the framework for 
testing new loyalism. The fourth chapter dealt with forerunners to the PUP and UDP, 
in terms of attempts by unionist politicians to find positive ways to accommodate 
nationalists and secure the union. These projects were the civic unionism of Terence 
O'Neill, the NILP's social democratic critique of the Unionist government, and the first 
political initiatives undertaken by the UVF and UDA. These will now be summarised 
in turn.
7.4.1 O'Neillism and the Northern Ireland Labour Party
The 1960s promised to mark a new era in Northern Ireland. The IRA abandoned its 
border campaign in 1962 and this seemed to create the space for projects that could 
make the constitutional issue marginal to Northern Irish political activity. O'Neill 
presented himself as a modernizer. His mission to revitalise the Northern Irish 
economy was spurred by the need to maintain support amongst the Protestant working 
class. However, he believed that economic growth would have the side benefit of 
bringing Catholics into the mainstream of Northern Irish society. This would require 
no adjustment in terms of political institutions or security arrangements; rather gestures 
of reconciliation would be sufficient.
O'Neill's faith in the power of civil society to generate common civic virtue was 
demonstrated by his commitment to civic weeks and the Project to Enlist the People
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(PEP). O'Neill's project was very much a top-down one, where his magnanimity 
towards Catholics would be an example that could be followed by the lower orders. His 
analysis of the division in Northern Ireland came from his belief that Catholics could be 
brought up to the level of civilisation set by a civic Northern Ireland, hence his belief 
that "if you treat Roman Catholics with due consideration and kindness, they will live 
like Protestants in spite of the authoritative nature of their church". 5 He believed 
Catholics had deliberately isolated themselves within Northern Ireland arguing that 
"where there is apartheid in our society it comes almost entirely from a voluntary 
separation from the mainstream of public and social life. This starts at an early age with 
the insistence that certain children cannot attend state schools". 6
O'Neill's project was seen as such a threat to the future of Northern Ireland that it 
encouraged the entrance of an outsider like lan Paisley into the mainstream and shaped 
the actions of the founders of the new UVF. However, his version of civic unionism 
was in fact very timid. His certainty that Catholics had marginalized themselves meant 
he had no willingness to consider any other reasons for abstentionism and isolationism. 
His faith in the power of civil society was a means by which he could resist institutional 
change. His commitment to modernization substituted any need to address issues of 
social and economic inequality in the province. O'Neill envisaged civil society as the 
place where the virtues of active citizenship could be developed in such a manner as to 
provide new legitimacy for the state. However, he was unwilling to reform that state in 
order to remove inequalities between these citizens and he was unable to deal with the 
demands generated by nationalists through the civil rights movement.
The Northern Ireland Labour Party challenged the dominance of the Unionist Party 
during this period but they were destroyed by the re-emergence of conflict at the end of 
the decade. The NILP manifestos centred on issues such as continuing high 
unemployment and attacked the Unionist Party for incompetence and high-handedness. 
After the IRA's border campaign was abandoned, many NILP members committed 
themselves to increasing their Catholic support base as well as their Protestant one. 
The NILP represent a nearer ancestor of new loyalists than O'Neill because of the
5 Interview with Terence O'Neill Belfast Telegraph 10th May 1969 www.ark.ac.uk
6 O'Neill, T Ulster at the Crossroads (London) Faber and Faber 1969, pi21
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party's emphasis on class as an important political cleavage in Northern Ireland, and a 
faith in the realignment of political activity from constitutional to social and economic 
issues. The NILP was also confident that it was important to mount an electoral battle 
that meant it would be fighting for the same votes as the Unionist Party. However, the 
onset of conflict revealed the fragility of the party's support base. It was not just that 
Protestant working class voters rallied to the defence of the union or blamed the NILP 
for its association with the British Labour Party.
The problem for the NILP was that both unionists and nationalist members could still 
continue to proclaim the importance of class politics, but the former directed this 
towards integration with Britain and British labour organisations, whilst the latter 
looked towards Irish labourism. There was no intrinsic reason why socialism would 
keep the two factions together in the face of constitutional turmoil.
7.4.2 The UVF and the UDA
After the success of the Ulster Workers' Council strike in May 1974, there was a drive 
towards political action by the leadership of the UDA and UVF. There was a genuine 
sense that loyalism lacked a political voice and it was legitimate to challenge the 
unionist hierarchy, even while the future of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the 
United Kingdom looked so uncertain. There was also a need to augment the legitimacy 
of the paramilitary organisations. The UVF took the conventional political party route, 
founding the VPP in 1974. The UDA, under the leadership of Andy Tyrie, involved 
itself in grassroots activities and in constitutional debate, which centred on the idea of a 
civic Ulster nation. However, by the end of the 1970s John McMichael had steered the 
UDA towards the formation of a political party, the ULDP
During the 1970s these political activities laid the foundations for the PUP and UDP. 
They encouraged debate on the diversity of identity within Northern Ireland. These 
developments also signified confidence that a constitutional settlement could be 
established that accommodated all residents of Northern Ireland. There was also a
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willingness to criticise unionist politicians for ignoring social and economic issues. In 
addition, for many paramilitaries in prison, especially within the UVF, there was a 
willingness to engage in debate with republicans and search for a sense of common 
interest.
These initiatives did not accord with the positive model of new loyalism for a number 
of reasons. Paramilitary political representatives performed poorly in elections. 
Furthermore, political debate about establishing common cause with nationalists did 
not direct the UVF and the UDA away from violence, and attacks on Catholic civilians 
continued. Indeed many within these organisations were openly hostile to political 
activity and resented what they saw as the hijacking of military groupings. These 
initiatives also faltered because the paramilitaries were restricted in their room for 
manouevre by other events and actors in Northern Ireland. Mainstream unionist 
politicians, who publicly rejected illegitimate force, managed to re-establish 
themselves after the strike. The British government bolstered the established security 
forces, which affected the paramilitary role of defender. Republicans exploited the 
special category protests and the international reaction to the death of their hunger 
strikers made it difficult for loyalist prisoners to continue their process of debate, even 
though many of them had a strong measure of empathy.
However, one of the key weaknesses of these first political steps, which meant that they 
corresponded to the negative model of new loyalism, was the lack of sophistication and 
depth to this work. The UDA's one big idea was an independent Ulster. Even though 
they retreated from the idea of full independence, they remained associated with the 
idea of an isolated Ulster, which appealed to neither nationalists nor unionists. The 
VPP was formed without a manifesto and disintegrated after its failure to get elected. 
In addition, the existence of two separate paramilitary organisations, which pursued 
separate political paths, lessened the possibilities for a coherent Protestant working 
class organisation and promoted discord, even to the point of murderous feuding. This 
problem still affects loyalist paramilitaries and their political representatives.
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7.5 The UDP and the PTIP
The previous two chapters have assessed the agendas of the UDP and their successors 
the UPRG, and of the PUP. There have been a number of problems that have faced 
both groupings. As Rowan notes "after the ceasefires of 1994, the loyalist parties did 
build on their electoral mandate, but it was a case of baby steps, rather than giant 
strides". This slow improvement was halted as the wider unionist community turned 
against the Good Friday Agreement. McAuley points out that "the PUP has had 
difficulty in continuing to convince its core support that the peace process has 
delivered". The UDP had in fact already failed to establish a significant level of core 
support, even amongst the UDA. Crawford argues that there was always a strong 
degree of ambivalence about the peace process, given that the aggressive UDA of the 
early 1990s had struck at the IRA so successfully. 9
The PUP managed the first hurdle of the 1998 Assembly election. However, the party 
lost support, and one seat, at the 2003 election. McAuley notes that the pluralism of the 
PUP and their allies within the UUP has been restricted by the "continued 
reconstruction of the traditional hegemonic unionist bloc around the DUP". 10 The PUP 
has also been affected by the strength of Sinn Fein, who far exceed the PUP in electoral 
terms, representing the fact that they have been able to take "their" people with them. 
The PUP is not in a position to battle with Sinn Fein as the respective representatives of 
loyalist and republican blocs.
Despite the problems the PUP have faced they have not yet been excluded from the 
political mainstream and their agenda has shown itself to be more sophisticated than 
anything produced by the UDP or UPRG. The reason for this difference lies in the 
'people' that both groupings have purported to speak for. The UDP moved away from 
ideas of independence. However, it was still based on the idea of a distinctive Ulster 
identity, which linked it to the original political activities of the UDA. Likewise the
7 Rowan. B Armed Peace: Life and Death After the Ceasefires (Edinburgh) Mainstream Publishing 2003. 
P72
8 McAuley, JW 'Unionism's last stand? Contemporary unionist politics and identity in Northern Ireland 
Global Review of Ethno Politics Vol.3 No.l, p62
9 Crawford, C Inside the UDA (London) Pluto 2003
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PUP continued to focus on class, which had been the main focus of any UVF political 
initiatives. The PUP have moved their class politics towards a discussion of 
community and still eschew ideas of an Ulster nation.
7.5.1 The UDA's Civic Ulster
By the time the UDP had entered the peace process, the party had moderated the 
original plans for an Independent Ulster to the championing of a distinctive Ulster 
identity. What remained was the belief laid out in the NUPRG discussions of the 1970s 
that "the only common denominator that Ulster people have whether they be Catholic 
or Protestant is that they are Ulstermen". 11 The commitment to an independent Ulster 
stemmed in part from the belief that "it will encourage the development of a common 
identity between all of our people regardless of religion". 12 Even after the idea of 
independence was downgraded, due to its palpable unpopularity, the belief in a 
common civic identity persisted.
This civic Ulster was consciously modeled on the United States of America. Civic 
institutions such as an assembly and a constitution would be complemented by a secular 
education system. The consensus created by constitutional change would enable 
politicians to tackle "the real enemies which confront and terrorise the whole 
community - social deprivation, economic recession, unemployment, the need for 
more housing and the breakdown of respect for law and order". 13 This would mean that 
civic citizenship would be enhanced by a diminution of social inequality.
As Kymlicka has pointed out it is erroneous to presume that liberal states are 
completely neutral in the sense that there is often an ethnic base to the official civic 
culture. 14 Whilst the UDA was constructing an ideal of a civic modern state, members
'°McAuley, JW2003,p70
" Glen Barr quoted in Bruce, S The Red Hand (Oxford) Oxford University Press 1992, p231
12 NUPRG Constitutional Proposals 1979
13 UPRG Common Sense 1987
14 Kymlicka, W 'the new debate over minority rights' from Requenjo, F (ed) Democracy and National
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were also influenced by ideas of the Cruthin and an ancient ethnic belonging to Ulster. 
The UDP entered negotiations for a settlement that accepted the need for political and 
cultural recognition of two national identities. It did not respond to this new challenge 
by developing its manifesto either by reformulating the significance of an Ulster 
identity in this bi-national context, or by enhancing its stance on social and economic 
issues, which remained a populist one. The emphasis on a separate sense of Ulster-ness 
failed to attract nationalist or unionist support.
It could be suggested that the UDA was singularly unsuited to its proposed civic 
nationalist programme. The UDA remained an association, a loose affiliation of 
members and units. In contrast, although the UVF was not quite the tight-knit military 
outfit its self-image suggested, it was a more organised and defined group. The UVF 
were also keener from the start to engage with institutions of the state, for example 
through the formation of a political party rather than a research group. It was 
acknowledged in Common Sense that a civic settlement rested in institutions and a 
written constitution. However, the nebulous decentralized nature of the UDA means 
that it is more suited to an ethnic idea of the nation where sovereignty cannot be fully 
vested in anything but the people. This legitimates populism and exclusivity. It is this 
fundamental base of all political activity associated with the UDA that means it has 
always gravitated towards the negative model of new loyalism. This was true of the 
UDP, but is especially so in respect of the current UPRG, which is particularly lacking 
in coherence and substance. It means that the UDA has remained connected to the 
highly conditional loyalty that denotes traditional loyalism. 15
7.5.2 The PUP and the Community
The PUP's alignment to a community rather than a nation does represent a development 
from original UVF thinking. Given the decline of the manufacturing industry in 
Northern Ireland the emphasis on community reveals an understanding of social and 
economic change and allows for a political platform that goes beyond the imagined 
constituency of male manual workers in unionised industrial locations.
Pluralism (London) Routledge 1991
15 Miller, D Queen's Rebels (Dublin) Gill and MacMillan 1978
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Ruane and Todd argue that
New loyalism presents itself as a genuine attempt at reconciliation which breaks 
with the view of irreconcilable communal conflict. But opposition to nationalism 
and republicanism remains intense and the conciliatory and egalitarian image 
fractures under pressure. 16
In the case of the PUP this is a simplistic analysis. As Ruane and Todd themselves 
acknowledge "the provisions of the Agreement do not tackle local level 
sectarianism". 17 The PUP concept of conflict transformation was meant to serve as a 
means of dealing with this issue. Conflict transformation acknowledged that division 
and antagonism remained but the concept demonstrated a belief that conflict over 
constitutional aspirations could be transformed into peaceful political activity. The 
PUP could therefore be quite open about their hostility to the ideals of republicanism. 
At the same time the party could forge alliances between what they saw as their 
community and the community spoken for by Sinn Fein. This would be achieved by 
encouraging realignment around social and economic issues.
Given that consociational settlements concentrate on accommodation of elites, the 
PUP's emphasis on community and grassroots politics provides a means by which 
cross-cutting cleavages could be encouraged from the bottom up. Conflict 
transformation represents both a pragmatic and imaginative framework for PUP 
alliances with Sinn Fein because it allows them to work with republicans on social and 
economic issues whilst still speaking for 'their' side of the divide. Sinn Fein and the 
PUP's mutual support in the area of education policy is a demonstration that this 
approach can be successful.
However, the flaw in this concept stems from the fact that some social and economic 
issues are not seen as separate from constitutional issues. In particular the provision of
16 Ruane, J & Todd, J The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland (Cambridge) University Press 1996, 
p!06
17 Ruane, J & Todd, J After the Good Friday Agreement: Analysing Political Change in Northern Ireland 
(Dublin) University College Dublin Press 1999, p27
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social housing, because of its association with territory, is an issue that generates 
antagonism between the communities that the PUP and Sinn Fein seek to represent. 
PUP members need to revise their understanding of ethnic cleansing' of loyalist areas 
if they are to transcend sectarianism and challenge Sinn Fein's analysis, which also 
rests on victimhood.
The PUP has been constrained by external factors, particularly increasing unionist 
disaffection as regards the Good Friday Agreement. This has affected the PUP's ability 
to challenge the DUP. The DUP won their first urban Westminster seat in 1979 in East 
Belfast. It is here that the PUP's most visible and charismatic senior figure, David 
Ervine, has stood for election. The PUP gained 10 per-cent of the vote in the 1996 
Forum elections and in the 1998 Assembly elections this rose to 14 per-cent. However, 
by the 2003 election this had slipped back to 10 per-cent. Meanwhile the DUP's vote 
has increased from 29 per-cent in the Forum elections to 31 per-cent in 1998 to 39 
per-cent in 2003. 18
The Good Friday Agreement has changed the parameters in which the DUP formulates 
its message. The emphasis is not on sovereignty but on the internal elements that 
constitute the human rights agenda of Sinn Fein. The recent success of the DUP in the 
2003 Assembly elections demonstrates that their common-sense worldview resonates 
with voters who have not previously given the party their support. The DUP have been 
able to exploit an interpretation of post-Agreement politics that seems logical to a group 
adjusting to a consociational settlement. If Sinn Fein have used their position in the 
negotiating process as leverage why not vote for the DUP who seem to be the only 
unionist party prepared to do the same for their community?
This suggests that external pressures have curtailed the PUP. However, it is apparent 
that internal tensions and contradictory impulses are at work and that presenting the 
PUP as victims of ethnic outbidding is too simplistic. The PUP accepted the need for 
police reform as part a new post-Agreement society. When interviewed for this thesis, 
Ervine said the emotional impact and sense of loss generated by police reform had to be 
expected but he asked "why is it that all of these quite expected things shock us, annoy
18 www.ark.ac.uk/elections
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us, upset us? Because people claim different and that's the difference" 19
However Ervine also argued that nationalists had unbalanced this process of reform by 
demanding single constituency benefits which "destablises the other side". 20 As has 
already been discussed, he has made public statements that suggest republican are 
making ever increasing demands as regards policing when he could have tried to sell 
the idea that Sinn Fein have in fact been forced to compromise in this area, whatever 
their rhetoric.
McAuley and McCormack argue that the DUP have had to work hard to maintain their 
urban support base and have therefore needed to address social and economic issues. 21 
This is another area where the PUP has sought to represent their potential electorate. 
However, party members need to challenge some of their own assumptions about the 
social democratic programme that they believe can transcend sectarianism at the local 
level. As Shirlow points out, conflict at interface areas encourages people to view their 
communities as pure and homogenous and to intimidate and even physically attack 
those on their own side who challenge this view. 22 If the PUP continues to accept the 
'ethnic cleansing' explanation for why violence occurs in situations like this their 
vision of their community cannot develop in terms of acknowledging internal diversity.
7.6 What's New about New Loyalism?
There was no obligation for those who took up arms in defence of Ulster in the 1970s 
and 1980s to rethink their position or make any contribution to the political life of 
Northern Ireland. Emerson's review of a biography of David Ervine notes:
Reviewing Ervine's contribution in one volume is sobering. It bids the question: 
'if only our elected representatives had such imagination'. But then the question
19 Interview with David Ervine 30th April 2003
20 Interview with David Ervine 30 Ih April 2003
21 McAuley, JW and McCormack, C 'The Protestant working class and the state in Northern Ireland 
since 1930''a problematic relationship' from Hutton, S and Stewart, S Ireland's Histories: Aspects of 
State. Society and Ideology (London) Routledge 1991
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turns around 'if only people with such imagination could get elected' and we're 
back to square one. Ervine could make his remarkable personal journey but he 
couldn't bring enough people with him. 23
The story of politicians such as David Ervine.and Billy Hutchinson suggest that the 
term new loyalism is really just the story of personal transformation. Only a tiny 
section of the loyalist community underwent their experiences of paramilitary activity 
and subsequent imprisonment. And only a handful of these people undertook to use 
these experiences as the beginning of a search for genuine rapprochement with 
nationalists. For new loyalism to be more than this the UDP and the PUP needed to 
develop a coherent manifesto, which would help marginalise sectarianism as an 
organising principle of loyalist political activity, and they needed to attract support for 
this in the form of votes.
What is clear is that during the period of the peace process and the signing of the Good 
Friday Agreement is that the PUP had developed a more comprehensive socialist 
manifesto than the original VPP and that the party had responded to changes in 
Northern Irish society such as the entry of women into the workforce. The UDP did 
not develop from populism and Ulster separatism in the same way.
However, the PUP has yet to fully correspond with the positive model of new loyalism. 
The party's challenge to the DUP has not succeeded and Paisley's party seems to be 
stronger than ever, although it cannot undo all the changes that the PUP, UDP and UUP 
accepted as part of a new constitutional settlement. The PUP also failed to establish a 
strong electoral base and has faced setbacks in this area. Finally, the party needs to be 
more critical about how members have dealt with social and economic issues. This said 
the PUP has shown itself capable of pragmatism, clear-headedness and imagination and 
may in a future period of stability be able to develop its project further in the direction 
of a confident and sophisticated new loyalist politics.
:: Shirlow, P 'Who fears to speak?' Global Review of Ethno-Politics Vol.3 No.l 2003 





1. Michael Acheson, Billy Mitchell and Joan Totten 12th March 2001 
Michael Acheson and Billy Mitchell are both former members of the UVF who have 
served life sentences for murder. They are both members of the PUP Executive. Joan 
Totten is a community worker who serves as secretary of the Oldpark branch of the 
PUP. She joined the party in 1997. Michael Acheson joined in 1996 and Billy Mitchell 
was a founder member of the PUP, which was formed in 1977.
2. Wilson Me Arthur 13th March 2001
At the time of this interview, Wilson McArthur was a full-time worker for the PUP at
the party's office in Stormont. Rejoined the party in 1996.
3. Paul Ferguson 13th March 2001
Paul Ferguson is a former employee of the electronics factory, Shorts. He is a member
of the PUP executive. He joined the party in 1998.
4. Eddie Kinner 14th March 2001
Eddie Kinner is a former member of the UVF who served a life sentence for murder. He
works as an IT officer and serves on the PUP executive. He joined the party in 1993.
5. Eileen Ward 14th March 2001
Eileen Ward manages the office at the PUP's headquarters on the Shankill Road. At the 
time of this interview she was also reading for a Women's Studies degree at Queen's 
University, Belfast. She joined the party in 1995.
6.Paul Morrow 20th August 2001
Paul Morrow is the PUP's website manager. At the time of this interview he was
unemployed. He joined the party in 1998.
7.Billy Hutchinson 13th January 2002
Billy Hutchinson is a former UVF member who served a life sentence for murder. At 
the time of this interview he was MLA for North Belfast, although he lost his seat in the 
2003 Assembly elections. He remains a councillor in the same area. He joined the party 
in 1992.
8. William 'Plum' Smith 18th January 2002
William Smith is a former UVF member who served a life sentence for murder. He 
works for EPIC, a charitable organisation that aids former loyalist paramilitary 
prisoners in their civilian lives. He is a founder member and Chairman of the PUP.
9.Hugh Smyth 23rd January 2002
Hugh Smyth is the PUP's longest-serving elected representative of the PUP. Before the 
formation of the party he had also been elected as an independent to the power-sharing 
assembly set-up by the Sunningdale Agreement, and he was a founder member of the 
PUP. At the time of this interview he was still the party's leader. He stepped down in 
April 2002 but remains a councillor for the Shankill ward in West Belfast.
294
10. Dawn Purvis 16th September 2002
At the time of this interview Dawn Purvis worked in the PUP's Stormont office, whilst 
completing a politics degree at Queen's University Belfast. She joined the party in 1994 
She stood (unsuccessfully) in East Belfast for the PUP at the 1998 Assembly elections 
and in the 2001 council elections. She directed the PUP's 'vote yes' campaign in the 
1998 referendum and is a member of the PUP executive.
11. David Rose 17th September 2002
David Rose is a deputy-headmaster at a state secondary school in Bangor, County 
Down. He joined the party in 1997. He became Deputy Leader of the PUP in April 
2002. F
12. Robin Stewart 17th January 2003
At the time of this interview, Robin Stewart was working as a volunteer in the East 
Belfast constituency office. Formerly he was a press officer for the PUP and an 
unsuccessful candidate in the local government elections in 2001. He ioined the party in 
1997. v y
13.David Ervine 30th April 2003
David Ervine succeeded Hugh Smyth to the post of Party Leader. He is also an MLA
and a councillor for East Belfast. He was a member of the UVF and was sentenced to
eleven years in 1974 after being stopped with a bomb in his car. He joined the party in
1984.
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